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One of the most significant and sustained intellectual efforts of our age 
concerns the human/animal distinction, or, to be more precise, its radical 
destabilization and displacement. Various disciplines have contributed 
findings of animal species exhibiting capacities and qualities once posited to be 
essential and exclusive to the human, thereby eroding the porous borders that 
we have constructed to separate and sharply delimit ourselves in opposition 
to other animals. Long lists of extensive studies enumerate mental phenomena 
possessed by animals, including the capacity to use tools, generate causal 
hypotheses from particular events, inhabit the experiential perspectives of 
others, and navigate spatial complexities.1 Pro-animal philosophers have 
predominantly utilized this breakdown in support of an interest-based ethics 
grounded in an ontology of gradual biologistic continuism that regards 
humans and animals as equal co-participants in the evolutionary process, 
with distinctions between them being a matter of degree rather than kind. 
These theorists follow through on the ethical implications of deep continuity 
in respect of ethically relevant capacities and traits by calling for recognition 
and application of the principle that similar interests warrant equal ethical 
consideration. This principle maintains that all individuals’ similar interests 
(for example, in not suffering or being confined) should feature equally in our 
ethical deliberations, regardless of who or what the individual is. From this 
perspective, sound ethical reasoning would dictate that arbitrary disregard for 
1 Martha Nussbaum “The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements” in Beauchamp T and 





the interests of other animals based on their species (speciesism)2 constitutes 
unjustifiable prejudice in the same way that arbitrary contempt for the 
interests of humans based on ethically irrelevant characteristics like race or 
gender (racism or sexism) constitutes unjustifiable discrimination. Relying 
on continuity theses and the condition of communal interests, these theorists 
ultimately regard themselves as exposing a shared fundamental identity 
or subjectivity that can be utilized to represent and protect the interests of 
animals in various paradigms.
I find this dominant approach to animal ethics to be theoretically and 
ethically problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the emphasis on speciesism 
as irrational or inconsistent ethical behavior that can be solely or primarily 
remedied through sound reasoning fails to adequately frame and address 
the complexity of the pertinent issues at stake in the contestation of animal 
subjugation. Rather than being primarily exponible in terms of irrational beliefs 
and practices, the subjugated status of the animal is the result of complex 
schemata of power and domination that span numerous historical, institutional, 
and cultural discourses and practices. As some philosophers have rigorously 
argued, our subjugating superiority over other animals is intrinsically tied 
to our historicity, sociality, and indeed what is considered to fundamentally 
constitute us as human. A destabilization of this complex oppressive schema 
would require fundamental changes across various discourses and institutions 
and accordingly necessitates a rigorous deconstruction of the socio-historical 
processes, relations and conditions that configure our identity. Power relations 
in the history of Western culture have almost never been constructed on 
grounds of biological species per se and have, on the contrary, consistently 
2 The term “speciesism” is most commonly associated with utilitarian philosopher and bioethicist 
Peter Singer, who analogizes discrimination based on species membership to (the thinking or 
worldview that undergirds and ultimately effects) racism and sexism. He argues that “[r]acists 
violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own 
race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists 
violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists 
allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other 
species”. Peter Singer Animal	Liberation 4th ed (Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 2009) 9.
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oppressed large sections of humanity.3 Dominant perspectives on ethics and 
community have unfolded in relation to capacities and traits considered to 
be quintessentially human, and emanating hegemony has always been wielded 
at the expense of large subsets of the human race and animals alike.4 The 
approach of locating these capacities or traits among animals in order to utilize 
it as the ground for an egalitarian ethics does not result in a displacement of 
man’s supposed exceptionalism, but on the contrary solidifies our position as 
patriarchal center of beings, reinstates the anthropocentric system that fails to 
heed the call of the animal, and effects a problematic neutralization or erasure 
of animality. Inasmuch as discourse on the animal continues to be shaped by 
this contour of the human as reference point from which to establish ethical 
agency and consideration, I support the supposition that the critical target for 
animal ethicists should rather be anthropocentrism, or the “set of relations and 
systems of power that are in the service of those who are considered by the 
dominant culture to be fully and properly human”.5 A central concern with the 
pervasive ramifications of human-centeredness not only allows us to address 
what I consider to be the centripetal force at work in the nuanced problematic 
of animal repression, but also allows us better to understand and identify 
the implicit anthropocentric constraints at work in certain discourses and 
institutions and, most notably for the purpose of my project, the challenges 
accompanying the utilization of law in service of animal liberation. My concern 
is that we paradoxically retain and reinforce the underlying conceptuality 
of discourses that are contributory to the very problem at hand when we 
uncritically add animals into existing frameworks of knowledge and modes of 
social regulation that are fundamentally anthropocentric.
My project accordingly contemplates the possibility of an ethics of 
difference that can effect a radical displacement of anthropocentrism and provide 
3 Matthew Calarco Thinking	 Through	 Animals:	 Identity,	 Difference,	 Indistinction (Stanford 
University Press: California, 2015) 26.
4 Calarco Thinking	Through	Animals 26.
5 Calarco Thinking	Through	Animals 25.
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an alternative framework within which to consider human-animal relationality 
against the multiple differences that subsist not only between humans and 
animals, but also amongst humans and animals. I am thus developing an 
argument in support of thinking and approaching difference differently from 
the dominant approaches in animal liberation discourse. The aim of my project 
is not to construct or propose a programmatic ethics that can be accommodated 
within the discipline of law so that animals can be represented in the legal 
arena. On the contrary, I aim to illustrate essential congruence between law 
and animal subjugation by exposing the anthropocentric underpinnings and 
orientation of law and arguing that law fundamentally grounds and maintains 
the subordinate status of animals. I am thus contesting what I perceive to be 
the insufficiently interrogated supposition that the key to animal liberation and 
emancipation is to be found in existing legal channels. I propose that the critical 
focus of animal ethicists should be on law and legal discourse as signifier of 
anthropocentric power, rather than legal reform as such. By disrupting or 
de-centering the construct(s) of law, my primary aim is to open a critical space 
wherein an alternative thought and approach to law and the question of the 
animal might develop.
1.2  Motivation and background
The motivation for this project arose out of real concerns with the increasingly 
glorifying approach to law and right(s) in animal studies, and the emanating 
desire to add a critical voice to the field. The academic discipline of animal 
law has grown exponentially over recent years, largely in response to the 
relentless efforts of the animal liberation movement. Yet, despite a growing 
academic interest and increasing legislative reform, it is hard to find evidence 
of meaningful change in the lives and deaths of animals. Theoretical and 
practical efforts aimed at legal reform bear witness to law’s non-incorporation 
of the animal’s fundamental interests and, as already suggested, I believe 
there is a subtle, yet pertinent reason why law is so resistant to the protection 
of other animals.
5
The dominant animal rights models proceed from the supposition that existing 
legal constructs provide a suitable framework within which to effect changes 
in our thinking and relation with animals. The object or property status of 
animals is commonly regarded as foundational to the problem of animal 
subjugation and animal rights theorists effectively seek a displacement of the 
line that separates the (legal) subject from the (legal) object so that animals 
can be endowed with the substratum of subjectivity from which rights and 
correlative legal protection flow. I use the word displacement deliberately in 
order to underscore that these models aim to effect a shift in the exclusionary 
boundaries of subjectivity, rather than alternative relational frameworks. 
These theorists consequently develop a jurisprudence that accepts and 
espouses the parameters constructed by law. My central concern is with the 
anthropocentrism implicit in the subject-centered model of law and how these 
models merely reproduce subject-centrism at an(other) equally problematic 
annexation, thus reinforcing the dogmatic humanism they seek to destabilize 
and eradicate. My aim is to articulate a series of interrelated issues that 
foreground the ways in which the model of (animal) rights forecloses certain 
ethical possibilities.
Philosopher Tom Regan has developed one of the most influential and 
comprehensive subject-based theories of animal rights,6 rigorously refuting 
the assumption that animals are objects or things in favor of a view of animals 
as beings with intrinsic worth and lives “that fare better or worse for them, 
logically independently of their utility value for others”.7 Regan’s egalitarian 
ethics advances a shared subjectivity (or being a subject-of-a-life, to use Regan’s 
terminology) as the ethically relevant property that establishes animals as 
individual co-subjects deserving of moral consideration and rights. This 
notion of subjectivity focuses on advanced cognitive, conative, and volitional 
6 See Tom Regan Defending	Animal	Rights (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 2001); Tom Regan 
The	Case	for	Animal	Rights 2nd ed (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2004).
7 Regan The	Case	for	Animal	Rights 178.
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capacities as the constitutive requisites for being considered an experiencing 
subject-of-a-life.8 The paradox of this shared subjectivity, however, is that it 
excludes the majority of the animal kingdom from its scope. Regan readily 
admits that his theory only applies to “mentally normal mammals of a year or 
more”,9 which means that his model strictly speaking does not provide a case 
for animal rights, but rather for rights of subjects.10 Because this image of the 
subject situates the human at its determinative center, Regan’s theory draws 
a different exclusionary boundary that merely reproduces a slightly more 
charitable iteration of anthropocentrism. The result is that certain animals 
are granted ethical consideration based on their propinquity to humanness, 
whilst those animals further removed from this particular standard of 
subjective life are regarded as having a lower ethical status. Recent law 
reforms offering increased legal protection to certain species of animals who 
manifest relevant human-like traits forcefully illustrate this point. Spain and 
the Balearic Islands have passed resolutions granting legal rights to the great 
apes11 whilst Belgium, Austria, New Zealand and the Netherlands have all 
passed laws banning great ape research.12 These laws inter alia grant the right 
to life and the protection of individual liberty (Spain, Balearic Islands) and the 
right not to be used in biomedical research (Belgium, Austria, New Zealand, 
Netherlands) to the great apes, our closest nonhuman relatives.13 Insofar as the 
8 For Regan, “individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, 
memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with 
feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action 
in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual 
welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently 
of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s 
interests”. Regan The	Case	for	Animal	Rights 243.  
9 Regan The	Case	for	Animal	Rights 78.  
10 Matthew Calarco Zoographies:	The	Question	of	the	Animal	From	Heidegger	to	Derrida (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 2008) 8.
11 Includes gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans.
12 Tom Beauchamp “Rights Theory and Animal Rights” in Beauchamp T and Frey G (eds) 
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Animal	Ethics (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) 198-227, 214.
13 For more on the starting point, underlying philosophy, and objections of the Great Ape Project see 
Cavalieri P and Singer P (eds) The	Great	Ape	Project:	Equality	Beyond	Humanity (St. Martin’s Press: 
New York, 1993); Paola Cavalieri “The Meaning of the Great Ape Project” 2015 (1) Politics	and	
Animals 16-34.
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status and position of other animals remain unaffected, the pertinent question 
is why would scholars advance a framework that is limited in its application 
when they would prefer to extend the scope of moral and legal consideration 
well beyond a small group of animals who possess a certain set of (human) 
characteristics?  
The reason is that both moral philosophy and law mainly function 
around an inherently anthropocentric subject-centered model and in order 
to effect any changes within these paradigms, scholars have to translate 
and fit their claims into philosophically or legally digestible language and 
constructs. Yet it is precisely these discourses, institutions and constructs 
that have historically legitimized and facilitated animal subjugation and, 
ironically, continue to shape animal liberation discourse. In the same way 
that a specific deleterious definition of the human was constructed to 
legitimize and normalize prejudicial treatment of some humans, current 
constructs of animal rights privilege certain groups of animals on account 
of their perceived similarity to humanness. The critical issue here concerns 
the implicit anthropocentric constraints that operate within political and 
legal institutions and the ways in which animal liberation discourse ends 
up accepting and replicating the constraints that ground and preserve these 
institutions. By subscribing to these restrictions, these theorists are subtly 
bound to determine the animal’s Being and worth in consonance with 
anthropocentric standards and ideals14 and end up granting ethical (and 
legal) consideration against a standard of humanness. 
1.2.1	 Towards	an	ethics	of	difference	and	singularity
We can identify a fundamental ethical problematic here, if by “ethical” we 
understand the notion of being in non-subsumptive relation with a particular 
Other who radically calls my being into question and awakens me to (ethical) 
14 Calarco Zoographies 8.
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responsibility. This notion of the ethical,15 developed by Emmanuel Levinas, 
is grounded in the primacy of the Other and signals a radical withdrawal 
from the egocentric supremacy entrenched in traditional Western thought:
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist 
spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other. We name this 
calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. 
The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts 
and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question 
of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming 
of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as 
the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that 
accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge.16 
This passage from the opening pages of his first major philosophical text, Totality 
and	 Infinity, in a sense encapsulates the entire philosophy of this work. Here 
Levinas reiterates, nuances and expands his original proposition regarding the 
Other’s problematization of the self to eventually designate this relationship as 
the site where not only ethics, but also knowledge are at stake. Indeed, Levinas’s 
thought largely developed in response to the Western philosophical tradition’s 
suppression of alterity, by which concept Levinas refers to both the Other’s 
intrinsic quality of strangeness (or otherness), and the fact of her strangeness. 
Against the solidification of the individual “I” as central point of reference from 
which others are grasped and embraced, Levinas characterizes the Western 
15 Colin Davis suggests that Levinas’s work is not predominantly concerned with ethics per 
se, but perhaps better described as falling within the broader domain of the	 ethical, “where 
ethical experiences and relationships occur before the foundation of ethics in the sense of 
philosophically established principles, rules or codes”. Levinas’s own use of the word éthique 
is furthermore ambivalent, as he most commonly uses it as an adjective or, when used as a 
noun, in contexts that make it impossible to determine its gender. This nuance is significant 
as éthique as a feminine noun denotes ethics in the English sense, whilst its use as a masculine 
substantivized adjective would denote something like the	ethical. See Colin Davis Levinas:	An	
Introduction (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996) 48.
16 Emmanuel Levinas Totality	 and	 Infinity:	 An	 Essay	 on	 Exteriority (trans Lingis A) (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1979) 43.
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philosophical tradition as most often being an ontology that reduces the 
Other to the self “by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures 
the comprehension of being”.17 The self has always been the privileged term, 
conceived as incorporating (be it in actuality or potentiality) that which is other. 
The Other, as Levinas reminds us, is however radically and wholly other (to 
the self) and resists subsummation or comprehension within my schematic 
thought. The Other lies beyond my categories of understanding and an attempt 
at grasping the Other within my sphere of knowledge denies her irreducible 
particularity and ensuing difference, in effect suppressing and holding the 
Other hostage: “Stranger … means the free one. Over him I have no power. He 
escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. 
He is not wholly in my site”.18 
It is via the	face of the Other that she is presented to me and interrupts me 
from a dimension of irreducible infinity: 
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the	 idea	 of	 the	
other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring 
as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities 
forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and 
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own 
measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea. It does not 
manifest itself by these qualities, but … expresses itself.19
The face, in Levinas’s particular philosophical sense, does therefore not 
present itself in the form of evidence to be seen and should not be confused 
with the anatomical landmark of the body. We do not see or experience the 
face in any manner that would constitute it as the object of my intentions and 
it cannot be reduced to my own definitions: 
17 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 43.  
18 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 39.  
19 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 50-1.
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The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this 
sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed, it is 
neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation 
the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which 
becomes precisely a content.20
The face, then, is prior to all else the locus in which alterity is revealed or 
expressed to me and it therefore dwells outside and beyond that which I can 
perceive or experience; “the face is signification, and signification without 
context”.21 The relation with the Other is an epiphany or revelation of an 
appeal that is “totally different from experience in the sensible sense of the 
term, relative and egoist”.22 Yet the mere appearance (or fact) of the Other in 
itself does not suffice to occasion an epiphany that reveals an appeal, as it is 
possible for the Other to merely exist alongside the self without meeting or 
touching the self.23 It is only when the self enters into the ethical dimension 
of the face and is touched as an (impotent) imperative that proximity is 
established.24 This encounter with the face of the Other is fundamentally 
ethical because it gives rise to the realization that I am not alone in the world 
and hence my power and freedom are called into question. The ethical nature 
of this encounter does however not mean that I will necessarily heed the call 
of the Other and act in an ethical way. The face is above all vulnerable and 
destitute in its uniqueness and, against its limitless forms and consequences, 
expresses the primordial commandment “you shall not commit murder”.25 
20 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 194.
21 Emmanuel Levinas Ethics	 and	 Infinity:	 Conversations	 with	 Phillipe	 Nemo (trans Cohen R) 
(Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, 1985) 86.
22 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 193.
23 Roger Burggraeve “’No One Can Save Oneself without Others’: An Ethic of Liberation in the 
Footsteps of Emmanuel Levinas” in Burggraeve R (ed) The	Awakening	to	the	Other:	A	Provocative	
Dialogue	with	Emmanuel	Levinas (Peeters: Leuven, 2008) 13-65, 41.
24 It is important to note that this does not entail an exposure of the Other’s interiority, as 
“[t]he presentation of the face, expression, does not disclose an inward world previously closed, 
adding thus a new region to comprehend or to take over”. Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 212. 
25 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 199.
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This commandment is not made from a position of compelling authority, 
but rather absolute passive otherness, a “paradoxical position of majesty 
and misery”.26 Because the Other is wholly other and resists my efforts at 
comparison and appropriation, I cannot control or even fathom her and she 
fundamentally escapes my power in a profound sense; “the face … invites 
me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or 
knowledge”.27
The ethical relation to the Other is thus characterized by an irreducible 
asymmetrical distance of nonidentity separating the self and the Other, and the 
prospect of a nonviolent relation requires that I guard this asymmetry against 
an appropriation or transmutation that would negate the Other’s quality of 
otherness. For Levinas, an extension of consideration to the Other on grounds 
of sameness thus constitutes a fundamental ethical failure and form of killing, 
in its broad sense. As we will see, it also amounts to a disavowal of my state 
of being exposed, addressed and dedicated to the Other before I direct myself 
towards her, as my devotion to the Other already existed before I discovered 
it. Levinas insists that our relation with the Other “precedes all ontology; it is 
the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology presupposes metaphysics”.28 Indeed 
the primary value of Totality	and	Infinity arguably lies in its anticipation of the 
prospect of a different sort of practice that might engage with the otherness of 
the Other in a nonviolent way. I intentionally characterize it as the anticipation 
of a certain prospect, because Levinas’s project of articulating why ethics 
26 Davis Levinas 50.
27 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 198. Levinas illustrates how the depth of the face radically modifies 
the very nature of power, which is henceforth not aimed at possessing, but at killing. Because 
the Other is absolutely beyond my power, it is, for Levinas, “the sole being I can wish to kill”. In 
the passion for murder, we identify and approach death as nothingness, because the intention 
here is aimed at annihilation. What Levinas ultimately illustrates, is that violence towards 
the Other can never accomplish its true aim, as any annihilation will inevitably be a relative 
annihilation. Because the face (of the Other) does not belong to my world, despite appearing in 
my world, I cannot eradicate it. In a very profound sense, then, the Other remains. See Levinas 
Totality	and	Infinity	198-99.
28 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 48.
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has primacy over ontology and showing that there is something outside or 
before Being, here remains beholden to the constraints of the ontological 
enterprise through retention of its language and concerns. His second major 
philosophical text, Otherwise	than	Being,	or,	Beyond	Essence,29 is however more 
self-conscious and introspective, and better succeeds in critically reflecting on 
philosophy itself and circumventing the constraints of ontological language.30
The title of this text presents a dual transformative translation of the 
Platonic Good beyond Being and explicitly identifies the intention of his 
project to overcome ontology. Otherwise	than	Being is throughout extremely 
aware of the problematic that its textuality presents to its own intelligibility, 
and it focuses our attention on the surface irregularities of language that 
obstruct effortless interpretation and access to philosophical propositions.31 
The challenges of expression posed to his thought are foregrounded at the 
outset: 
When stated in propositions, the unsayable (or the an-archical) espouses 
the forms of formal logic; the beyond being is posited in doxic theses, 
and glimmers in the amphibology of being and beings – in which beings 
dissimulate being. The otherwise	than	being is stated in a saying that must 
also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise	than	being from the said 
in which it already comes to signify but a being	otherwise.32
29 Emmanuel Levinas Otherwise	 than	 Being,	 or,	 Beyond	 Essence (trans Lingis A) (Duquesne 
University Press: Pittsburgh, 1998).
30 In the foreword to the German translation of the text, Levinas himself acknowledged that 
Totality	 and	 Infinity simultaneously preserved and problematized its own main conceptual 
tools (see Emmanuel Levinas Totalität	 und	 Unendlichkeit:	 Versuch	 über	 die	 Exteriorität (trans 
Krewani W) (Verlag Karl Alber: München, 1987). There is wide consensus amongst scholars 
that Otherwise	than	Being can be seen as a re-reading of Totality	and	Infinity that responds to 
Jacques Derrida’s critique in “Violence and Metaphysics” (see Robert Bernasconi and Simon 
Critchley “Introduction” in Bernasconi R and Critchley S (eds) Re-Reading	 Levinas	 (Indiana 
University Press: Bloomington, 1991) xi-xviii; Robert Bernasconi “Skepticism in the Face of 
Philosophy” in Bernasconi R and Critchley S (eds) Re-Reading	 Levinas (Indiana University 
Press: Bloomington, 1991) 149-61.
31 Davis Levinas 74.
32 Levinas Otherwise	than	Being 7.
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The distinction between otherwise than being (autrement qu’être) and being 
otherwise (être autrement) is foundational to Levinas’s project. In approaching 
something that transcends Being, Levinas is all too aware of the peril of 
transmuting this other-than-being into merely another Being, and the danger 
lies in the ontological assumptions embedded in philosophical language. The 
oftentimes overwhelming complexity of Levinasian ethics (at least partially) 
derives from this enterprise of trying to exceed a tradition from	 within, 
neither accepting nor evading the philosophical heritage that poses as both 
site and target of the project: “The extreme audacity of Levinas’s text lies 
in its attempt to theorize the limitations of theory, to conceptualize and to 
exemplify a dimension of language which normally slips through the themes 
and propositions of philosophy”.33
In Otherwise	 than	 Being Levinas portrays the radical passivity and 
primordial exposure to the Other through a distinction between two 
dimensions of language, which include a pre-original Saying (le	 Dire) or 
foreword that constitutes the condition of possibility of any type of speech 
act that breaks silence by verbal (or written) signs in the Said (le	 Dit). 
We acknowledge the Other through language and for Levinas, “language 
does not begin with the signs that one gives, with words. Language is 
above all the fact of being addressed”.34 The (ethical) Saying is therefore a 
pre-condition and ground of the (ontological) Said and my radical responsibility 
towards the Other originates prior to language or, indeed, my consciousness 
of the Other’s call: “the responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior 
33 Davis Levinas 75.
34 Emmanuel Levinas “The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas” (trans 
Benjamin A and Wright T) in Bernasconi R and Wood D (eds) The	 Provocation	 of	 Levinas:	
Rethinking	the	Other	(Routledge: New York, 1988) 168-80, 169-70. Levinas elsewhere writes that 
“[s]aying opens me to the other, before saying something said, before the said that is spoken 
in this sincerity forms a screen between me and the other. It is a saying without words, but not 
with empty hands”. Emmanuel Levinas Of	God	Who	Comes	to	Mind (trans Bergo B) (Stanford 
University Press: Stanford, 1998) 74.
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to anything said … [It is] an interruption of essence”.35 This interruption and 
infinite responsibility is furthermore inescapable; whilst I may decide not to 
answer the Other’s call that originates responsibility, I cannot silence her. I am 
hostage to the Other and her interruption derives from a past removed from 
my consciousness and will. For Levinas, philosophy has traditionally focused 
on the Said and in doing so, failed to recognize our primordial exposure to the 
Other that is effected in Saying. It is precisely through the Saying that Levinas 
offers a defense of subjectivity from the context of a poststructuralist critique 
that undermines and disrupts the fundamentality of the classical humanist 
subject’s sovereignty. Levinas’s subjectivity is not formulated in terms of 
autonomy, consciousness, intentionality or choice, but rather heteronomy, 
subjection, passivity and responsibility. My exposure to the “alterity, the 
radical heterogeneity of the other”36 is a condition of my subjectivity, rather 
than a mere aspect of it:
There is an abandon of the sovereign and active subjectivity, of undeclined 
self-consciousness, as the subject in the nominative form in an apophansis. 
And there is in subjectivity’s relationship with the other, which we are here 
striving to describe, a quasi-hagiographic style that wishes to be neither 
a sermon nor the confession of a “beautiful soul” … One must show in 
saying, qua approach, the very de-posing or desituating of the subject, 
which nonetheless remains an irreplaceable uniqueness, and is thus the 
subjectivity of the subject. This passivity is more passive still than any 
receptivity, in which for philosophers the supreme model of the passivity 
of the subject resides.37
The crucial importance that Levinas’s conception of ethics accords to otherness 
has made it an appealing framework for scholars working in various areas, 
35 Levinas Otherwise	than	Being 43.
36 Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 36.
37 Levinas Otherwise	than	Being 47-8.  
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including queer theory,38 feminist studies,39 and animal ethics.40 Yet the application 
of Levinasian ethics outside of his circle of interest is not without complications. 
Some scholars have argued that Levinas’s account of femininity depicts women 
as sexed beings that are determined and differentiated in relation to man,41 and 
that aspects of his writing revert “back within the boundaries staked out by the 
philosophical constitution of the masculine subject”.42 Similarly, it needs to be 
noted that Levinas’s writings on the animal are problematic in denying (albeit 
inconsistently) that the animal is capable of eliciting an ethical response, or, 
put simply, that all animals have a face. Indeed, Levinas’s insistence that the 
ethics he contemplates is a humanism of the other man should be taken seriously 
and warrants sustained consideration.43 In my project I defend the proposition 
that Levinasian ethics, despite having its genesis in a mainly anthropocentric 
context, can make a valuable contribution to the field of animal ethics. 
My reasoning here is twofold and necessitates elaboration.
Firstly, I read the underlying logic of Levinas’s notion of the ethical as 
fundamentally belying any form of anthropocentrism. A rigorous reading of 
Levinas’s logic opens onto a deeper conception of “universal	ethical	consideration, 
that is, an agnostic form of ethical consideration that has no a priori constraints 
or boundaries”.44 I believe this reading is best supported through a close 
38 See Matthew Bolton “The Ethics of Alterity: Adapting Queerness in Brokeback	Mountain” 2011 
(5) Adaptation 35-56.
39 See Tina Chanter “Feminism and the Other” in Bernasconi R and Wood D (eds) The	Provocation	
of	Levinas:	Rethinking	 the	Other (Routledge: New York, 1988) 32-56; Alison Ainley “Amorous 
Discourses: ‘The Phenomenology of Eros’ and Love Stories” in Bernasconi R and Wood D (eds) 
The	Provocation	of	Levinas:	Rethinking	the	Other (Routledge: New York, 1988) 70-82.
40 See Jonathan Crowe “Levinasian Ethics and Animal Rights” 2008 (26) Windsor	Yearbook	of	Access	
to	Justice 313-28.
41 Simone De Beauvoir The	Second	Sex (trans Borde C and Malovany-Chevallier S) (Vintage Books: 
London, 2011) 6.
42 Luce Irigaray “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love” (trans Whitford M) in 
Bernasconi R and Critchley S (eds) Re-Reading	Levinas (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 
1991) 109-18, 113. 
43 John Llewelyn “Am I Obsessed by Bobby? (Humanism of the Other Animal)” in Bernasconi R 
and Critchley S (eds) Re-Reading	Levinas (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1991) 234-45, 
244.
44 Calarco Zoographies 55.
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examination of the texts in which Levinas directly addresses questions of 
animality, against the backdrop of his larger oeuvre.45 The unresolvable internal 
contradiction that an anthropocentric predilection transposes into Levinas’s 
thought is most evident in his struggle to logically metabolize the possibility 
of the “you shall not commit murder” commandment being expressed in the 
face of the animal. When provoked with the question of animal ethics, Levinas 
confirms “the ethical extends to all living beings”46 whilst also paradoxically 
maintaining “one cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal”47 and that “a more 
specific analysis is needed”48 before he can say whether a specific animal (for 
instance a snake) has a face. These statements are incompatible with his defense 
of subjectivity as the direct responsibility emanating from a call that precedes 
my consciousness and any form of conceptualization that would foreshadow the 
transference of an “idea” in the Said,49 and his conceptualization of the Other as 
wholly other with a face that expresses an infinity that resists any appropriation 
within cognition. It is precisely the unknowability of the Other that, for Levinas, 
initiates our relation, and this means that the Other cannot be delimited in 
advance of an encounter with this infinity.50 Because of his tendency to revert 
45 Focusing on different foundational questions than I do, Peter Atterton also argues that “the 
logic of Levinas’s own arguments concerning the otherness of the Other militates against 
interpreting ethics exclusively in terms of human interests and values, and, furthermore, that 
Levinas’s phenomenology of the face applies to all beings that can suffer and are capable 
of expressing that suffering to me”. Peter Atterton “Levinas and Our Moral Responsibility 
Toward Other Animals” 2011 (54) Inquiry:	An	Interdisciplinary	Journal	of	Philosophy 633-49, 633.
46 Levinas “The Paradox of Morality” 171-72.
47 Levinas “The Paradox of Morality” 169, own emphasis.
48 Levinas “The Paradox of Morality” 172.
49 Levinas elsewhere emphasizes “I speak of responsibility as the essential, primary and 
fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical terms. Ethics, here, 
does not supplement a preceding existential base; the very mode of subjectivity is knotted in 
ethics understood as responsibility”. Levinas Ethics	and	Infinity 95.
50 Derrida articulates a more radical critique around Levinas’s notion of otherness and his illogical 
reluctance to recognize the animal as Other, arguing that it “can be a surprise, coming from a 
thinking so ‘obsessed’ (I am purposely using Levinas’s word), so preoccupied by an obsession 
with the other and with his infinite alterity. If I am responsible for the other, and before the other, 
and in the place of the other, on behalf of the other, isn’t the animal more other still, more radically 
other, if I might put it that way, than the other in whom I recognize my brother, than the other in 
whom I identify my fellow or my neighbor? If I have a duty [devoir] – something owed before any 
debt, before any right – toward the other, wouldn’t it then also be toward the animal, which is still 
more other than the other human, my brother or my neighbor?” Jacques Derrida The Animal That 
Therefore	I	Am (trans Wills D, ed Mallet M) (Fordham University Press: New York, 2008) 107.
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to anthropocentrism, Levinas risks reinforcing certain aspects of the traditional 
metaphysical humanism that he finds problematic. Acknowledging the ground 
of “the crisis of humanism” being the notion that man (of Western metaphysics) is 
the central point of reference of the universe, Levinas admits “the unburied dead 
in wars and extermination camps make one believe the idea of a death without 
a morning after and render tragic-comic the concern for oneself and illusory the 
pretension of the rational animal to have a privileged place in the cosmos and the 
power to dominate and integrate the totality of being in a self-consciousness”.51 
Yet despite the displacement (of classical metaphysical humanism) brought 
about by the radical openness to alterity that characterizes Levinas’s subject, 
his self-confessedly non-metaphysical humanism remains grounded in the 
unquestioned metaphysically humanist assumption that the imperative of ethics 
can only arise from another human being. It is this aspect of Levinas’s thought 
that presents a counter-movement that forecloses the prospect of a true openness 
to Otherness, and that Jacques Derrida is implicating in his charge that Levinas’s 
discourse, despite disrupting “a certain traditional humanism … nonetheless 
remain[s] [a] profound humanism”.52 I would suggest, along with Derrida, that 
the role of animality in Levinas’s thought can be carefully considered as not only 
presenting a latent logical inconsistency, but also the site where Levinas risks 
betraying his own project of decentering the “Man” of classical humanism. I am 
therefore, in a sense, offering an ethical reading of Levinas, because my reading 
is based in his structures of thought and examined against the criteria dictated 
by his own texts. My neo-Levinasian approach to the question of the animal thus 
also presents an attempt to salvage Levinas’s formulation of the ethical relation 
as Other by preserving it as the unsayable.
51 Emmanuel Levinas Collected	Philosophical	Papers (trans Lingis A) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Dordrecht, 1987) 127.
52 Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy “’Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An 
Interview with Jacques Derrida” (trans Connor P and Ronell A) in Cadava E, Connor P and 
Nancy J (eds) Who	Comes	after	the	Subject?	(Routledge: New York, 1991) 96-119, 113. Matthew 
Calarco correctly notes that Derrida’s use of the word “profound” should here be understood as 
meaning something like “dogmatic” or “metaphysical”. See Matthew Calarco “Deconstruction 
is not Vegetarianism: Humanism, Subjectivity, and Animal Ethics” 2004 (37) Continental 
Philosophy	Review 175-201, 180.
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Secondly, Levinas’s engagement with the ethical provides a fitting framework 
within which to deconstruct and critique the current models of animal rights 
because it allows us more clearly to understand and articulate why the very 
starting point of these models can be seen as unethical. Given the disparate 
nature and scope of Levinas’s vast oeuvre, it is impossible to do justice to 
the complexity of his thought in the scope of a few chapters. Despite being 
foundational to my project, my engagement with Levinas’s ethics will be 
schematic and focus on the main lines of his thought and development as they 
pertain to my project. Levinas’s ethical philosophy of alterity is not concerned 
with a programmatic ethics in search of a behavioral system of rules, nor an 
attempt at articulating how one determines the right way of behaving. Rather, 
he is concerned with that which precedes the above, namely “the fundamental 
condition and conditions of possibility that lie at the foundation of every 
concrete encounter, whether with friend or foe: the face-to-face itself”.53 
Levinas’s thought is often called an “ethics before ethics” precisely because 
it concerns our ethical mode of being that precedes any decision or action of 
an ethical nature.54 Whilst a concrete or practical ethics can (and I will argue 
should) indeed proceed from a Levinasian basis, Levinas saw his primary task 
as illustrating that the foundation of ethics does not entail an identification 
with another being in terms of either sameness or distinction,55 but that it 
rather inheres in an encounter with the radically Other whose face beckons 
from a dimension of irreducible infinity that interrupts the totality of the self’s 
existence and gives rise to an inescapable ethical responsibility.
Levinas’s insights into the meaning of ethics (understood as being borne 
from the radically Other) is especially apposite for both understanding the 
53 Roger Burggraeve “Awakened into Vigilance – In Conversation with a Recalcitrant Thinker” 
in Burggraeve R (ed) The	Awakening	to	the	Other:	A	Provocative	Dialogue	with	Emmanuel	Levinas	
(Peeters: Leuven, 2008) 1-11, 4.
54 Burggraeve “Awakened into Vigilance” 4.
55 Levinas insists that “[t]he alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would 
distinguish him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that 
community of genus which already nullifies alterity”. Levinas Totality	and	Infinity 194.    
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violence and erasure effected by what I here term the	anthropomorphic	hegemony	
of	subjectivity, and the possible configuration of a positive animal ethics that 
can think through and respond to the singularity and absolute alterity of the 
animal Other. I have coined the phrase anthropomorphic	hegemony	of	subjectivity 
in order to designate the tacit anthropocentric contours of the construct of 
subjectivity that guide a determination of animal Being and ethical worth 
against a standard of humanness. This focus forces us to (re)turn to our 
traditional conceptions of animality and interrogate critically the functioning 
of our reductionistic and essentialist accounts of animals. The significance of 
drawing attention to these aspects cannot be overstated, as it fundamentally 
concerns the very possibility of locating the disruptive power inherent to an 
encounter with the animal, and thus of an alternative thought of relationality 
that might develop from nonanthropocentric grounds. These reflections 
awaken us to the question of the animal as a transgressive and transgressal 
experience of limitrophy, one that exposes the limits of existing discourses 
and also the crucial need for alternative thoughts and practices.  
In situating and characterizing the current epoch of human-animal 
relations against a historical background of exponential proliferation in 
violence towards animals despite the increasing presence of the animal 
liberation movement’s counter-voice, Derrida describes this struggle (for 
compassion) as passing through a critically important phase: 
We are passing through that phase, and it passes through us. To think 
the war we find ourselves waging is not only a duty, a responsibility, an 
obligation, it is also a necessity, a constraint that, like it or not, directly 
or indirectly, no one can escape. Henceforth more than ever. And I say 
‘to think’ this war, because I believe it concerns what we call ‘thinking’.56
Derrida’s reference to “thinking” suggests that the question of violence and 
compassion towards animals is positioned at the limits of extant discourses 
56 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 29.
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- be it philosophical, scientific or legal - and he is calling for an alternative 
approach and thought in regard to the question of the animal.57 More than 
just a call to think, Derrida is foregrounding our ethical responsibility to 
engage in a	 thinking that allows us to critically reflect on the underlying 
assumptions and anthropocentric constraints at work in the resources we 
use to address the plight of the animal. I share the position that our ethical 
duty towards animals requires no less than radically new discourses, ethical 
frameworks, and determinations of animality that destabilize the problematic 
of anthropocentrism from a context it no longer controls at its center. This 
need arises because the anthropocentric discourse from which the subject 
emerges remains expressive of its constitutive presuppositions of human 
chauvinism and continues to assimilate animals to a norm of humanness. 
The problematic necessitates a critical deconstructive project to be situated at 
the limit(s) of the subject in order to firstly gain insight into the significance of 
the anthropocentric and carno-phallogocentric metaphysical structure from 
which the concept of subjectivity emanates, and to secondly open up a space 
within which an alternative thought and approach to (the question of) the 
animal might develop. Matthew Calarco situates deconstruction at precisely 
this level, “namely, the level of trying to articulate another thought of relation 
(ethics) and practice (politics) that moves beyond the limits of anthropocentric 
traditions and institutions”.58 
1.2.2	 Deconstruction	and	limitrophy	
Very important to the practice of deconstruction, as already alluded to above, 
is the notion of limit. Critics of deconstruction have repeatedly misinterpreted 
the concept over the years, oftentimes willfully engendering negative 
preconceptions of nihilism and fatalism. Drucilla Cornell’s remarkable project 
of re-conceptualizing deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit allows us to 
57 See Calarco Zoographies 113-14. 
58 Calarco Zoographies 115.
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better comprehend the philosophical foundations of deconstruction and, very 
importantly for the purposes of my project, its implications for a legal system.59 
Cornell’s designation responds to the misinterpretations that depreciate 
deconstructive theory to an “’unreconstructable’ litter”60 by illustrating that 
the philosophical tradition allows for the discovery and preservation of 
standards for ethical conduct and thereby reserves the possibility of ethical 
engagement within deconstructive thought.  
Proceeding through what Derrida calls “the logic of parergonality”,61 
Cornell’s project “exposes the quasi-transcendental conditions that establish 
any system, including a legal system as a system”62 and, in turn, demonstrates 
the inevitability of an excess or “beyond” to a system, that which the system 
inescapably excludes. The primary significance of Cornell’s notion of ethics 
for my project is the way in which it helps us better to understand justice as 
the limit to a system of positive law and the attendant increase in our ethical 
responsibility, precisely because it reveals the ethical aspiration impelling the 
exposure of the system’s limit and Other. Cornell’s reading of deconstruction 
reflects deep insight into the limitrophe nature of deconstruction and the 
relevance of the way in which deconstruction exposes the limit of a system 
or concept. The limit cannot be positively described as an oppositional cut 
or self-limitation and thereby reduced to a dichotomy or excess that can be 
incorporated into the system. As I will repeatedly emphasize, the work of 
deconstruction is not to efface a limit, but rather to complicate, multiply and 
delinearize the limit(s). The consonance between Derrida and Cornell, the 
two philosophers most intimately linked to my project, perhaps resonates 
strongest and most pertinently in Derrida’s later claim with regards to his 
deconstructive interventions into animality, that “limitrophy is therefore 
59 See Drucilla Cornell The Philosophy of the Limit (Routledge: New York, 1992).
60 Cornell The Philosophy of the Limit 1.
61 See Jacques Derrida The	Truth	in	Painting	(trans Bennington G and McLeod I) (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1987).
62 Cornell The Philosophy of the Limit 1.
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[his] subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or grows at the 
limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what feeds	the	limit, 
generates it, raises it, and complicates it”.63 
In this vein, my project identifies the human/animal oppositional limit, 
specifically its constitutive functioning in relation to the construct of subjectivity, 
as the starting point for the clearing of a critical space for the development 
of an alternative thought of relation. Western metaphysical discourse has 
consistently entrenched a human/animal binary in order to oppositionally 
define and delimit man in relation to the rest of animalkind. Within this 
analytic, man has been defined by contrast to its animal-supplement and, in 
turn, the animal has been juxtaposed privatively as a site of dis-possession by 
being differentiated as lacking certain capacities and traits considered proper 
to the human. Through this juxtaposition, the differences between humans and 
other animals are conceptualized as a contradiction grounded in deficiency 
and the oppositional limit operates as architect of man’s position of mastery. 
As with most classical philosophical oppositions, this limit does not involve 
“the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. 
One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has 
the upper hand”.64 A critical engagement with these concepts elucidates their 
metaphysical functioning which, when placed in opposition, never effects the 
face to face of two concepts, but a “conflictual and subordinating structure”.65
The single oppositional line has not only functioned to solidify 
anthropocentric hegemony, but has eradicated the complex matrix of 
existences and relational structures on both sides of the rupture by effacing 
differences and reverting to the homogenous. Just as the pseudo-concept of 
“the animal” suggests a homogenous group of beings that encapsulates the 
single essence of ants, gorillas, kangaroos, and everything in between, “the 
63 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 29.
64 Jacques Derrida Positions (trans Bass A) (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1981) 41.
65 Derrida Positions 41.
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human” absorbs all racial, historical, and gender differences and is charged 
with various violent hierarchies that have accompanied the figuring of this 
grouping in opposition to people of color, women, homosexuals, and other 
Others. It is only through a rigorous deconstruction of these oppositions that 
we are able to clear a critical space wherein we can rethink the dissimilarities 
between (distinctive) humans and animals through a logic of difference and 
singularity, rather than oppositional distinction. The task, then, is to revisit 
the radical heterogeneities that exist beyond the reductive homogeneity 
engendered by the human/animal categorization. The starting point of this 
project, I argue, is a reflection on the importance or internal necessity of this 
reductive disengagement in Western philosophical discourse and law, and 
I subsequently deconstruct its constitutive functioning in relation to man’s 
becoming-subject and the subjugating mastery facilitated in its historicity. 
In line with much of the scholarship written in the posthumanist tradition, I 
thus also take the metaphysics of subjectivity as the point of departure and 
critical target of my project. I am in particular concerned with anthropocentrism 
as a guiding thread of the Western metaphysical tradition and its implications 
for an attempt to assimilate animals to the model of (legal) subjectivity born 
from that tradition. 
My aim in approaching the deconstructive exercise from this specific 
vantage point is twofold. I firstly wish to clarify the larger stakes involved 
in the critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity. As Calarco has argued, the 
work of philosophers like Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari66 has often been misread as leading “to a political dead 
66 Although I do not touch on their work here, the critical contributions that Agamben, Deleuze 
and Guattari have made to animal studies helped clarify my thinking and shape my project 
aimed at effecting a radical displacement of metaphysical humanism and anthropocentrism. 
See especially Giorgio Agamben	 Infancy	 and	 History:	 Essays	 on	 the	 Destruction	 of	 Experience 
(trans Heron L) (Verso: London, 1993); Giorgio Agamben Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	
Life (trans Heller-Roazen D) (Stanford University Press: California, 1998); Giorgio Agamben 
The	Open:	Man	and	Animal	(trans Attell K) (Stanford University Press: California, 2004); Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia (trans Massumi 
B) (Bloomsbury Academic: London, 2013); Gilles Deleuze Francis	Bacon:	The	Logic	of	Sensation 
(trans Smith D) (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2003).
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end”.67 More than just exposing the consequences of a lingering legacy of 
Cartesian subjectivity in postmodernity, the critique of subjectivity, if properly 
understood, allows us more clearly to see and articulate the relationship 
between metaphysical humanism and metaphysical anthropocentrism.68 I 
aim to contribute a deeper understanding of the way in which discourses that 
critique metaphysical humanism whilst remaining beholden to an essentialist 
logic of opposition between human and animal, ultimately leaves us with a 
more rigorous delimitation of man that remains tributary to precisely what it 
aims to displace. 
I secondly wish to (re)turn animal rights discourse to the technical language 
and theoretical discipline of law and right(s). Whilst there is no shortage of 
theories advocating the reformation of humanist liberatory discourse to ground 
the animal’s ethical agency, there is a dearth of scholarship that addresses the 
juridical register and conditions of existence of animal rights at a critical and 
theoretical intersection. By undertaking a jurisprudential positioning of the 
animal in law, I aim to foreground the anthropocentric conditions that limit law’s 
ability to logically and ethically take account of its construction and destruction 
of animal life, and problematize approaches that advocate a hasty retrieval of 
legal subjectivity towards an end of rights for animals. Being very cautious and 
skeptical of movements grounded in classical models of subjectivity, I ultimately 
urge that any engagement with law (and especially a resort to law) in service of 
animal liberation should be tentative, reflective and cautious.
My reservations concerning the liberatory discourse of animal rights 
are obviously controversial given the unimaginable suffering that millions of 
animals endure every day and the significance of the law reforms achieved by 
67 Calarco Zoographies 13.
68 Calarco Zoographies 13. Not unrelated to this thesis, scholars like Kelly Oliver have argued that 
the human/animal binary opposition is intimately linked to the man/woman and heterosexual/
homosexual binaries, and that a dismantling of the former binary inevitably has important 
implications for the latter binaries. See Kelly Oliver “Sexual Difference, Animal Difference: 
Derrida and Difference ‘Worthy of Its Name’” 2009 (24) Hypatia 54-76.
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some animal rights groups. It is therefore important that I briefly give a broad 
contextualization of my views and project in relation to animal rights strategies 
and discourse as a whole. It is important to note that I am sympathetic towards 
the initiatives of animal rights groups for two reasons; I firstly support the general 
abolitionist goal of the animal rights movement, and secondly appreciate that the 
animal rights model presents one of the very few concrete and feasible options 
that currently exist for the realization of a positive political project in support of 
animal protection. I would however insist that such sympathy neither negates nor 
contradicts the importance and need for my critical project of thinking through 
the limitations and shortcomings of the animal rights approach in order to open 
a space within which we can develop a more sophisticated ethical disposition 
towards animals. To critique the theoretical presuppositions and underlying 
metaphysical support of animal rights theory does not by the fact itself constitute 
a critique of its underlying ideology. On the contrary, I aim to illustrate that 
the theoretical conditions of existence of animals rights and equality discourse 
does not allow for the realization of its emancipatory ideal because it fails to 
address more fundamental issues around conceptions of “(hu)man”, “animal”, 
and “right(s)” that both constitute and preserve precisely what is in question. 
The philosophy of animal rights paradoxically solidifies an anthropocentric way 
of thinking about animals via an uncritical reproduction of the juridical concept 
of human rights, and entrenches relations of subordination through a disavowal 
of difference. As I will repeatedly illustrate, my project furthermore supports 
the thesis that animal liberation will, unfortunately, inevitably be a slow and 
gradual process. I will indeed advance a critical approach of slowness as one way 
of rigorously deconstructing the (functioning of the) human/animal limit and its 
relation to different discourses and institutions, particularly law. I believe that 
any approach failing to take on the laborious, time-consuming task of confronting 
the nuanced problematic of metaphysical anthropocentrism will foreclose the 
possibility of destabilizing and moving beyond the very interpretation of the 
human (as subject) that lies at the heart of animal subjugation. 
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What is needed, then, is a ceaseless deconstruction of “the whole conceptual 
machinery, and its interestedness, which has allowed us to speak of the 
‘subject’ up to now”.69 Concomitant to my focus on the anthropocentrism of 
the metaphysics of subjectivity, this task necessitates an engagement with 
the complex network of relations and traditions that configure the sacrificial 
structure characterizing the subject. Derrida’s neologism carno-phallogocentrism 
underlines and further complicates the violence embedded in the partitions 
that institute the anthropo-centric subject beyond the privative space that the 
animal occupies at the border of the human (subject)/animal (object) rupture, 
foregrounding carnivorism (carno), masculinity (phallo) and rationality (logo) 
as constitutive prerequisites of classical conceptions of subjectivity. Derrida’s 
concept firstly highlights a constitutive scheme of ingestion that underlies 
the relation between subjectivity and the animal’s body. Derrida furthermore 
emphasizes that the violence of the metaphysics of subjectivity reaches well 
beyond the human/animal divide and has historically excluded other beings 
from the construct of subjectivity, particularly women and children.
Feminists and sociologists such as Carol Smart have made similar 
arguments in other contexts by illustrating the exclusionary and hierarchical 
logic of classical conceptions of subjectivity and the implications for 
institutions that evoke this construct. Smart has argued that any challenge to 
exclusionary mechanisms of power “require no less than a major change in 
forms of subjectivity and understanding”70 and, having convincingly argued 
that the law is deeply resistant to the concerns of women, warned feminists 
to “avoid the siren call of law”.71 Smart illustrates how the law produces 
and sustains a gendered order and draws parallels between a feminist resort 
to law and the iatrogenic potential of medicine to create illness and disease 
in the strive for cures. Providing examples of what she terms the	 juridogenic 
69 Derrida and Nancy “’Eating Well’” 109.
70 Carol Smart Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law (Routledge: New York, 1989) 2.
71 Smart Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law 160.
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potential of law to generate harm as a consequence of its operations, Smart 
argues that emancipation cannot be sought within a system of knowledge 
that celebrates and sustains the very oppression in question. Smart’s wider 
thesis on the paradox of challenging a form of power whilst accepting its 
own terms of reference holds value for all liberation movements seeking 
to effect change within a space of marginalization and disqualification. 
For reasons not unrelated to Smart’s appeal to feminists to de-center 
law wherever feasible rather than using the law hardheadedly “in the hope 
that new law or more law might be better law”,72 I call for an engagement with 
the underlying metaphysical support of animal rights at a conceptual level, 
rather than a simple pragmatic utilization of law as an instrument of immediate 
resolution.
1.3  Approach and methodology
The main conceptual framework of this project draws from the work of 
Derrida and Cornell. I explore the question of the animal from a critical 
perspective that seeks to illustrate the significance of deconstruction for 
animal ethics and foregrounds various elements of the theoretical and ethical 
problematic surrounding the traditional rights-based approach that has come 
to dominate animal ethics discourse. My project is also grounded in a critical 
understanding of theory itself and my engagement with concepts and aesthetic 
ideas problematizes the notion of a single rigidly disengaged or circumscribed 
theory that can provide an all-encompassing account of animal Being and 
effect an exhaustive revolution. My approach acknowledges the pervasiveness 
of anthropocentrism and the profound hold that it has over Western culture, 
including extant sciences and philosophies. As Calarco notes, “there is no doubt 
that we need to think unheard-of thoughts about animals, that we need new 
languages, new artworks, new histories, even new sciences and philosophies. 
The field of animal studies is interdisciplinary precisely for this reason: it is 
72 Smart Feminism	and	the	Power	of	Law 160.
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seeking out every available resource to aid in the task of working through the 
question of the animal”.73 My particular study is animated by the urgency to 
add to this list the need for not only a new (kind of) law, but also new ways 
of approaching law and understanding law’s role as operative architect of 
animal oppression. In this regard I also challenge the view that there can be a 
meaningful disentanglement of a strive for (formal) justice in the public legal 
sphere and in the (informal) sphere of social relations, as prevailing societal 
norms and assumptions will inevitably be replicated in the legal system. 
1.4  A note on terminology
As already explicated, the reductive functioning and violent consequences 
effected by the concept of “the animal” (as homogenous contradistinctive to the 
human) lay central to the argument that I am developing. Having facilitated a 
disavowal of our own animality and a veritable war of the species, the concept is 
deeply embedded in the Western philosophical tradition and inextricably linked 
to man’s position of mastery. The task for thought here concerns designation of 
the unsubstitutable singularity of an existence that refuses conceptualization. In 
response, Derrida invents the portmanteau word animot, which as a homophone 
of (the plural) animaux reverberates the plural for animals in the singular form 
and “envisage[s] the existence of ‘living creatures’, whose plurality cannot be 
assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to 
humanity”.74 The suffix “mot” (“word”) implicates language, which the animal 
has always been deprived of, in order to accede to a certain type of thinking 
that does not approach this difference privatively. It is thus not “a matter of 
‘giving speech back’ to animals”, but of thinking the absence of the word as 
asymmetrical separateness rather than a privation.75 I use the plural “animals” 
and general singular “(the) animal” in this dissertation to represent all animal 
73 Calarco Zoographies 6.
74 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 47.
75 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am	48.
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species other than humans, in full awareness of the biologistic inaccuracy and 
violent metaphysical baggage that these terms carry. Whilst their retention is 
necessary for the work of deconstruction, I ask, following Derrida, that these 
terms be silently substituted by animot and read as if appearing under erasure 
as animals and the animal in acknowledgement of their insufficiency and 
limitation.76
1.5  Chapter overview
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. It comprises this introductory 
chapter in which I outline the proposed problem statement and aims of my 
study, a concluding chapter in which I offer a holistic overview of the issues 
pursued and argument developed, and six substantive chapters in the form 
of research articles that have been published in accredited peer-reviewed 
journals. 
In chapter 2 I jurisprudentially position the question of the animal in 
relation to law, justice, and the call for a deconstruction of the human (subject) by 
examining the philosophical foundations of- and reciprocation between justice 
and deconstruction through Derrida’s notion of “(un)deconstructibility”. I 
draw on Cornell’s reconception of deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit 
in order to highlight the ethical significance of deconstructive theory for law 
and more clearly articulate the operational force of justice as aporia or the limit 
to a system of law. I examine the deconstructive potential of veganism against 
the carno-phallogocentric schema of sacrifice that constitutes the human as 
subject and patriarchal center of beings, and argue that veganism provides 
one possible mode of effecting a destabilization of this sacrificial configuration 
76 For a concise explanation of Derrida’s use of erasure, see Jacques Derrida Of	Grammatology 
(trans Spivak G) (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2016) xxxii-xxxix. Christopher 
Norris explains the functioning of the marks of erasure as an acknowledgement “of both the 
inadequacy of the terms employed – their highly provisional status – and the fact that thinking 
simply cannot manage without them in the work of deconstruction. By this graphic means, much 
akin to the anomalous spelling of différance, concepts are perpetually shaken and dislodged”. 
Christopher Norris Deconstruction:	Theory	and	Practice	3rd ed (Routledge: London, 2002) 68.
30
and a vehicle through which we can respond to our ethical responsibility to 
the animal Other in thought and praxis. My contemplations on veganism as 
a form of deconstruction and mode of being should not be misunderstood 
as an attempt at concretizing justice in relation to a programmatic ideality or 
advancing the same link between veganism and deconstruction that Derrida 
theorizes between justice and deconstruction.77 On the contrary, I draw on 
Charles Pierce’s notion of secondness as a prism through which to illustrate 
the inescapability of a sacrificial existence and develop an understanding of 
the ethical as a necessary impossibility. As certain manifestations of sacrifice 
inevitably remain in the impossibility of its delimitation and “one eats [the 
Other] regardless and lets oneself be eaten by [the Other]”,78 it is ultimately 
not a question of eating, but of addressing the metonymy of introjection 
configuring the question of eating well. I accordingly explore and propose 
veganism as one way of eating well.  
In chapter 3 I consider law’s relation to animal subjugation, both as 
facilitator of animal sacrifice and possible enabler of animal liberation, by 
philosophically examining the relationship between the two most prominent 
theories aimed at addressing the plight of the animal, namely animal welfarism 
and the rights-based approach. I return to the problem of sacrifice by reflecting 
on the logic that undergirds the exclusion of animals from the thou shalt not 
kill proscription, and examining its ideological translation into the respective 
theories. A destabilization of the enabling hegemonic framework requires 
that we “sacrifice sacrifice”79 by rigorously deconstructing the underlying 
assumptions of discourses and practices that see the killing of animals as a 
noncriminal putting to death, and adapting our engagement with animals 
accordingly. I utilize Karin van Marle’s deconstructive approach of slowness as 
77 See Jacques Derrida “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” (trans Quaintance 
M) in Anidjar G (ed) Acts	of	Religion (Routledge: New York, 2002) 230-98.
78 Derrida and Nancy “’Eating Well’” 114.
79 Derrida and Nancy “’Eating Well’” 114.
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theoretical framework for a critical reflection on the philosophical foundations 
of the two approaches and the channels and strategies we employ in the pursuit 
of animal liberation. Slowness, as a strategy of delay, calls for a suspension 
or disruption of a chronological and linear conception of time in order to 
understand the configuration of a particular contemporary problematic as 
situated in the past, present and future, and to create a (moment of) thinking 
that can adequately reflect on the underlying assumptions and constraints 
at work in the resources we use to address the plight of the animal. After 
critically engaging with the historical-ideological trajectory of the animal 
defense movement, I demonstrate that animal welfarists accept and operate 
within a sacrificial anthropocentric configuration whilst animal rightists are 
ideologically committed to a recalibration of the animal’s status as sacrificial 
being. These ideological inconsistencies, I argue, demand a conceptual 
separation of the two paradigms if we are to preserve the possibility of 
transforming the juridicism and sacrificial logic that underpins our thinking 
and the legal institutions that legitimize our sacrificial practices. 
Having identified animal rights theory as grounded in a more 
progressive ideology than the welfarist paradigm, I turn to a theoretical 
problematization of the construct of animal rights in chapter 4 in order to 
examine whether the theoretical conditions of existence of animal rights allow 
for the realization of its emancipatory ideals. In the first part of this chapter 
I employ a semiotic approach to consider the composition of rights and its 
symbolic functioning. I illustrate that rights do not stand in concrete relation 
to any specific thing or entity but rather comprise of legal and linguistic signs, 
words, symbols and ideals, and that this expansive potential of the construct 
makes it possible for animals to be bearers of rights. My focus in the second 
part of this chapter concerns a deconstruction of the similarity principle that 
grounds the current conceptions of animal rights. I argue that the similarity 
principle arrogates the human at its determinative center and measures 
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animals against a standard of humanness, thereby not only (re)instating an 
anthropocentric human/animal hierarchy, but also creating a pecking order 
amongst animals based on their proximity to humanness. At an ontological 
level the similarity principle functions around reductive disengagements that 
privilege selfness over otherness and appropriates the Other as a reflection of 
the self, thereby disavowing alterity and collapsing the ethical relation into 
absolute symmetry.
In chapter 5 I expose the ontology of similarity underlying rights 
theory as absorbedly related to the metaphysics of subjectivity by 
uncovering the genesis, development and completion of the metaphysical 
tradition as the founding and unfolding of cognate conceptions of 
subjectivity that increasingly situate man as the relational center of all that 
is. The main purpose of this chapter is to (re)turn the discourse of animal 
rights to its dependency on the event of subjectivity through a modest 
and focused engagement with the most fundamental pre-condition 
of rights: the question of the subject. To this end, the first part of this chapter 
undertakes a critical analysis of (the history of) subjectivity through an 
exposure of the metaphysical and anthropocentric quasi-transcendental 
conditions that guide the unfolding conceptualization and concluding 
identification of man as subject. I locate a critical moment for the metaphysical 
subject in the work of Martin Heidegger which, whilst sadly not sustained 
in his later writings, provides a point of departure for an examination of 
the significance that animality plays in the metaphysical tradition and its 
constitutive relation to the construct of subjectivity. Heidegger identifies the 
question of Being (or Seinsfrage) as the guiding question of philosophy and 
critiques the metaphysical tradition for developing theses on the meaning of 
Being that progressively obfuscate its original sending by passing over the 
question of Being itself. I further problematize the Heideggerian critique of 
the metaphysics of subjectivity by approaching it from an interdependent, 
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but differentiated vantage point, shifting the focus from the implications 
of the human becoming subject, to the significance of the human becoming 
subject. By recognizing that human(ity) was consistently juxtaposed to 
animal(ity) throughout the development of Western metaphysics, we can 
begin to reflect on the anthropomorphic hegemony of subjectivity and its 
implications for discourses and institutions that evoke this construct. By 
assimilating animals to the traditional model of subjectivity, I argue, animal 
rights theorists paradoxically re-construct the classical humanist subject of 
metaphysics and re-establish the subject-centered system that silences the 
call of the animal Other. In the second part of this chapter I examine how 
we can address, incapacitate and move beyond this schemata of power 
through a rigorous deconstruction of the partitions that institute the subject 
and how deconstruction clears a space for a de	 novo determination of the 
animal “subject” that can proceed from different sites of nonanthropocentric 
interruption. The duty inherent to the practice of deconstruction inheres at 
precisely this level, namely the level of thinking through and beyond the 
limits of the anthropocentric (sub)structures that we have inherited. I argue 
that this problematic is pronounced in its translation into the subject-centered 
model of law, as animal rights theorists are ultimately forced to establish 
rights for animals as	 subjects by assimilating a human-like subjectivity, 
thereby (re)producing another iteration of anthropocentric subjectivism and 
extending the legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social regulation that is 
fundamentally anthropocentric. I accordingly accentuate my call for a critical 
engagement with law at a conceptual level. 
Chapter 6 offers a critical discussion of a recent decision by the highest 
court in South Africa in order to illustrate the significant theoretical and 
ethical difficulties accompanying the utilization of law as a channel for 
animal liberation. Whilst interpreting the right of a statutory body to privately 
prosecute cases of animal cruelty, the Constitutional Court in National	Society	
34
for	 the	Prevention	of	Cruelty	 to	Animals	v	Minister	 of	 Justice	 and	Constitutional	
Development	and	Another [2016] ZACC 46 made significant pronouncements 
that destabilize the ground of the animal’s legal status. The court does 
however not consistently maintain this position and, by entangling ideologies 
that I have argued to be fundamentally discordant in chapter 3, delivers a 
ruling that is puzzling and paradoxical. The court’s struggle to logically 
metabolize its construction and destruction of the animal is a symptom of the 
anthropocentric constraints that inhere in legal institutions and the challenges 
accompanying the representation of animals in a (legal) system that is 
fundamentally anthropocentric. Despite reinforcing the object or utility status 
of animals in certain parts of the judgment, the court also recognizes that 
animals are individuals with intrinsic value and suggests that the foundation 
for animal protection has shifted from an external utilitarian calculus towards 
an understanding of animals as individuals whose experiential lives fare 
well or ill for them independent of their usefulness to others. Whilst the most 
obvious implication of the court’s pronouncements concerns a destabilization 
of the (human) subject/(animal) object dichotomy entrenched in law, the 
judgment foregrounds the sobering reality that full legal emancipation of 
animals requires the utilization of legally digestible constructs that will have 
to be stripped of the very presuppositions that constituted and continues 
to ground them. This inherent characteristic of the law, I continue to argue, 
necessitates a rigorous problematization of law and right(s) and should make 
animal ethicists very cautious of how, and indeed whether, they utilize law.
Having articulated a series of interrelated issues that foreground the 
ways in which standard philosophical and legal approaches to the question 
of the animal foreclose certain ethical possibilities, chapter 7 reflects on 
the capacity of literature to problematize the authority of traditional 
philosophical and legal discourses and circumvent some of the theoretical 
and ethical constraints that they pose. The potential of literature to destabilize 
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meaning and challenge the authority of a singular interpretation are central 
to the argument being developed here. I examine what literature brings to 
law through the lens of literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s writings on the 
dialogical properties of the novel and I offer reflections on ways in which 
literature might begin to open up new potentialities and risks for thought in 
relation to the question of the animal (in law). The ethics of the novel proceed 
from a relational structure where identity is in flux and neither the self nor 
the Other is solely human, allowing us to employ literature as a vehicle to 
ethically “write” the animal and “read” her response that is silenced by the 
law. A Bakhtinian approach to the relationship of law and literature de-
emphasizes the role and importance of literary content or subject matter in 
favor of increased attention to the style and structure of the novel, which is 
fundamental to understanding the nature of literature and its implications 
for other discourses. Bakhtin calls the novelistic structure that allows for the 
expression of diverging views through a multiplicity of voices the polyphonic 
novel, and identifies the genre of Socratic dialogue as originating the artistic 
prose composition from which the novel evolved. Bakhtin accordingly 
advances a notion of literature as communal process in which meaning is 
pluralistically conversed and collectively constructed by multiple voices 
that subsist in a constant relation of dialogicality and resist interpretative 
closure. For Bakhtin, the structural instability that is generated by the 
novel’s style and structure not only leans towards a problematization of any 
pontifical authority, but also places the novel’s own authority in question. 
This characteristic, I argue, holds great ethical value in the face of unequal 
power relations, as its volatile nature and susceptibility to interruption and 
inversion is revealed. I advance a reading of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals 
as polyphonic novel through an interpretation of the protagonist as Socratic 
figure and voice of refusal. My reading is grounded in van Marle’s reflections 
on a politics of refusal as a mode of abnegation that destabilizes traditional 
ways of theorizing and engaging politics and law. This chapter explores 
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how a politics of refusal is fundamentally engaged in the task of exposing a 
limit, in turn preserving the possibility of an alternative thought of human-
animal relationality and ultimately another law. In considering the relevance 
of the insights and subversive force that literature brings to law, I turn to 
van Marle’s notion of a risking	law and tentatively reflect on the capacity of 
literature to gesture a decentered and humbled law that is challenged in its 
ignorant complacency and realistically approached as a method with both 
advantageous and pernicious consequences. 
37
18
TOWARDS AN ETHICAL RELATION 





This article explores the ethical significance of deconstruction for law and advances 
veganism as a form of deconstruction that exposes and resists the anthropocentric character 
of social and legal configurations. The article engages with Jacques Derrida’s project of 
deconstructing the (human) subject and draws on Drucilla Cornell’s reconception of 
deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit. By examining the philosophical foundations 
of justice and deconstruction, the article exposes justice as the limit to a system of law 
and investigates the capacity of deconstruction to advance the ethical relation (to the 
nonhuman Other).
Justice? – you get justice in the next world, in this world, you have the law.1
I  IntroductIon
To assert that law and justice are not synonyms is no longer a controversial 
statement. The impotence of a system of positive law, as a mechanism to bring 
about a realm of even-handedness, has been widely illustrated and criticised.2 
It was believed, not too long ago, that blacks were naturally born into a destiny 
of slavery,3 that women were physiologically and psychologically inferior and 
lesser beings than their male counterparts4 and that homosexuality, like cancer, 
was a disease that necessitated medical treatment.5 Not surprisingly, the law 
reflected these dogmas and by doing so engaged in a process of ‘othering’, 
by creating a protagonist-antagonist dualism and ultimately facilitating 
subordination. Laws relating to animals are also a direct manifestation of 
the philosophical presuppositions that underpin the way we perceive the 
nonhuman Other. What is needed, is a deconstruction of the system that 
fails to embrace that which is other to the system. In the first part of this 
article, I examine the philosophical foundations of and reciprocation between 
justice and deconstruction. Drawing on Drucilla Cornell’s reconception of 
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deconstruction as the philosophy of the limit, I illustrate the ethical significance 
of deconstruction for law in the second part. Relying on this notion of ethics, 
I finally demonstrate the deconstructive capacity of veganism and argue that 
veganism plays an important role in exposing and resisting anthropocentric 
configurations that perpetuate the subservient position of the nonhuman 
Other.
II  deconstructIon and the Law
A search for and demand of justice is often accompanied by the problematic 
(and ultimately unattainable) task of defining justice. The inevitable certainty 
of pluralism and consequential challenge of identifying just substantive 
principles, force us to confront a reality wherein my ideal of justice will 
more often than not differ from, if not directly rival, that of my neighbour. 
But as Jacques Derrida reminds us, justice is a transcendent, incalculable 
experience and consequently ‘one cannot speak directly about justice, 
thematize or objectivise justice, say “this is just”, and even less “I am just”, 
without immediately betraying justice, if not law’.6 Subscription to this insight 
can however generate noteworthy concerns: If we are not able to recognise 
and concretise certain minimal standards as just, what are we (or should we 
be) striving for? Is an ethical critiquing of law not an exercise in futility, a 
postponement of the inevitability of equating justice to law? Such reasoning 
is however clearly not in accord with Derrida’s insistence on reserving ‘the 
possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts law 
but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to 
it that it may just as well demand law as exclude it’:7
This excess of justice over law and calculation, this overflowing of the unpresentable over 
the determinable, cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political 
battles, within an institution or a state, between institutions or states.8
Derrida’s fundamental argument that justice exceeds law is based on Michel 
de Montaigne’s insight (in turn followed by Blaise Pascal) into the naissance 
of the law. Law, not originating from justice or reason, is built on custom. 
That, according to Montaigne, is the ‘mystical foundations of the authority 
of laws’:
Custom creates the whole of equity, for the simple reason that it is accepted. It is the mystical 
foundation of its authority. Whoever carries it back to first principles destroys it.9
Montaigne argues that law has not been constructed in a way that allows for 
the embodiment of justice. We abide by the law not ‘because they are just, but 
because they have authority’.10 Here, I deliberately use the word ‘constructed’, 
as the notion of law as a self-generating construct propelled by inherent 
6 J Derrida ‘Force of Law’ in G Anidjar (ed) Acts of Religion (2002) 230, 237.
7 Ibid 233.
8 Ibid 257.
9 Quoted in Derrida (note 6 above) 239.
10 Ibid 240.
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force, is fundamental to Derrida’s insistence that the law is deconstructable. 
Employing the idiomatic expression ‘to enforce the law’ as point of departure, 
Derrida exposes the inevitable force that lies at the core of law. Whilst there 
are certainly laws that are not enforced, ‘there is no law without force, whether 
this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior …’.11 
Without this force, any system’s claim to be law would be redundant. This 
act of force central to the genesis of any legal system, endow the system 
with legitimacy. Since this constitutive force ‘cannot by definition rest on 
anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground. This 
is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of “illegal” or 
“illegitimate”. They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment’.12 
By understanding that the law is primarily ‘a fictional creation which self-
perpetuates’ and that there is no higher charge behind law, we can in turn 
understand that any attempt to conflate justice and positive law will inevitably 
result in naive legal positivism – a falsely held belief that justice can be found 
within the rights and remedies provided by an existing legal system.13 We can 
never completely attain justice by merely imparting a decision that is in accord 
with legal rules. Justice, as we will later see, is the limit to any legal system. 
Here, it is worth noting the ethical dimension to Derrida’s deconstructive 
thought. By exposing the mythological structure underlying the authority 
of law, he accentuates the risk involved in safeguarding existing ideals as 
unquestionable truth.14
Before I turn to an analysis of Derrida’s conceptualisation of Justice as 
Aporia, I would like to highlight a nexus between justice and deconstruction 
that Derrida evokes in Force of Law, namely the potential of deconstruction 
to destabilise the (arbitrarily constructed) limits that we erect to lead us in 
ascertaining which entities are worthy of being subjects of justice. History 
bears witness to numerous examples of marginalisation, and the focus of our 
concern for justice continues to be limited. Derrida argues that the violence of 
injustice is only applicable to humans, more specifically ‘man as a speaking 
animal’:15
[O]ne would not speak of injustice or violence toward an animal, even less toward a vegetable 
or a stone. An animal can be made to suffer, but one would never say, in a sense said to be 
proper, that it is a wronged subject, the victim of a crime, of a murder, of a rape or a theft, of 
a perjury.16
The exclusion of groups deemed inferior, Derrida argues, is however not 
restricted to nonhumans, as ‘there are still many “subjects” among humankind 
who are not recognised as subjects and who receive this animal treatment’.17 
11 Ibid 233.
12 Ibid 242.
13 D Litowitz ‘Derrida on Law and Justice: Borrowing (Illicitly?) from Plato and Kant’ (1995) 8 
Canadian J of Law and Jurisprudence 325, 330. 
14 D Cornell The Philosophy of the Limit (1992) 10.
15 Derrida (note 6 above) 246.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
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The barrier between those worthy of justice (‘subjects of justice’) and those 
not worthy (‘non-subjects of justice’) is thus unstable.18
But what is the significance of identifying and exposing this (unstable) 
anthropocentric barrier that excludes the nonhuman animal from our sphere 
of concern for justice? This generates the opportunity for animal liberation 
scholars to deconstruct the barrier and challenge the exclusion of nonhumans 
as possible subjects of justice, as membership to a specific species should 
not be the decisive criterion granting moral citizenship to a subject.19 The 
potential of deconstruction to challenge these barriers embodies the corollary 
of re-setting the boundaries and, ultimately, ethically embracing the nonhuman 
Other. As Derrida argues:
[B]y deconstructing the partitions that institute the human subject (preferably and 
paradigmatically the adult male, rather than the woman, child, or animal) at the measure of 
the just and the unjust, one does not necessarily lead toward injustice, nor to effacement of an 
opposition between just and unjust but, in the name of a demand more insatiable than justice, 
leads perhaps to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus of limits within which a history and 
a culture have been able to confine their criteriology.20
(a)  Conceptualising justice as aporia
For Derrida, the very notion of justice embodies impossibility, a set of aporias 
that cannot be dissolved without paradoxicalising justice. This impossibility, 
as I have already argued, should not hinder our struggle for justice. We always 
owe justice to the Other and although this ‘incalculable’ demand can never be 
satisfied, the strive for justice nevertheless imposes a limitless responsibility, 
a ‘bottomless duty to the Other’.21
Derrida articulates three unsurpassable aporias to formulate his argument 
that justice is ‘the experience that we are unable to experience’. The first aporia, 
the epokhē of the rule, delineates the impossibility accompanying any attempt 
to generate a just outcome to a scenario whilst also adhering to prescribed 
legal doctrine. To act justly, according to Derrida, one must necessarily be 
free, because ‘one will not say of a being without freedom, or at least of one 
who is not free in a given act, that its decision is just or unjust’.22 A judge acting 
within the parameters of the law is however caught in a paradox: bound by 
rules and precedent on the one hand, the individualism of each case requires 
a de novo approach on the other, ‘an absolutely unique interpretation which 
no existing coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely’.23 Monotonous 
adherence to and application of a rule cannot be equated to making a just 
decision, or even any decision.
18 J Balkin ‘Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice’ (1994) 92 Michigan LR 1131, 
1143.
19 For an exposition of speciesism and the belief that only human life in sacrosanct, see P Singer 
Animal Liberation (2009) 18–23.
20 Derrida (note 6 above) 247.
21 Litowitz (note 13 above) 328.
22 Derrida (note 6 above) 251.
23 Ibid.
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To obtain justice through law, the judge needs to simultaneously judge the 
law, and judge by means of the law. A just decision will ‘be both regulated 
and without regulation’, it will ‘preserve the law and also destroy or suspend it 
enough to have to reinvent it in each case’.24 To act in conformity with a legal 
principle might result in a decision that is unjust, whilst a just outcome might 
have no grounding in law. Thus, we clearly see ‘justice run up against the 
limitations of law, and law run up against the impossibility of justice’.25
The second aporia is absorbedly related to the first and reveals the 
paradoxical relation between (a decision following the) law and justice. 
The ‘haunting of the undecidable’, which is caught in every legal decision, 
demarcates decision-making with calculation and illustrates why justice 
cannot exist with or without a decision. This undecidability is more than the 
mere pressure facing a judge when confronted with two or more decisions, 
it represents the experience of being caught in an unsurpassable moment of 
undecidability whilst taking cognisance of legal rules.
We need to clearly distinguish decision-making from calculation, ‘for if 
calculation is calculation, the decision to calculate is not of the order of the 
calculable, and it must not be so’.26 Whilst a decision not passing ‘the test 
and ordeal of the undecidable’ can never be a free decision, but only ‘the 
programmable application … of a calculable process’, it is not possible to 
establish whether the judge went through this test and ordeal before rendering 
her decision.27 Because there is no recipe or prescription for justice, we can never 
formulate or construct a ‘just’ law. But whilst justice is foreign to encapsulation, 
a decision still needs to be made.28 This decision might be in accordance with 
the law and thus legal, but not just. The moment of undecidability, although 
being a necessary stride in arriving at a ‘just’ decision, will not in itself bring 
about justice either, ‘for only a decision is just’.29 To attain justice through 
law thus requires the (impossible) amalgamation of an incalculable experience 
with a calculable, rule governed construct. Ultimately, there can be no justice 
without a decision and no decision can effectively capture justice. This leads 
Derrida to arrive at the conclusion that a decision can never ‘be said to be 
presently and fully just: either it has not yet been made according to a rule, and 
nothing allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a rule’.30
With the third aporia, Derrida illustrates how the immediacy and urgency 
that characterise justice, impedes deliberative practice. Because the demand 
for justice is always immediate, it obstructs the horizon of knowledge, which 
is ‘both the opening and the limit that defines either an infinite progress or 
a waiting and awaiting’.31 The infinite demand for justice does not allow 
24 Ibid.
25 Litowitz (note 13 above) 332.
26 Derrida (note 6 above) 252.
27 Ibid.
28 Litowitz (note 13 above) 332.
29 Derrida (note 6 above) 253.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid 255.
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for a subsequent engagement with ‘the infinite information and unlimited 
knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could 
justify it’.32 By making a decision, we bring an untimely halt to an attempt at 
rendering bottomless justice to the Other, which is why justice is always ‘to 
come’: ‘[Justice] remains by coming, it has to come, it is to come … it deploys 
the very dimension of events irreducibly to come’.33
These three interrelated aporias demonstrate why law is inaccessible to 
justice: trying to deposit an incalculable duty (justice) into calculable rules 
(law) is like trying to fit a square into a circle. But what is the reciprocity 
between law and justice? Whilst Derrida explicitly distinguishes law from 
justice, he does not place the two at counter-ends of a binary dualism. Derrida 
illustrates the reciprocal action through the notion of ‘undeconstructability’. 
Both the deconstructability of law and the undeconstructibility of justice, 
makes deconstruction attainable. Deconstruction therefore subsists in the 
space that divides law, which as a construct will always be deconstructable, 
from the undeconstructability of justice. We thus see a symbiotic relationship 
ultimately ending in mutual reinforcement – ‘Justice undermines law and 
law undermines justice’.34 We also see a clear nexus between justice and 
deconstruction, in fact Derrida goes as far as saying ‘deconstruction is justice’.35 
For the purposes of this article I will not further examine this statement on the 
several levels needed to do justice to Derrida’s thought. My focus is rather on 
problematising and destabilising a legal system that’s claim to authority rests 
on nothing but its own functioning and it is through deconstruction that we 
expose and resist the faults imbedded in the system.
III  reconceIvInG deconstructIon as the PhilosoPhy of the limit
By renaming deconstruction the philosophy of the limit Cornell, ‘driven by an 
ethical desire to enact the ethical relation’, allows us to better comprehend the 
philosophical foundations of deconstruction and its implications for a legal 
system.36 The philosophy of the limit refocuses our attention on the limits that 
hinder philosophical understanding and subsequently highlights two aspects 
of deconstructive theory that are vital to comprehending philosophical 
perspectives on legal problems. Firstly, deconstruction seen as the philosophy 
of the limit reserves the possibility of ethical engagement within deconstructive 
thought. By juxtaposing a view of deconstruction as an exercise ultimately 
generating an ‘unreconstuctable litter’ with a notion of deconstruction as a 
philosophy that limits, Cornell illustrates that deconstructive tradition allows 
for the discovery and preservation of standards for ethical conduct and the 
capacity of deconstruction to advance the ethical relation is thus emphasised. 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid 256.
34 M Valverde ‘Derrida’s Justice and Foucault’s Freedom: Ethics, History, and Social Movements’ 
(1999) 24 Law and Social Inquiry 655, 659. 
35 Derrida (note 6 above) 243.
36 Cornell (note 14 above).
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The focus of Cornell’s project is rather on ‘expos(ing) the quasi-transcendental 
conditions that establish any system, including a legal system as a system’.37 
This shift in focus emphasises a ‘beyond’ intrinsic to any system, that which 
is excluded from the system.
Secondly, deconstruction seen as a limit captures the ineptness that 
inevitably accompanies any attempt to grasp meaning. In critiquing Hegelian 
idealism, Charles Pierce employs the notion of secondness to indicate that we 
will always be left with a residue after an attempt to conceptualise, something 
that ‘resists’, because we can never interpret reality in its totality.38 This 
restriction to a system of meaning emphasises the subjective nature of reality 
and impinges on our relationship to the Other, as it ‘demands our attention to 
what is outside ourselves and our representational schema’.39 Understanding 
the sphere of secondness is thus foundational to any attempt at advancing the 
ethical relation to the Other.
This attempt to heed the call of the Other should however not be seen as 
an effort to incorporate that which is other into the system. There will always 
be an Other to the system, as the functioning of différance40 impedes any 
system from integrating its other into the system. A nonviolative relation to 
the Other is not founded in forced unity, but in the recognition of the Other’s 
particularity and ensuing difference. Paradoxically, an instance of sameness 
emanates from this very recognition. Amidst this ethical asymmetry, we 
find phenomenological symmetry by recognising that the Other, also being 
an ‘I’ just as I am an ‘I’, is simultaneously different from me and the same 
as me.41 Unity stems from our singularity and this interplay between ethical 
asymmetry and phenomenological symmetry is pivotal to heeding the call of 
the Other. As Derrida explains, ‘without the phenomenon of other as other no 
respect would be possible. The phenomenon of respect supposes the respect of 
phenomenality. And ethics, phenomenology’.42
With this interpretation of the ethical relation, we firstly see another ethical 
dimension to Derrida’s deconstructive thought. Derrida attempts to reserve 
the prospect of a nonviolative relationship by showing that the Other should be 
regarded as the ‘unsayable’, as ‘one cannot speak of the ethical as the beyond 
to metaphysics other than in the language of ontology’.43 Secondly, Derrida’s 
insight requires that we acknowledge the ethical relation as an aspiration 
and not a possibility, as ‘the possibility of the ethical lies in its impossibility; 
otherwise, the ethical would be reduced to the actual, to the totality of what 
37 Ibid 1.
38 Ibid.
39 D Cornell ‘Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for 
Transformative Legal Interpretation’ (1988) 136 Univ of Pennsylvania LR 1135, 1198.
40 Cornell describes diffèrance as ‘the “truth” that “being” is presented in time and, therefore, there 
can be no all encompassing ontology of the “here” and “now”’. D Cornell Beyond Accommodation 
(1991) 108. 
41 Cornell (note 14 above) 55. 
42 J Derrida Signéponge (1984) 121. 
43 Cornell (note 14 above) 83.
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is’.44 Deconstruction protects the ethical relation from being reduced to 
‘the mere Other of Ontology’, an appropriation that denies the otherness of 
the other. Deconstruction then exposes the limit to the achievable. It is, as 
Cornell reconceptualises the practice, a philosophy that limits. This limit of 
impossibility, as with the impossibility of justice, does however not relieve us 
from our limitless responsibility:
There is [always] disruption of totality. The Other cannot be completely eliminated in any 
given representational system. The Other survives. In this sense, the ethical is a necessity 
as well as an impossibility – a necessity in that the remain(s) cannot totally be evaded even 
if they need not be heeded. The Other remain(s). The call to responsibility is prior to our 
subjectivity, prior to our choice. We may not answer, but we are not free to simply silence 
the call.45
In answering the question whether deconstruction enacts the ethical relation, 
Cornell thus reminds us that we ultimately enact the ethical relation through 
aspiration and not actualisation.46
Iv  veGanIsm and deconstructIon
In Comment ne pas manger – Deconstruction and Humanism,47 David Wood 
formulates various arguments to substantiate his assertion that, despite an 
attempt to address and advance the ethical relation to ‘the animal’ through 
the deconstruction of the (human) subject, Derrida’s thought is haunted by a 
humanist predilection. For Wood, Derrida’s critique of Heiddegerian thought 
as constrained by ‘a certain anthropocentric or even humanist teleology’48 
is ironic and paradoxical because Derrida himself fails to recognise and 
advance the relation between (the) deconstruction (of the human subject) and 
vegetarianism.
Whilst I agree with Wood that there is deconstructive capacity inherent to 
our resistance to nonhuman sacrifice through physical consumption, I do not 
subscribe to the notion that we can oppose anthropocentric configurations by 
merely renouncing the consumption of flesh. Rather than commensurating 
deconstruction with vegetarianism, what is needed is a deconstruction of 
vegetarianism. My primary aspiration here is to expose the undercurrents of 
sacrifice and anthropocentrism that underlie vegetarianism and to illustrate 
why deconstruction, if recognised as a vehicle through which we respond to 
our ethical responsibility to (nonhuman) otherness, should rather be identified 
with veganism.
It needs to be noted from the onset that the scheme of domination that has 
come to be synonymous with the (human) subject spans the entire spectrum 




47 D Wood ‘Comment ne pas manger – Deconstruction and Humanism’ in H Steeves (ed) Animal 
Others: On ethics, Ontology and Animal Life (1999) 15.
48 J Derrida Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (1989) 55.
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sacrifice. Derrida’s objective of deconstructing the (human) subject as a being 
that sacrifices is obvious. One of the nuances to Derrida’s deconstructive 
undertaking that might not be so apparent, is his concomitant exposure of 
the role of law as facilitator of this sacrificial behaviour. Our anthropocentric 
cultural constructs cannot be separated from the (legal) system that allows 
for the ‘non-criminal putting-to-death’ of animals, as the law (being a human 
construct) will reproduce and perpetuate prevailing social structures. To this 
extent, any rigid separation between our aspiration towards ‘formal’ justice in 
the public sphere and ‘informal’ justice in the sphere of socio-ethical relations 
will ultimately prove to be fictitious, as sustainable transformation in the one 
sphere is dependent on transformation in the other.49 As any destabilisation of 
species hierarchy will thus inevitably be observed by the law, our resistance 
of anthropocentric social configurations also exposes and resists the 
anthropocentric character of the law. This reciprocity between and challenge 
to the private/public division needs to be borne in mind as I advance veganism 
as a practice that deconstructs anthropocentrism. But let me first sketch the 
background to Wood’s critique on Derrida.
(a)  The (human) subject and sacrifice
In an interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled ‘“Eating Well”, or the Calculation 
of the Subject’50 Derrida deconstructs the notion of subjectivity by engaging 
with the question ‘Who comes after the subject?’. Derrida destabilises 
the question from the onset and broadens the scope of his deconstructive 
undertaking (to include ‘the animal’) by alluding to the segregative nature 
of the pronoun ‘who’ as facilitator of a problematic ‘human’/’animal’ 
dualism. Despite Nancy’s effort to delineate the ‘who’ in his question as a 
sphere transcending subjectivity, as a ‘place “of the subject” that appears 
precisely through deconstruction itself’,51 Derrida remains adamant that the 
‘substitut[ion] [of] a very indeterminate “who” for a “subject” overburdened 
with metaphysical determinations is perhaps not enough to bring about any 
decisive displacement’ of subjectivity.52
Derrida then goes on to draw a nexus between the ‘who’ and the notion of 
‘sacrifice’ and it is here where Derrida, according to Wood, ‘parts company 
with vegetarianism’. Derrida starts off by saying:
I would still try to link the question of the ‘who’ to the question of ‘sacrifice’. The conjunction 
of ‘who’ and ‘sacrifice’ not only recalls the concept of the subject as phallogocentric structure, 
at least according to its dominant schema: one day I hope to demonstrate that this schema 
implies carnivorous virility.53
49 Cornell (note 14 above) 174.
50 J Derrida & J-L Nancy “‘Eating well”, or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jaques 
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Derrida depicts this schema of domination in ‘the whole canonised or 
hegemonic discourse of Western metaphysics or religions’,54 which he calls 
carnophallogocentrism, as:
[a] matter of discerning a place left open, in the very structure of these discourses (which 
are also ‘cultures’) for a noncriminal putting to death. Such are the executions of ingestion, 
incorporation, or introjections of the corpse. An operation as real as it is symbolic when the 
corpse is ‘animal’.55
Wood focuses on the difference between symbolic and actual sacrifice and 
argues that Derrida ‘interiorize[s] the actual eating of animals inside the 
symbolic eating of anything by anyone’, thereby convoluting this distinction 
in an attempt to amalgamate the two manifestations of sacrifice.56 As a degree 
of symbolic sacrifice seems inevitable to Wood, he argues that this superficial 
amalgamation allows us to simultaneously accept this fate and congruently 
evade our ethical responsibility to take steps that could eradicate actual 
sacrifice. Wood argues as follows:
First [Derrida] assimilates – there is no other word for it – real and symbolic sacrifice so that 
real sacrifice (killing and eating flesh) becomes an instance of symbolic sacrifice. With this 
change of focus, the question of eating (well) can be generalized in such a way as to leave 
open the question of real or symbolic sacrifice. And to the extent that in this culture sacrifice 
in the broad (symbolic sense) seems unavoidable, there would seem to be little motivation for 
practical transformations of our engagement in sacrificial behaviour.57
The practical transformation that Wood refers to is of course the ethically 
motivated espousal of a vegetarian existence. Vegetarianism, Wood argues, 
can be seen as a deconstructive practise insofar as it ‘can become a finite 
symbolic substitute for an unlimited and undelimitable responsibility – the 
renegotiation of our Being-toward-other-animals’.58 Wood’s assertion is 
thus that vegetarianism circumvents real sacrifice and, as the symbolic 
manifestations of sacrifice are inescapable, vegetarianism thus provides 
an adequate pragmatic foundation for advancing the ethical relation to the 
nonhuman Other. And this is where his argument becomes problematic. 
It is a dangerous and violent appropriation to place only the actual killing 
of a nonhuman animal in the register of real sacrifice and all other forms 
in the register of symbolic and consequently unavoidable sacrifice. Here, I 
would like to comment on Wood’s interpretation of Derrida’s exposition of 
the inevitability of symbolic sacrifice and his assertion that vegetarianism 
proliferates resistance to anthropocentric schemata of domination.
(b)  Symbolic sacrifice as secondness
In his interview with Nancy, Derrida argues that a sort of symbolic violence 
is a general inevitability of life and that ‘vegetarians, too, partake of animals, 
54 Ibid 112.
55 Ibid.
56 Wood (note 47 above) 30.
57 Ibid 31.
58 Ibid 32.
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even men. They practice a different mode of denegation’.59 Derrida has 
elsewhere argued that ‘a certain cannibalism remains unsurpassable’ and that 
he consequently does not believe in ‘absolute vegetarianism’:
[V]egetarians, like everyone else, can also incorporate, symbolically, something living, 
something of flesh and blood – of man and of God.60
These assertions, I believe, are consistent with Derrida’s argument that the 
ethical relation is an impossible possibility, impossible because we cannot 
condense the ethical to the actual and thereby realise the relation. As is the 
case with (the impossibility of) justice, this does however not relieve us of our 
ethical responsibility to strive towards an ethical relation to the nonhuman 
Other. Clearly, the inevitable violence and denegation that Derrida speaks of 
does not refer to the actual killing of animals for consumption, or to any form 
of violence that can be avoided for that matter.
The inevitability lies in the impossible, that which always resists our 
attempt to heed the call of the Other. Symbolic sacrifice, therefore, dwells 
in the sphere of secondness; it is the manifestations of sacrifice that resists 
concretisation, encapsulation and eradication. This form of sacrifice cannot 
be concretised because there will always be a surplus to our system of 
meaning that resists an attempt to interpretively harmonise any ‘sign’61 
with the suffering. This manifestation of sacrifice cannot be semeiotically 
encapsulated either because there is no enclosed circle in which interpretation 
of the sacrifice takes place, ‘the sign itself always points us to another sign 
beyond the repetition implicit in self-reference’.62 This sacrifice is analogous 
to what Cornell refers to as ‘the irreducible exteriority of suffering’; neither 
past nor future instances of this manifestation of sacrifice can be ‘interpreted 
away’.63 Symbolic sacrifice is the residue that evades internment by any 
system of signs. With this in mind, let me now turn to the problematical 
aspects of Wood’s assertion that vegetarianism deconstructs humanist 
predilections.
(c)  The anthropocentric predilection of vegetarianism
The argument that vegetarianism is a form of deconstruction that resists 
actual sacrifice and anthropocentric configurations falls short on two levels. 
Firstly, we need to clearly delineate the disparity between symbolic and actual 
sacrifice. If we are to subscribe to my argument that symbolic sacrifice stems 
from inevitable violation and real sacrifice from violative conduct that can be 
avoided, we will see why vegetarianism does not circumvent real sacrifice.
59 Derrida & Nancy (note 50 above) 114–5.
60 J Derrida & E Roudinesco For what Tomorrow (2004) 67–8.
61 For Pierce, a ‘sign’ is something that carries extended meaning, something through which we ‘know 
something more’. See T Zick ‘Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First 
Amendment Ethnography’ (2004) 45 William and Mary LR 2261, 2330. 
62 Cornell (note 39 above) 1198.
63 Ibid 1170.
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For the animals that produce the by-products that form part of a vegetarian 
diet, life is anything but natural and nonviolative. After being debeaked 
to avoid the cannibalistic behaviour that would otherwise ensue from the 
overcrowded conditions, layer hens are confined to battery cages so small 
that they are denied even the most basic desire to spread their wings. 
Layer hens endure these circumstances until they are no longer physically 
able to produce enough eggs to outweigh the costs of keeping them alive. 
They are then usually sold to low-income households for home slaughter 
or killed.64 Sadly, the reality that accompanies the dairy that we consume 
is not any rosier. Predestined for a lifetime of pregnancies and milking, 
cows are fed an artificially manipulated diet and hormones that promote 
lactation, resulting in ten times the milk production of a cow under natural 
conditions. After an abnormally short life of three to five years, the cows are 
sent to the slaughterhouse where they are killed and processed into meat for 
consumption.65 It is hard to accept Wood’s implicit argument that the sacrifice 
typifying these animals’ lives are merely symbolic. The sacrifice is very real 
and can, more importantly, be avoided by adopting a vegan lifestyle.
There are some that may argue that the lives of these animals need not 
be so violative, that we can circumvent these harsh conditions by rearing 
animals in ‘free-range’ environments and implementing welfare strategies 
to better their overall life conditions. It is not my goal to address the false 
promises and pragmatic impracticalities of these ‘free-range’ conditions and 
welfarist approaches.66 I’d rather like to demonstrate that, even if we accept 
the possibility of raising and utilising these animals in a way that is completely 
natural and nonviolative, vegetarianism as a form of deconstruction will still 
fail to resist anthropocentric configurations.
Secondly, vegetarianism is underscored by the notion that human beings 
have the right to freely take and use the by-products of nonhuman animals 
as we see fit. Granted that nonhuman animals are not directly killed for this 
purpose, they still occupy a dimension as sacrificial beings; they are seen as 
means to a (human) end. This anthropocentric approach places man in the 
position of the dominant subject with the nonhuman animal being denounced 
to subservient Other. No degree of ‘humane’ treatment or loving affection 
can eliminate this anthropocentrism inherent to vegetarianism. The slave 
working under reasonable or even plush conditions is still exactly that: a slave, 
an individual having no other alternative than being servant to her master. 
The argument that vegetarianism can deconstruct and subsequently resist 
our anthropocentric way of dealing with and thinking about other animals is 
consequently internally paradoxical. It is true that:
64 M Pickover Animal Rights in South Africa (2005) 153.
65 Ibid 149.
66 For more on ‘free-range’ conditions see J Safran Foer Eating Animals (2009) 61.
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carophallogocentrism is not a dispensation of Being toward which resistance is futile; it is a 
mutually reinforcing network of powers, schemata of domination, and investments that has 
to reproduce itself to stay in existence.67
These schemata of domination can and should furthermore be resisted, but by 
attempting to resist one anthropocentric institution with another one, we run 
the risk of perpetuating the system we seek to eradicate.
v  concLusIon
This article should by no means be misconstrued as a critique of animal 
welfarism or vegetarianism as such. It should go without saying that 
vegetarianism is indeed a more ethical way of being than a carnivorous 
existence, resisting (if nothing else) the killing of so many of our fellow 
earthlings. By exposing the anthropocentric values woven into the supposedly 
unprejudiced fabric that constitute vegetarianism, I have merely tried to argue 
that it would be philosophically inconsistent to associate vegetarianism with 
the deconstruction of carnophallogocentrism as there can fundamentally be 
no ensuing displacement of the (human) subject as dominant figure.
My primary aspiration was to advance veganism as a way of being that 
allows us to move towards the enactment of the ethical relation to the nonhuman 
Other. To this end, I started off by examining the interaction between law, 
justice and deconstruction. Through Derrida’s conceptualisation of justice 
as a state of puzzlement that cannot be resolved, we saw that justice serves 
as a limit to any system of law. The second part of this article was devoted 
to an engagement with Cornell’s project of reconceiving deconstruction as 
the philosophy of the limit, a project that exposed the ethical force behind 
deconstruction and protected the ethical relation from being degenerated into 
symmetry and the Other being denied her otherness. The philosophy of the 
limit also showed us that the ethical relation can never be realised, it remains 
an impossible possibility. The question then, is what mode of being will enable 
me to foster a nonviolative relationship to the (nonhuman) Other? In answering 
this question, I exposed the inherent anthropocentric and sacrificial character 
of vegetarianism and advanced veganism as a way of being that allows us to 
criticise and resist subjugation of the (nonhuman) Other.
Ethical philosophy, it seems, fulfils an important critical function. It 
exposes ill-conceived formulations and schematisations and depicts ensuing 
limitations. No one can claim a just existence or actualise the ethical relation 
to the nonhuman Other, not even the vegan. Justice (and the realisation of 
the ethical relation) might, sadly, indeed only come in the next world. But 
it simultaneously also poses a test to our humanity, daring us to engage in a 
battle that is both a necessity and an impossibility.
67 Wood (note 47 above) 33.
30 (2012) 28 SAJHR
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Adherents of the ‘new welfarist’ approach advocate welfare reforms as essential short-term
steps en route to the ultimate ideal of animal rights. A critical engagement with the
ideological underpinnings of animal welfare theory and animal rights theory illustrates the
contrasting moral spaces that the animal occupies in these theories and that the ‘new
welfarist’ approach is philosophically unsound in assuming that these approaches are
ideologically compatible. Karin van Marle’s ‘jurisprudence of slowness’ and Jacques
Derrida’s exposition of the sacrificial logic underlying Western culture’s exclusion of
animals from the ‘thou shalt not kill’ proscription provides a framework within which to
illustrate and engage with the ideological purlieu that separates these theories.
1 Introduction
Humans’ relationship with other animals has proven to be a complex, confusing
and disconcerting one, often exposing the capacity to arbitrarily discriminate,
marginalise and enslave. Through centuries of denouncing animals as objects to
be used as we see fit, we have normalised the torture, exploitation and killing of
our fellow earthlings. We embody a set of assumptions wherein animals occupy
a space as sacrificial beings unworthy of moral concern, making our actions seem
rational. This exclusionary logic is maintained by a complex network of relations
and traditions. Jacques Derrida uses the term ‘carnophallogocentrism’ to illustrate
the complexity of the various axes that configure the sacrificial structure
characterising ‘the (human) subject’ and the hegemony that typifies our
interaction with animals. He delineates carnophallogocentrism as: 
BComm (Law) (Cum Laude) LLB (Cum Laude) LLM (Jurisprudence) (Cum Laude). Senior Lecturer,*
Department of Jurisprudence, University of South Africa. I gratefully acknowledge the financial
assistance of the College of Law Research and Innovation Committee, University of South Africa. 
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The whole canonized or hegemonic discourse of Western metaphysics or
religions, including the most original forms that this discourse might assume today
... [being discourse that is] a matter of discerning a place left open, in the very
structure of these discourses (which are also ‘cultures’) for a noncriminal putting
to death. Such are the executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjections of
the corpse. An operation as real as it is symbolic when the corpse is ‘animal’.1
A deconstruction of carnophallogocentrism, for Derrida, fundamentally
necessitates an interrogation of our (anthropocentric) conceptualisation of
animality and the ethical, political and legal consequences thereof. Whilst the
question of animality ‘is difficult and enigmatic in itself, it also represents the limit
upon which all the great questions are formed and determined, as well as all the
concepts that attempt to delimit what is “proper to man”, the essence and future
of humanity, ethics, politics, law, “human rights”, “crimes against humanity”,
“genocide”, etc’.  Derrida engages with these (de)limitations by questioning the2
way in which the human-animal distinction is drawn in Western metaphysical
discourse as an oppositional cut. By juxtaposing the human (subject) and animal
(object), the differences between humans and animals are conceptualised as a
contradiction and our hegemony is maintained. I have previously argued that we
need a deconstruction and ensuing displacement of the human subject as
phallogocentric structure and patriarchal centre of beings and that we need to
embrace a mode of being that allows us to promote an ethical relation to the
animal Other. To this end, I explored the possibility of justice, specifically in
relation to the animal, and advanced veganism as a form of deconstruction and
one ethical way of being that allows us to criticise and resist anthropocentric
configurations that maintain and perpetuate subjugation of the animal Other.3
Destabilisation of the human-animal oppositional distinction however not only
challenges the anthropocentric order in which the human claims a position as
patriarchal centre of beings, but opens up a space for a further deconstruction of
traditions and institutions that are founded on, and maintain such distinction, like
the de jure legitimisation of animal exploitation and sacrifice. The law has always
facilitated and legitimised a culture of animal sacrifice, excluding animals from the
status of being full subjects of the law and denying them basic legal protection.
The anthropocentric constraints that limit and shape traditional legal discourse
and the way in which the concept of legal subjectivity has historically been
constituted, raises several important issues with regard to the question whether
Derrida and Nancy ‘“Eating well” or the calculation of the subject: An interview with Jacques1
Derrida’ (trans Connor and Ronell) in Cadava, Connor and Nancy (eds) Who comes after the
subject? (1991) 112.
Derrida and Roudinesco For what tomorrow ... A dialogue (trans Fort) (2001) 63.2
See De Villiers ‘Towards an ethical relation to the nonhuman Other: Deconstruction, veganism and3
the law’ (2012) SAJHR 18.
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legal institutions can (at all) be reformed in order to embrace animals as full legal
subjects. Issues pertaining to juridical images of personality or personhood,
reproduction and representation where the law marks genealogies of different
kinds of being, the ‘lawful’ space of the animal and the function of law as an
instrument of social change and institution all warrant serious critical
engagement.4
My focus in this article is a more modest one: I will consider law’s relation to
animal subjugation, both as facilitator of animal sacrifice and as possible enabler
of animal liberation, by philosophically examining the relationship between the two
most prominent theories intended to address the plight of the animal. I will
illustrate how the animal advocacy movement has since its genesis been broadly
divided into two camps, one advocating for the ‘humane’ treatment of animals and
the other for the complete abolition of human (ab)use of animals. The distinction
and interaction between these approaches, respectively known as animal
welfarism and the rights based approach, has been muddied in recent years by
intellectual and practical efforts. This has led to the emergence of ‘new welfarism’,
an approach that sees welfarist reforms as essential short term steps en route to
the ultimate ideal of animal rights. My main aim in this article is to explore the
ideological foundations underlying animal welfare and animal rights theory and
to illustrate that these approaches are based on contrasting and irreconcilable
ideologies, rendering an amalgamation of the approaches highly problematic and
detrimental to the ideal of animal liberation. 
To the extent that the (present) attempt at synthesising a welfarist- and rights
based approach finds its point of departure in a (past) conflict period, I am of the
opinion that an engagement with the historical-ideological trajectory of the animal
defence movement is vital to understanding and thinking about the problem of
animal oppression that we face. History, as Douzinas and Gearey aptly note
whilst commenting on the value of slow reflection, ‘is not the nightmare from
which we must awake, but the process which we must slow down and
understand’.  I will accordingly start off by briefly sketching the history of the5
animal advocacy movement and highlighting the developments that facilitated the
divergence of the welfare- and rights based approaches. I will then examine the
rationale and assumptions underlying the new welfarist position and argue that
this approach constitutes an uncritical ‘privileging of the present’ that is ultimately
For a comprehensive engagement with these issues and other related themes, see Otomo and4
Mussawir (eds) Law and the question of the animal: A critical jurisprudence (2013); Haldar ‘Law and
animalities’ (2009) Law and Humanities 71; Haldar ‘Zoologian jurisprudence’ (2011) International
Journal for the Semiotics of Law 291; Braverman Zooland: The institution of captivity (2012);
Braverman ‘Animal mobilegalities: The regulation of animal movement in the American city’ (2013)
Humanimalia 104.
Douzinas and Geary A Critical jurisprudence: The political philosophy of justice (2005) 255.5
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to the detriment of the ideal that animal rightists strive to realise. I will draw on
Karin van Marle’s jurisprudence of slowness to argue that we need to create a
(moment of) thinking that is able to address the plight of the animal and
meaningfully reflect on the way in which we utilise the law to facilitate the
transformation towards animal liberation. By following Van Marle’s deconstructive
approach, which she connects with ‘slowness, lingering and greater attention’,6
we can reflect on the fundamental ideological discrepancy between the welfare-
and rights based approaches that makes a theoretical and strategic
amalgamation highly problematic. In order to illustrate this ideological dissonance
I will engage with Derrida’s thesis that humans maintain a conceptual human-
animal divide by failing to embrace animals in the proscription ‘thou shalt not kill’
and examining how this prohibition translates into the respective theories.
2 The history of the animal advocacy movement
The history of a united attempt at addressing the interests of animals in the
Western world can be dated back to the eighteenth century. After a sixty year
period that saw several works critiquing the widespread brutality towards animals,
the 1800s subsequently saw a united effort take shape in England to address the
plight of animals.  These literary works inter alia denounced sadistic practices like7
cock throwing, critiqued the cruel treatment of horses used by carters and
advanced the notion that the murderous behaviour of criminals stems from
society’s failure to suppress all forms of cruelty.  Whilst these works did not enjoy8
mainstream readership and were generally regarded as ‘super sensitive or even
eccentric’, they played an important role in gradually sensitising the general public
to change: ‘the writers were, so to speak, the artillery bombarding a position from
a reasonably safe distance; the brunt of the fighting had to be done by the
Members of Parliament’.9
This struggle began in 1800 when Sir W Pulteney introduced a bill in the
English Parliament that was aimed at the prevention of bull-baiting, a cruel form
of ‘entertainment’ that had steadily decreased in popularity amongst the upper
classes in the years following the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Despite the
decreasing popularity of bull baiting, the majority of the Parliament found that the
bill interfered with the amusement of the people and opposed the bill.  Led by10
Lord Thomas Erskine, a more detailed and inclusive bill aimed at prohibiting
cruelty to domestic animals was introduced nine years later and passed in the
Van Marle ‘Law’s time, particularity and slowness’ (2003) SAJHR 239 at 245.6
Silverstein Unleashing rights: Law, meaning and the animal rights movement (1996) 30.7
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House of Lords before it was rejected in the House of Commons. A new era of
benevolence had to wait until 1822 when we saw the first instance of a legislature
regulating and criminalising cruelty to an animal with the adoption of the Ill
Treatment of Cattle (or Martin’s) Act.11
During this time, structured efforts began to grow outside the realm of the
legislature and in 1824 Richard Martin and other English humanitarians organised
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA).  The SPCA is12
regarded as the first animal protection organisation and is credited with laying the
foundations for what would eventually become the animal welfare movement.13
The SPCA struggled in the early years after its formation and would only gain
noteworthy momentum in 1840 when, after becoming Queen, Victoria ordered the
organisation to add the prefix ‘royal’ to its name. This gave the organisation great
leverage and enabled the RSPCA to establish additional associations in Ireland,
Germany, Austria, Belgium and Holland.14
Whilst the welfare movement in England initially focused exclusively on
cruelty to domesticated animals, a new branch of animal protection was born in
the 1860s when the antivivisection movement formed.  With this, the focus15
expanded to include animals used in scientific experimentation. The formation of
the antivivisection movement would bring about the first split in the larger animal
advocacy movement. Whilst some proponents of the movement sought to
minimise the suffering imposed on animals used in experimentation, others
advocated the complete abolition of vivisection. These ideological inconsistencies
divided the animal advocacy movement into the antivivisection camp and the
welfare camp.  Notwithstanding these ruptures, the new branch of animal16
advocacy achieved notable success. The British Cruelty to Animals Act passed
in 1976, securing a foundation for the regulation of animal use in laboratories.17
The animal welfare movement soon moved to the United States, a country
that had tremendous world influence. After retiring as the secretary of the
American legation to Russia, Henry Bergh returned to the United States with the
ambition of introducing the idea of animal protection and organising an American
equivalent of the RSPCA.  Supported by humanitarians like Abraham Lincoln,18
Bergh’s efforts lead to the first anticruelty statute being passed in the State of
New York in 1866. A few days before the act was passed, parliament also
Nash The rights of nature: A history of environmental ethics (1989) 25.11
Ibid.12
Silverstein (n 7) 31.13
Carson Men, beasts and gods: A history of cruelty and kindness to animals (1972) 54.14
Silverstein (n 7) 31.15
Ibid. 16
Nash (n 11) 26.17
Id 46.18
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chartered a humane society. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, headed by Bergh, was the first of its kind in the Western hemisphere.
Enjoying delegated police powers, the ASPCA was able to prosecute numerous
incidents of animal cruelty.19
2.1 The shift from welfarism to rights
After the death of Bergh, the American humane movement gradually lapsed into
‘a dog and cat concern’. Whilst several factors contributed to this shift, the most
prominent factors included the location of the welfare organisations in the cities,
where the majority of animals were domesticated animals, and limited city funds
being allocated to address doorstep issues like stray animals.20
The World Wars and worldwide industrialisation amplified this shift and
animal welfare issues were gradually pushed to the periphery. Consequently, the
welfare movement lost momentum during the first half of the century.  The 1960s21
brought a steady revival of animal welfare concerns, but it would not be until the
1970s that the intellectual efforts of scholars like Peter Singer would revitalise the
movement and initiate a shift towards rights talk. It is important to note that, whilst
Singer’s approach to animal liberation is grounded in utilitarian theory and not
rights theory, his work has nevertheless provided a philosophical foundation for
animal rights theorists and played a pivotal role in the creation of many animal
rights organisations, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA), the world’s largest animal rights organisation.  The re-born movement22
rapidly gained momentum during the 1980s and established popularity as the
‘animal rights movement’, advocating the philosophy that animals should be
included in the community of rights-holders.23
The emergence of the rights movement was accompanied by inevitable
tension and conflict with the animal welfare movement, whose approach to animal
advocacy differed in ‘focus, philosophy, language and tactics’.  By now, the24
welfare movement focussed almost exclusively on companion animals and turned
a blind eye to the plight of farm animals and animals used in experimentation. As
Helena Silverstein notes, ‘it was not uncommon for board members of humane
organisations to support hunting and meat consumption. Moreover, welfare
groups held that treatment of animals should be guided by compassion: animals
deserve some protection, deserve to be treated humanely, but do not have
Carson (n 14) 96.19
Niven (n 8) 109.20
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rights’.  The focus of welfarists has always been one of reform. Animal welfarists25
seek the implementation of legislation that improves the lives of the animals that
we utilise and not a basic shift in the way we see and relate to animals.
Conversely the animal rights movement rejects human utilisation of animals,
irrespective of the degree of ‘humaneness’ accompanying the use. Animal
rightists contend that a desire for meat consumption, leather products, hunting or
entertainment cannot validate or justify the emanating suffering imposed on
animals and therefore seek a radical shift in the way we relate to animals. For the
rightists, this shift will not stem from mere compassion but requires the extension
of rights to animals.26
Whilst the chasm between the welfare camp and the rights camp remains,
recent years have seen the gap shrink and in some cases even disappear. The
reason for this narrowing, as we will see, has been both practical and theoretical.
Some welfare societies have started to expand their focus to the plight of animals
used in food production and experimentation and some rightists believe that
welfare strategies should be employed en route to the extension of rights to
animals. Some theorists see (ideological) common ground between these two
approaches and argue that there can consequently be no meaningful separation. 
The consequence of this is that ‘animal rights’ has become a generic term
that refers to a wide range of views and approaches to the protection of animals.
Tom Beauchamp, for instance, sees the distinction between the two camps as ‘a
crude tool for dividing up the world of protective support for animals’ and rejects
the use of ‘animal rights’ as a polarising term that suggests that there is ‘inherent
conflict or an inseparable gulf between “rightists” and “welfarists”’.  Rather, he27
argues that ‘the many theories that afford protection to animals are better
analysed as a spectrum of accounts spread across a continuum that ranges from,
on one end, a minimal set of human obligations to animals (eg, “do not treat
animals cruelly” and “do not slaughter inhumanely”) to, on the other end, a
maximal and prohibitionist set of human obligations to animals (eg, “do not kill
animals” and “do not utilise animals in laboratories”)’.  These hybrid approaches28
maintain a new welfarist stance that supposes the possibility of mutually
reinforcing reciprocity between welfarism and rights theory. 
In the remainder of this article I will argue that this continuum account of
animal advocacy theories and the hybrid approach of new welfarism are
theoretically unsound and counterproductive. The welfare- and rights based
approaches rest on fundamentally incompatible views on the place of animals in
Ibid (own emphasis).25
See Regan The case for animal rights 2 ed (2004).26
Beauchamp ‘Rights theory and animal rights’ in Beauchamp and Frey (eds) The Oxford handbook27
of animal ethics (2011) 200-201.
Id 201.28
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our moral community and are therefore indeed, in my opinion, separated by an
ideological gulf. This gulf, I will furthermore argue, needs to be maintained if we
are to circumvent some of the violent and reductive aspects of the law relating to
animals and ultimately facilitate the much needed shift in the way we view
animals.
3 The amalgamation of welfarism and rights
The new welfare approach regards adherence to welfare measures that aim to
address the suffering of animals as important incremental steps towards the
ultimate goal of animal rights, animal welfare is seen as the short term means
towards the long term goal of animal rights. As Gary Francione explains, ‘it
appears as though the new welfarists believe that some causal connection exists
between cleaner cages today and empty cages tomorrow, or between more
“humane” slaughter practices today and no slaughtering tomorrow’.  The29
consequence of this approach is that the ‘animal rights’ movement ‘temporarily’
pursues an ideological and practical agenda that concurs with the approach
followed by those who condone the utility status of animals.30
The rationale behind the new welfarist approach is twofold. Firstly, welfarist
reforms are seen as bringing about positive change to the conditions in which
animals live and die by reducing their suffering and it is believed that these types
of improvements can incrementally lead to the eradication of all animal (ab)use.
Secondly, the extension of rights to animals is seen as a ‘utopian’ ideal that can
only (possibly) be realised in the long-term. Consequently, the new welfarists
argue, we need concrete normative guidance in the form of welfare policies to
inform the way we interact with animals on a day to day basis en route to the ideal
of animal liberation.31
As Francione argues, a certain confusion regarding the micro and macro
levels of moral theory preoccupies the reasoning of the new welfarists.  Ingrid32
Newkirk, co-founder and current president of PETA, sees welfare reform as
something that ‘can only bring us closer to our ultimate goal’ of animal rights.33
Newkirk uses the example of a statute requiring that a thirsty cow awaiting
slaughter be provided with water to illustrate her support of welfare legislation.
Newkirk criticises animal rights advocates who refused to support such a statute
Francione ‘Animal rights and animal welfare’ (1996) Rutgers LR 397 at 399.29
Ibid.30
Id 399-400. Animal rights theorists Steven Wise and Susan Hankin also argue in favour of an31
incremental approach to ultimately secure rights for animals; see Wise Drawing the line: Science
and the case for animal rights (2002); Hankin ‘Not a living room sofa: Changing the legal status of
companion animals’ 2007 Rutgers Journal of Law and Public Policy 314.
Francione (n 29) 422-426. 32
Id 423.33
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on the basis that it maintains the utility status of animals, arguing that she ‘cannot
imagine how those vegetarians with clean hands, who declined to help, could
explain their politics to the poor cows, sitting in the dust with parched throats’.34
I have little doubt that most people, and I include meat eaters as well as
ethical vegetarians and vegans, will feel a moral imperative to give water to a
thirsty cow awaiting slaughter and will act on this belief when having the
opportunity to do so. The point is, of course, that it is not a matter of either
supporting welfare reform or turning a blind eye to the cow’s suffering. It is
possible to feel morally obligated to minimise her suffering without supporting an
animal welfare stance merely because it also strives to lessen suffering. In fact,
there is good reason to oppose welfarism if you believe that it perpetuates the
institutionalisation of animal exploitation that lies at the very core of the suffering
that the cow awaiting her slaughter has to endure.35
Francione uses a hypothetical scenario to forcefully deconstruct Newkirk’s
argument and expose the interconnectedness between the suffering of exploited
animals, which presents only one interest that warrants consideration and
protection, and the enabling ideological foundations of the schemata of
domination in which that suffering occurs. Francione asks that we place ourselves
in the position of ‘a guard working in a prison in which completely innocent people
are being tortured and jailed by government security forces for no reason other
than that they have political views that differ from those of the government’.  As36
you disagree with the way in which the prisoners are treated, you take all the
steps that someone in your position can to minimise the suffering of the prisoners.
This means that you refrain from directly partaking in the infliction of torture and
physical ill-treatment of the prisoners and provide hungry and thirsty prisoners
with food and water when you are able to do so.37
Upon deciding that you not only disagree with the institutionalised violation
of the prisoners’ basic rights but that you want to eradicate the system of political
persecution and bereavement of other interests ‘that together define the minimal
conditions of what it means to not be treated exclusively as a means to an end’,
Ibid. For an adaptation of Ingrid Newkirk’s thirsty cow story to illustrate how the pursuit of welfare34
reform is detrimental to the animal rights movement, see DeCoux ‘Speaking for the modern
Prometheus: The significance of animal suffering to the abolition movement’ (2009) Animal Law 9.
Taimie Bryant shares Francione’s view that the property status of animals, which is maintained35
and perpetuated by welfarism, is foundational to the problem of animal exploitation. Bryant argues
‘the reason that the legal status of animals as the property of humans has such a dramatic effect
is that it rests so firmly on the ideology of humans’ presumed superiority to animals and humans’
presumed centrality in the natural world’. Bryant ‘Sacrificing the sacrifice of animals: Legal
personhood for animals, the status of animals as property, and the presumed primacy of humans’
(2008) Rutgers LJ 247.
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you resign from your position as guard and form an organisation that seeks to
destabilise the regime.38
This pursuit of destabilisation can be approached from at least two
perspectives. Firstly you can seek the enactment of legislation requiring that the
prisoners periodically be given water and food, except under circumstances that
the warden deems it ‘necessary’ that food and water be withheld in the interest
of state security. This can be followed by another law requiring that prisoners be
tortured ‘humanely’, except under circumstances wherein it is necessary to
deviate from this directive. Alternatively you can aim your efforts at the foundation
of the institutionalised exploitation, at the government that condones and
facilitates the imprisonment and torturing of people for the regime’s self-benefit.
You might raise public awareness on the existence of such practises through
demonstrations or protests and lobby for political change.39
These two approaches differ significantly in focus. The first approach
exclusively addresses the prisoner’s interest in not suffering and seeks that
legislative reform concretise at macro level what the guard, whilst working in
prison, did at micro level. Whilst the second approach continues to address the
prisoner’s pain and suffering, it acknowledges this pain and suffering as an
outgrowth of the system of institutionalised exploitation in which people are
treated as a means to an end and aims to destabilise the hegemonic foundation
rather than alleviating the symptoms.40
The guard faced by a hungry and thirsty prisoner decides on an issue of
morality at a micro level that concerns a course of action in response to another
person’s suffering that stems from a socially and legally sanctioned deprivation
of her interests. The guard’s response and approach at macro level is an entirely
different issue: ‘it is not the case that the decision to offer water to the prisoner
requires that the guard try to secure laws to achieve that reduction of suffering on
an institutional basis by, for example, providing a glass of water to each prisoner
on the way to execution’.  Whilst the interest in not suffering is certainly one that41
warrants protection, there are other interests at stake that need to be recognised
as well.  The interest in not suffering is in fact secondary to the interest in not42
being treated instrumentally in a system of institutionalised exploitation when the
Id 424.38
Ibid.39
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suffering emanates from that very utilisation: ‘after all, even if the prisoner was not
tortured, or subjected to thirst and hunger – that is, even if the interest in pain and
suffering was respected completely – the prisoner would still be a prisoner’.43
I want to argue that the welfare-rights amalgamation is akin to an attempt at
mixing oil and water. The discordant ideological foundations of welfare theory and
rights theory renders a consolidation disagreeable for the same reason that the
molecular structure of water and oil makes suffusion impossible. Welfarism
accepts the utility status of animals and maintains the anthropocentric framework
in which it functions, whilst rights theory seeks the total abolition of human use of
animals and attempts to displace this hegemonic structure. The constituent parts
of new welfarism are thus fundamentally at odds, rendering the approach
internally fissured and philosophically unsound. 
4 The theoretical foundations and internal
paradoxes of new welfarism
As stated before, my main aim in this article is to illustrate the ideological
inconsistencies regarding the place of animals in our moral community that
inheres in the space that separates welfare- and rights based approaches, and
not to elaborate on the theories underlying the respective approaches. A brief
exposition of the theoretical foundations of these approaches is however
necessary to elucidate and facilitate the following discussion. 
4.1 Utilitarianism
The philosophical grounding of animal welfarism can be traced back to the
writings of scholars like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, whose work
provides a framework for a utilitarian defence of animal interests. Up until the late-
twentieth century Mill’s views were almost regarded as a canonical expression of
utilitarian theory, with utilitarian thought not undergoing any major changes in the
hundred years since Mill’s contribution.  Mill’s views provided a model that44
approaches utilitarian theory as ‘consequentialist, welfarist, aggregative,
maximising, and impersonal’.  His views were consequentialist insofar as the45
rightness or wrongness of an act depended on the goodness or badness of its
consequences. His views were welfarist in that rightness was seen as a function
of goodness, the goodness being understood as counting the welfare of both
humans and animals. The impersonal and aggregative dimensions of this model
Francione (n 29) 426.43
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stem from the view that rightness should be determined through the neutral
assessment of the increase and reduction in the welfare of all influenced by the
act, and that the increases should be calculated across all subjects affected.
Lastly his views were maximising in that the principle of utility was formulated, in
light of welfarist considerations, as ‘always maximise net happiness’.46
It was however Bentham who had a greater impact on utilitarian theory as a
foundation for animal welfare. Bentham claimed that a being’s capacity to suffer
is a sufficient condition for moral consideration. The question, he argued, ‘is not
Can they reason? nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?’  With this, Bentham47
included animal suffering in the social utility function and almost all the utilitarians
after Bentham, including Robert Nozick and most prominently Peter Singer, would
follow suit.  It is not hard to see what effect this emphasis on suffering has on the48
utilitarian argument, ‘it simply seizes upon the pain involved, weighs it against the
pain on the other side (though the method of doing so is not obvious and hardly
ever discussed), and decides accordingly what ought to be done’.  It thus comes49
down to a utilitarian balancing: the right action will be the one that produces the
largest summative balance of pleasure over pain.50
4.2 Moral rights
Animal rightists, on the other hand, reject utilitarian balancing and believe that the
rightness of an act towards an animal requires the recognition of moral rights.
The theoretical underpinnings of animal rights can be found in natural law and
natural rights theory.  Human rights developed from these theories and provided51
a framework that was adapted to advance rights theories that can accommodate
animals. Consequently the term ‘rights’ fundamentally has the same meaning in
both human- and animal rights paradigms.
In order to claim that animals have rights within a natural rights theory,
theorists advance different views on what (exact criterion) grants an animal moral
citizenship or standing. Whilst there is no consensus on this point, they commonly
employ an interest theory to assert that animals share one or more attributes or
interests that we regard as fundamental to being human and that merit protection
by rights. These attributes or interests, they all agree, grant animals the rights to
Id 172-173.46
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inter alia life, liberty and bodily integrity. The most comprehensive theory of
animal rights was developed by Tom Regan, who primarily relies on subjective
consciousness to argue that animals are, like humans, ‘subjects of a life’ and that
this grants animals rights that cannot be violated for the sake of human interests.
Regan argues as follows:
[Animals] bring the mystery of a unified psychological presence to the world. Like
us, they possess a variety of sensory, cognitive, conative, and volitional
capacities. They see and hear, believe and desire, remember and anticipate, and
plan and intend. Moreover as is true in our case, what happens to them matters
to them. Physical pleasures and pain – these they share with us. But they also
share fear and contentment, anger and loneliness, frustration and satisfaction,
and cunning and imprudence; these and a host of other psychological states and
dispositions collectively help define the mental lives and relative well-being of
those humans and animals who ... are ‘subjects of a life’.52
Steven Wise grounds his argument for animal rights on Immanuel Kant’s
philosophy of dignity and proposes a neo-Kantian test to determine which animals
possess ‘practical autonomy’ and subsequent moral rights.  Wise’s approach is53
related to Regan’s insofar as Wise argues that practical autonomy ‘is not
predicated on the ability to reason, but on a being’s possession of preferences,
the ability to act to satisfy them, and the sense that it is she who wants and seeks
satisfaction’.  Rights theorist Gary Chartier also argues that animals possess54
moral rights and draws on natural rights theory to advocate for (legal) animal
rights.55
By regarding animals as possessing moral rights, these theorists bestow a
distinctive moral status on animals. This moral status cannot be harmonised with
a view of animals as utility objects or the property of their owners, a view that
welfarists readily accept. Animal rightists see animals as possessing inherent
value separate from their usefulness to humans. The new welfarist attempt at
synthesising animal welfare and rights dissolves this progressive ideological
foundation that undergirds animal rights theory into general rhetoric that serves
to justify our continued containment of animals in a subordinate position, thereby
entrenching the status quo and indefinitely postponing the striving for justice. The
water cannot eventually infuse with the oil to create a new substance. But in order
to understand why welfarism will not serve the ideal that the animal rights
Regan Defending animal rights (2001) 42-43. 52
Wise ‘Animal rights, one step at a time’ in Sunstein and Nussbaum (eds) Animal rights: Current53
debates and new directions (2004) 19-50.
Goodman ‘Animal ethics and the law’ 2006 Temple LR 1291 at 1301.54
See Chartier ‘Natural law and animal rights’ (2010) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence55
33.
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movement strives to realise, we need to critically reflect on the philosophical
foundations, the ‘molecular structure’, of these theories rather than thoughtlessly
yielding to the here-and-now anthropocentric legal disposition in the hope that
minor changes in the way we abuse animals now will one day bring about animal
rights.
The latter approach amounts to what Van Marle calls a ‘privileging of the
present’ that counteracts ‘visions of a future, a not-yetness that is never present,
always postponed’.  We focus so intently on the present, the fact that we do not56
have any animal rights today and will not have any animal rights tomorrow, that
we do not take the time to critically examine the approach we employ in
(re)‘negotiating the past, present and future’.  I believe Van Marle’s call to57
attentiveness and her proposal of slowness is needed to create ‘a thinking’ and
an instant from which we can critically (re)consider the new welfare approach to
animal liberation.
5 The need for a moment of slowness and reflection
amidst chaotic violence towards animals
The questions of time and memory lie central to Van Marle’s jurisprudence of
slowness. Milan Kundera’s reflection on the ecstatic slowness of the motorcyclist,
cut off from both the past and the future in the instant of his flight, provides Van
Marle with a starting point from which to contemplate the law and (legal)
interpretation and their relation to time. From here, Van Marle takes on the task
of creating an approach of slowness in the midst of chaotic movement.
Law’s chronology is one of inescapable speed, inescapable because of the
very nature of law. ‘Law, because of its rule-bound nature, and judgements,
because of their over-emphasis on calculation, excludes the needs of the
particular and ... “closes the door of the law”’.  This means that the (needs of the)58
particular moment become enveloped in the general and therein lies the violence
of the law: ‘the violence (and reductive nature) [of the law] refers to law’s
tendency to make the particular general and the concrete abstract’.  Whilst this59
intrinsic characteristic of the law and legal judgement is inescapable, it should
always be borne in mind as we engage in legal reading and interpretation. We
cannot eradicate this inherent characteristic of the law, but an approach of
slowness can help us circumvent some of its reductive tendencies.60
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Slowness calls for a disruption and a suspension to create a moment from
which we can (re)consider. ‘Law’s present is always that of the need to establish,
to distinguish, and to create sure foundations. The present can only be redeemed
by affirming a time that is not one of resolution; rather, a holding open of many
versions of events, of differently inflected truths’.  These inflected truths reside61
in the past of collective memory. Memory as ‘a support of an embodied and
embedded recollection’ constitutes disruption in itself, for, as Van Marle reminds
us, ‘memory ... is a construction and in this sense the traditional concepts of
linear and chronological time are disrupted’.  Here we see why the past is as62
significant for Van Marle in ‘de-privileging the present’ as the future is. Legal
interpretation’s relation with the past and future illustrates a paradox:
Because we employ our past experiences when we imagine and our imagination
when we remember, the paradox of imagining the past and remembering the
future is created. Time, memory and imagination accordingly become part of a
more complex configuration than a mere linear or chronological remembering or
projection.63
This relation exposes multiple voices, differences and manifold notions of
truth. The question that Van Marle poses acknowledges and seeks to address
this complexity: how do we listen to these voices and engage with these truths to
and from the here and now? Or, (re)turning to my focus in this article, how do we
interpret and relate the ‘imagined’ past and continuing violence towards animals
and the only present legal recourse of welfare reform against a postponed and
‘remembered’ future of animal liberation?
The multiplicity of voices and truths cannot be heard in (law’s) speed. We are
called to slow down and firstly acknowledge and contemplate the spirit of
complexity peculiarising the specific situation which, as Van Marle reminds us, is
situated in the past, present and future. In order to adequately address these
different dimensions, she calls for ‘a disruption of a chronological and linear
conception of time’ so that we can embrace the nuances of the situation.  Van64
Marle uses artistic passages to illustrate how such a disruption can come about.
She specifically engages with Martin Hall’s archaeological investigation that offers
two contrasting approaches to the contemplation of time and memory, a short story
by Paul Auster that highlights the relevance of attention to detail and particularity,
and an animated film by William Kentridge in which memory is portrayed in a
manner that fractures and problematises conventional conceptions of time.65
Douzinas and Geary (n 5) 254.61
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Van Marle then translates the notion of attentiveness that we find in these
artistic events into a deconstructive approach to the law and (legal) interpretation.
With this, she is not suggesting that a new method of law and legal interpretation
be followed, but rather urging a reconsideration, ‘an approach which, if embraced
by legal scholars, lawyers and judges, could have an effect on how we
understand and do law in the long run’.  Her main aim is to investigate the time66
aspect intrinsic to deconstruction and to illustrate how this deconstructive
approach can assist in providing an interpretation (of a text or situation) that is
regardful of particularity and the fluidity of meaning. Such an approach ‘embraces
both a disruption of chronological time – and accordingly multiple notions of truth
and fluidity of meanings – and a slowness or dwelling (strategy of delay)’.  This67
strategy of delay firstly underlines the ethical imperative of deconstruction by
acknowledging the limits of any attempt at interpretation, ‘that which cannot be
known, that which escapes’,  thereby recalling the Peircean notion of68
‘secondness’ and the limits and impossibility of (the) law as justice that I have
elsewhere examined.  This approach furthermore remains, at its very core, a call69
to ‘read and reread, interpret and re-interpret without hastening to a final end’,
thereby postponing law’s time and speed that generalises and universalises.70
Slowness becomes synonymous with (critical) reflection and, more than just a call
to think, the challenge to engage in a thinking that can adequately address the
problems that we face.  I believe that by taking up this challenge, we can hold71
open the possibility of a transformation in our thinking about the question of
violence and compassion towards animals and the channels and strategies we
employ in the pursuit of animal liberation.
Derrida calls attention to an important recent change in the human-animal
relation. The past two centuries have witnessed both an exponential increase in
violence perpetuated against animals, and an accompanying upsurge in the
presence of an ‘organized disavowal of this torture’ by the animal advocacy
movement. The movement is comprised of ‘minority, weak, marginal voices, little
assured of their discourse within the law, as a declaration of rights’.  For Derrida,72
the war between the animal protection movement and industrialised
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unequal struggle’, the former being the marginal force in this struggle.  Derrida’s73
hypothesis, however, is that regardless of the inequality of this war, we are
nevertheless passing through a complex moment wherein this struggle has
become ‘uncircumventable for thought’:74
This war ... is passing through a critical phase. We are passing through that
phase, and it passes through us. To think the war we find ourselves waging is not
only a duty, a responsibility, an obligation, it is also a necessity, a constraint that,
like it or not, directly or indirectly, no one can escape. Henceforth more than ever.
And I say ‘to think’ this war, because I believe it concerns what we call ‘thinking’.75
Derrida’s reference to ‘thinking’ is a call for an alternative approach and
thought in regard to the question of the animal, one that can think through and
critically reflect on the underlying assumptions and anthropocentric constraints at
work in the resources we use to address the plight of the animal. It is in this vein
that Van Marle’s approach of slowness emphasises the need ‘to address the new
times; to be up to the challenges that they present’  and provides a framework76
through which we can pause and critically reflect on the new welfare approach,
its underlying assumptions and theoretical foundations; thereby preserving the
possibility of transforming the juridicism and sacrificial logic that underpins our
thinking and the legal institutions that reinforce our sacrificial practices. Such a
transformation would require that we embrace a spirit of continuity, keeping in
mind the complexity of the moment as a configuration of the anthropocentric
structures of law’s past, present and future, rather than collapsing time into the
speed of the present instant only.
It is along these lines that I would now like to ‘take the time’ to meaningfully
reflect on the internal ideological incoherency of the new welfarist position by
turning to engage with Derrida’s argument that humans maintain their hegemony
and a view of animals as sacrificial beings by failing to embrace animals in the
‘thou shalt not kill’ prohibition. To be clear, Derrida’s argument is not aimed at
critiquing animal welfarism, at least not directly. Nor does it in any way constitute
a support of animal rights theory. It does however provide a suitable platform from
which to illustrate and engage with the ideological inconsistencies between the
welfare- and rights-based approaches that, in my opinion, demand a conceptual
separation of the two paradigms. 
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6 Thou shalt not kill (the human)
I firstly need to contextualise Derrida’s argument as part of a bigger project aimed
at deconstructing the privileging of the human (subject) within an anthropocentric
sacrificial structure. For Derrida, this privileging stems from the entrenched binary
human-animal opposition that has been constructed in Western metaphysical
discourse. Derrida finds this juxtaposition problematic and urges that we rethink
the dissimilarities between humans and animals through the logic of différance,
rather than an oppositional distinction.  This project requires an in-depth77
investigation and questioning of the place of animality in Western metaphysics,
a task that Derrida customarily approaches through a rigorous reading of Martin
Heidegger’s texts: 
Can the voice of a friend be that of an animal? Is friendship possible for the
animal or between animals? Like Aristotle, Heidegger would say: no. Do we not
have a responsibility toward the living in general? The answer is still ‘no,’ and this
may be because the question is formed, asked in such a way that the answer
must necessarily be ‘no’ according to the whole canonised or hegemonic
discourse of Western metaphysics or religions ...78
One of the most pervasive ramifications of this oppositional human-animal
divide is the problem of sacrifice. The way in which we view the killing of animals
within this hegemonic structure, as necessary carnivorous sacrifice, rests on an
ideology that assumes the superiority of humans over animals and the centrality
of humans in the natural world: ‘through our conduct we define the “other-than-
human” (animal) as the means to human ends’.  The (human) killing of animals79
is not seen as murder but remains, to use Derrida’s phrase, a ‘noncriminal putting
to death’. With these assumptions, we avoid taking any moral responsibility for
the animal. As Derrida explains:
 
The subject is responsible for the other before being responsible for himself as
‘me’. This responsibility to the other, for the other, comes to him, for example (but
this is not just one example among others) in the ‘Thou shalt not kill’. Thou shalt
not kill thy neighbour. Consequences follow upon one another, and must do so
continuously: thou shalt not make him suffer, which is sometimes worse than
death, thou shalt not do him harm, thou shalt not eat him, even a little bit, etc ...
But the ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is addressed to the other and presupposes him. It is
destined to the very thing that it institutes, the other as man. It is by him that the
Calarco ‘Deconstruction is not vegetarianism: Humanism, subjectivity, and animal ethics’ (2004)77
Continental Philosophy Review 175 at 189. 
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subject is first of all held hostage. The ‘Thou shalt not kill’ – with all its
consequences, which are limitless – has never been understood within the Judeo-
Christian tradition ... as a ‘Thou shalt not put to death the living in general’. ... the
other, such as this can be thought according to the imperative of ethical
transcendence, is indeed the other man: man as other, the other as man.80
Derrida draws a link between the scope of the term ‘murder’ and the
‘category of others-to-whom-we-owe-responsibilities’.  If animals can only be81
killed and not murdered, they are excluded from the category of others-to-whom-
we-owe-responsibilities. The implication is also that the killing of an animal cannot
be unjust or unlawful, as it is the element of wrongfulness that characterises the
distinction between killing and murdering. ‘Thus, the hegemony of humans is
sustained by both the act of casual killing and its conceptualisation as not
murder’.  A displacement of this hegemony, for Derrida, requires that we82
‘sacrifice sacrifice’:
Discourses as original as those of Heidegger and Levinas disrupt, of course, a
certain traditional humanism. In spite of the differences separating them, they
nonetheless remain profound humanisms to the extent that they do not sacrifice
sacrifice.83
It is important to keep Derrida’s thesis on the inescapability of a sacrificial
existence in mind when interpreting this passage. Derrida is adamant that certain
manifestations of sacrifice inevitably remain in the impossibility of its delimitation,
that ‘one eats [the Other] regardless and lets oneself be eaten by him’.  The84
unwillingness to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’, for Derrida, refers to an unwillingness to
question dominant discourse that sees the killing of animals as noncriminal and
to adapt our (un)ethical response to animals accordingly.  Before such a85
discursive shift can take place, however, we need to reflect on the importance of
this very logic (of sacrifice) in understanding why we humans construct and
engage in a culture of animal sacrifice. 
Derrida tracks and deconstructs this culture of sacrifice along the finest
threads.  Linking the Genesis tale of Adam and Eve’s nudity and shame, the86
effect of the animal’s presence on Cain and Abel’s fraternity, Prometheus’ act of
stealing fire to compensate for man’s nakedness and Bellerophon’s sense of
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modesty, shame and reticence, Derrida argues that biblical and Greek myth is
united in a problematic understanding of man’s privilege over the animal. This
‘invariable schema’, for Derrida, is the following:
What is proper to man, his subjugating superiority over the animal, his very be-
coming-subject, his historicity, his emergence out of nature, his sociality, his
access to knowledge and technics, all that, everything (in a nonfinite number of
predicates) that is proper to man would derive from this originary fault, indeed,
from this default in propriety, what is proper to man as default in propriety – and
from the imperative necessity that finds in it its development and resilience.87
This passage is fundamental to understanding Derrida’s thesis on ‘the
autobiographical animal’ and the interconnectedness between autobiography and
truth, ‘that the question of truth in general, and my truth in particular is also
structured by this logic of restitution, paying back, making good, putting right,
correcting an original fault’.  Man is unique in his awareness of his nakedness88
and resultant attempt at compensation and supplementation, whilst the animal
organism simply lives out its life. To sacrifice the animal is to affirm our
superiority, privilege and domination over the being of the animal. ‘Animals, then,
are slaves and sacrificial offerings to our need for ritual symbolic confirmation of
our peculiar self-understanding ... the (external) animal we eat stands in for the
(internal) animal we must overcome’.  This carnivorous violence demarcates our89
civilization, indirectly legitimising a whole schema of violence. Understanding and
addressing this nuanced culture of sacrifice is essential to achieving a much
needed shift in the way we relate to the animal. My ongoing concern is the way
in which the legal approaches we utilise in the pursuit of animal liberation
paradoxically entrenches, rather than destabilises, our ‘proper’ position at the top
of an (anthropocentric) value hierarchy and continue to facilitate this culture.
6.1 Sacrificing the animal
We have seen that animal welfarists acknowledge that animals possess interests
that warrant consideration, most notably the interest in not suffering. But this
interest is qualified and can best be described as an interest in not suffering
unnecessarily. The utilitarian approach does not seek to eradicate suffering, but
to balance the (animal) suffering against the (human) pleasure derived from the
utilisation (of the animal). We can immediately identify limitations to the balancing
process itself. From a methodological perspective the measuring of pleasures
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and pains is severely problematic, especially across species. But we can take
another step back and ask what is pleasure and what is pain? As Martha
Nussbaum argues, these very touchstones of utilitarianism are disputed
concepts.  These limitations become even more apparent, and confusing, when90
we examine the legal translation and concretisation of the animal welfare
approach. 
Animal welfarists seek to address their concerns through the enactment of
animal protection legislation that regulates the conditions in which animals live
and die. This legislation aims to reduce the suffering of animals whilst confirming
the status of animals as property to be used to the benefit of their owners. The
Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962 aims ‘to consolidate and amend the laws
relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals’. A deconstructive reading of the
act exposes the need for clarification and qualification of its purpose. Like most
animal protection legislation this one is also under-inclusive and vague. The word
‘unnecessarily’ or ‘unnecessary’ appears at least eight times in section two alone.
Section 2(1)(b) only forbids confinement or tethering that causes the animal
‘unnecessary’ suffering and similarly, section 2(1)(c) prohibits only the
‘unnecessary’ starving, under feeding or withholding of water or food from any
animal. This means that it is conversely necessary and permissible to sometimes
starve the animal. As ‘unnecessary’ is not defined in the act, standard practices
constitute the norm and ‘necessity’. Ultimately only acts of gratuitous violence are
recognised as contravening the act: ‘as long as an individual or entity can justify
as necessary the infliction of suffering on animals, that infliction of suffering is
beyond the reach of state anticruelty laws, regardless of the type and degree of
suffering the animals experience’.91
In S v Gerwe  the appellant was inter alia charged with contravening the92
Animal Protection Act by stabbing a dog in the neck. The relevant section of the
act in terms of which the appellant was charged read that ‘any person who cruelly
overloads, overdrives, overrides, beats, kicks, goads, ill-treats, neglects,
infuriates, terrifies, tortures or maims any animals shall, subject to the provisions
of this act ... be guilty of an offence’. The appeal court grappled with the word
‘cruelly’ and in trying to make sense of this proviso shunned the particular and
reverted to general, abstract legal doctrine, thereby clearly illustrating Van Marle’s
argument on the limits of the law and ‘the violence that is brought into
institutionalised legal readings and interpretations’.  The court forced a93
conclusion to a particular dispute through the imposition of general law. Acting
Judge King held that ‘the word “cruelly” indicates that mens rea in the form of
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intention is required. It is not enough to show objectively ill-treatment; subjectively
it must be shown that the accused intended to “torture and maim”’. The appeal
court found that the stab wounds to the dog’s neck did not provide sufficient
‘evidence’ that the dog was tortured or maimed and overturned the conviction of
the court a quo.
The approach that the court followed in this case is a clear indication of the
way in which the law views animals. The dog was not seen as an individual
subject or as a party to the litigation that could be wronged in any way, but a mere
object that could (possibly) be damaged. The most palpable trace of the court’s
(and law’s) view of the dog is arguably its reference to the dog as an ‘it’, as if the
dog was not a living, sentient creature with a particular sex and breed, let alone
a name. The court’s approach and outcome of the case begs a questioning into
the role and effectiveness of the Animals Protection Act, which is supposed to
promote the welfare of animals and ‘prevent cruelty to animals’. We however find
the same view of animals in this very act. The act throughout refers to the
‘destruction’  of an animal, once again inculcating the view of animals as94
inanimate things and perpetuating a binary human-animal, subject-object
opposition. The animal is denied the dignity of being able to ‘die’ and denounced
as an object that can only be destroyed. Derrida has also engaged with the notion
of dying and the way that it is used in discourse to appositionally define ‘the
human’ and ‘the animal’. He complicates and destabilises this distinction by
arguing that:
[o]ne could point to a thousand signs that show that animals also die. Although the
innumerable structural differences that separate one “species” from another
should make us vigilant about any discourse on animality or bestiality in general,
one can say that animals have a very significant relation to death, to murder and
to war (hence to borders), to mourning and to hospitality, and so forth.95
Derrida once again asks that we be mindful of the ‘innumerable structural
differences’ between humans and animals, that we approach the partitions and
separations as différance rather than an oppositional limit. Van Marle’s proposal
of slowness comes into play here, as it is through a strategy of delay that we can
explore difference and particularity and circumvent the universalisation and
generalisation brought about by law’s speed. The Animals Protection Act however
maintains an oppositional dualism and, ‘as every opposition does, effaces the
differences and leads back to the homogenous’.  Through this dualism we96
See inter alia sections 3(1)(a), 4(3)(b), 5(1).94
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maintain our hegemony and exclude animals from our sphere of moral
consideration. It comes as no surprise, then, that courts have on several
occasions found that animal welfare legislation is not aimed at protecting animals
at all, but rather to protect humans and their property. In R v Moato  the court97
considered the purpose of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act  and found98
that the purpose of the act was not to endow animals with legal personhood or to
protect animals. Rather, the purpose was to forbid legal persons to act so cruelly
towards animals that it would negatively impact the emotional well-being of
society. This ratio was upheld in S v Edmunds  when Judge Miller stated that the99
object of the act ‘was not to elevate animals to the status of human beings but to
prevent people from treating animals in a manner which would offend the finer
sensibilities of society’. In the minority judgement of NCSPCA v Openshaw Judge
Cameron departs from this view, arguing that
 
… though not conferring rights on the animals they protect, the [Societies for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1993 and the Animals Protection Act
71 of 1962] are designed to promote their welfare. The statutes recognise that
animals are sentient beings that are capable of suffering and of experiencing pain.
And they recognise that, regrettably, humans are capable of inflicting suffering on
animals and causing them pain. The statutes thus acknowledge the need for
animals to be protected from human ill-treatment.  100
Cameron however follows this passage by unambiguously reiterating that
‘like slaves under the Roman law, [animals] are the objects of the law, without
being its subjects’.  Scholars have argued that Cameron’s statements, whilst101
representing progression from preceding cases on the legal status of animals,
nevertheless remain puzzling and paradoxical.  Whilst recognising that animals’102
capacity to suffer constitutes a ground for protection against cruel treatment,
Cameron also asserts that animals are objects without any legal rights. If humans
have duties towards animals that stem from their interest in not suffering, one can
argue that such duties, in terms of a Hohfeldian conception of rights, do indeed 
confer correlative rights upon the animals to be free from human abuse.103
Wesley Hohfeld published his famous article on the fundamental distinctions
between different types of legal rights in 1913. Hohfeld’s analysis was the
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culmination of an extensive body of analytical jurisprudence on the basic
differences between legal liberties and legal rights.  Hohfeld identified a set of104
eight basic legal rights consisting of four primary legal entitlements (rights,
privileges, powers and immunities) and their opposites (no-rights, duties,
disabilities and liabilities). 'Rights' are state enforceable claims that others operate
in a certain manner in relation to the holder of the right. ‘Privileges’ permit the
holder to act in a certain manner without being accountable for damages to others
and without others having redress to state powers for the prevention of those
acts. 'Powers' reflect the ability to, through state-enforcement, alter the legal
entitlements possessed by oneself or others and ‘immunities’ protect one’s
entitlements from being altered by others.  Correspondingly, the four opposites105
reflect the absence of such entitlements. One has ‘no-right’ when one does not
have the power to beckon the state to direct the conduct of others and ‘duties’
reflect the absence of permission to act in a certain manner. ‘Disabilities’ refer to
the absence of the ability to alter legal entitlements and ‘liabilities’ reflect the
absence of protection from having one's entitlements being altered by others.  106
Hohfeld illustrated the internal relationships between the different
fundamental legal rights by arranging them in terms of opposition and
correlativity. The jural opposites are structured as rights/no-rights, privilege/duty,
power/disability and immunity/ liability. The jural correlatives are structured as
right/duty, privilege/no-right, power/ liability and immunity/disability.107
Hohfeld used the concept of ‘opposites’ to express that one must have one
or the other right, but not both (of the opposites). As the opposites contradict one
another on the same subject, they cannot exist in the same person.  The108
concept of correlativity is more complex. The Hohfeldian analysis emphasises
that advantages are just one side of the legal rights coin. At the same time that
an advantage is conferred on one citizen, a vulnerability is necessarily
constructed on the part of others: 'legal rights are not simply entitlements, but
jural relationships'.  The notion of correlativity is used to express a single legal109
relation from the perspective of the two parties:110
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If X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative
(and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place.111
A duty that X owes Y translates into Y having a right against X. The
expressions are counterparts, rights are fundamentally duties placed on others
to act in a specific manner.  Likewise, privileges and no-rights are also112
correlatives:
Whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he
himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does
not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to
stay off.113
Relying on this view of rights as claims based on duties, David Bilchitz
critiques Cameron for not translating his recognition that we have a duty (not to
inflict suffering on an animal) into a right (to not be subjected to suffering by
human beings):
A duty towards animals to avoid treating them cruelly would logically entail that
they have a correlative right not to be subjected to cruel treatment. Even if we
reject a strict correlativity between duties and rights in some cases (such as those
involving general positive obligations upon individuals), it appears clear that such
correlativity does hold where general negative obligations are involved. A duty to
avoid inflicting suffering on an animal applies to every animal one comes into
contact with: thus, every animal can claim a right to avoid having suffering inflicted
upon it.114
Whilst there is certainly merit in this argument, I do not wish to comment on
Cameron’s unwillingness to think through the implications of his assertions on the
status of animals in terms of the correlativity of duties and rights. Some readings
and explications of Hohfeldian theory indeed support granting rights to animals115
whilst others are not favourable to extending rights to animals.  Rather, I want116
to argue that Cameron’s judgement reflects a characteristic welfare perspective
and indeed a very progressive interpretation and application of this approach, his
(minority) judgement thereby clearly highlighting the limits and inability of this
approach to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’. Cameron departs from an exclusively human-
Hohfeld (n 107) 32.111
Singer (n 105) 987.112
Hohfeld (n 107) 32.113
Bilchitz (n 102) 48-49.114
See Francione Animals, property and the law (1995); Wise (n 108).115
See Wellman Real rights (1995); Sumner The moral foundation of rights (1987).116
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centric approach to animal welfare legislation, arguing that ‘the interests of the
animals’ should be taken into account when the question of granting an interim
interdict in terms of the act is considered. Welfare theory does indeed
acknowledge that animals have an interest in not suffering, but maintains the
object-status of animals. This should not come as a surprise if we consider the
theoretical foundations of animal welfarism. The utilitarian aggregation of
consequences does not recognise every individual life as an end in itself, but
allows for lives to be utilised as means for the ends of others.  If the pleasure-117
and-pain scale tips one way, the utilisation is permissible and the animal may be
sacrificed. If it tips the other way the animal may not be utilised, at least not under
those specific circumstances. 
Peter Singer makes extensive use of images and narratives to vividly
describe the almost unthinkable suffering that animals endure on factory farms
and in laboratories. As Singer argues that the pleasure derived from these
practices cannot possibly outweigh the suffering, he holds that the utilitarian
pleasure-and-pain scale holds great value for the plight of the animal.  The118
ongoing suffering of animals in these environments, despite a long history of
animal welfare advocacy and legislation, unfortunately suggest otherwise. But
even if this was the case and we could eradicate large scale industrial factory
farming through a utilitarian balancing of pleasures and pains, the scale would not
tilt in favour of the animals in cases where traditional farming practices are
appropriately adjusted and an appeal to the collective good outweighs the
(reduced) suffering accompanying the utilisation of the animal.119
It is this utilisation and view of animals as sacrificial beings that rights theorists
seek to eradicate. If animals possess rights, the argument goes, these rights will
obstruct appeals to the aggregated human good from outweighing the interests of
animals and humans would not be allowed to (ab)use animals as they see fit.120
Here we see a fundamental ideological dissonance between the welfarist and
rights-based approach. Animal welfarism cannot ‘sacrifice sacrifice’, because the
animal is categorised as a sacrificial being. The real problem with utilitarian animal
welfare theory ‘has nothing essentially to do with pain and suffering, even if they are
intrinsically evil. The right starting place is that we are using animal lives for our own
purposes and often using them up. Whether pain is or is not inflicted in the process,
we are still using and often using up these lives’.  Animal rightists reject this view121
of animals and demand that we view animals as inviolable subjects with intrinsic
worth and abolish all human use of animals.
Nussbaum (n 50) 237.117
See Singer (n 47).118
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These fundamental discrepancies render welfarism incapable of advancing
the ideal of animal liberation, if by animal liberation we understand the
emancipation of animals to be free from human exploitation. Animal welfarism
cannot displace or destabilise the view of animals as subordinate utility objects,
but conversely reinforces the property status of animals. The necessity of human
(ab)use of animals as such is never questioned; within a welfarist framework ‘only
questions about the necessity of particular acts in relation to the presumed
entitlement of humans to use animals’ are addressed.  Consequently, human-122
animal interaction and conflict arising from competing interests is conceptualised
in a way that means the interests of humans will inevitably prevail. Within this
framework, a mere concern for the interest of animals in not suffering will not
‘eventually’ translate into emancipation. Emancipation requires the destabilisation
of this anthropocentric sacrificial structure that accepts and maintains the
subordinate status of animals. Rights theorists strive to bring about this
destabilisation through the extension of rights to animals. 
7 Conclusion
I have argued in this article that there is inherent conflict between the animal
welfare approach and animal rights approach. The same ideological
incongruencies that caused the initial split between the antivivisectionists and
welfarists during the 1860s remain to this day. This divergence stemmed from
incompatible views on the moral status of animals, which not only render the two
approaches contradictory, but makes an amalgamation detrimental to the ideals
that animal rights theorists strive to realise. Animal welfarists accept and operate
within a sacrificial anthropocentric structure that entrenches a human-animal
binary opposition by conceptualising the dissimilarities between humans and
animals as an oppositional cut. The utility status of animals as sacrificial beings
is thereby perpetuated and not displaced, such displacement being the
(opposing) aim of the animal rights movement.
I proposed that we follow Van Marle’s deconstructive approach of slowness
to interpret and reflect on the new welfarist amalgamation of utilitarian-based
welfare theory and rights theory. By proposing a ‘strategy of delay’ and ‘de-
privileging of the present’, Van Marle is not denying the here-and-now, but on the
contrary supporting an approach to (legal) interpretation that allows us to better
understand the complexities that configure the status quo. By relying on Van
Marle’s deconstructive insights and Derrida’s argument that humans maintain
their hegemony by excluding animals from the ‘thou shalt not kill’ prohibition, I
tried to not only illustrate the contrasting moral spaces that the animal occupies
Bryant (n 35) 249.122
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in animal welfare theory and rights theory, but that the interim employment of
welfare strategies to pursue the more liberal future goal of animal rights is the
result of an uncritical privileging of the here and now and leads to an indefinite
postponement of the striving for justice. 
By highlighting the dissonance between the approaches, my aim was to
illustrate that (animal) rights theory can and should be celebrated as pursuing a
more progressive ideal of animal liberation than its welfarist predecessor. The
emanating question, then, is whether the extension of rights to animals will indeed
realise this ideal and liberate them from oppression? I have previously undertaken
a theoretical problematisation of animal rights by examining the development and
theoretical conditions of existence of animal rights and arguing that the theoretical
premises of contemporary (animal) rights discourse does not allow for the
realisation of its emancipatory ideal, as it paradoxically entrenches relations of
subordination by negating plurality and difference and solidifies an anthropocentric
hierarchical structure.  To critique the theoretical presuppositions of animal rights123
theory does however not by the fact itself constitute a critique of its underlying
ideological values. The ultimate aim of my deconstructive project, driven by a desire
to retrieve the emancipatory power of animal rights, is to articulate a response to
the question of what it might mean to return ‘animal rights’ to its ethical substrata
and I believe that a clear understanding of its ideological premise is foundational to
this project. I aimed to illustrate that such a project requires the implementation of
critical tools that can adequately address the challenges with which the question of
the animal (in law) presents us and introduced a possible framework within which
to philosophically examine and call into question the way we relate to animals and
the dominant approaches we utilise to facilitate a transformation of the human-
animal relation.
De Villiers ‘Examining the similarity principle and language of (animal) rights as a foundation for123
animal liberation’ (2012) SAPL 40.
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Examining the similarity principle and
language of (animal) rights as a foundation
for animal liberation  *
Jan-Harm de Villiers**
1 Introduction
With the animal liberation movement gathering academic steam I believe it is
more important than ever that proponents of the movement ask themselves the
same question that Alice in Wonderland asks the Cheshire cat upon reaching a
fork in the road: ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’
The cat replies: ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to’. Upon
answering that she does not much care where she is going, so long as she gets
somewhere, the cat’s response to Alice is quite insightful: ‘Then it doesn’t matter
which way you go ... you’re sure to do that if you only walk long enough’.1
In this passage Lewis Carroll calls attention to the importance of critically
reflecting on the route you choose to travel to your final destination and the
reciprocity between a course of action and the emanating outcome. If the ultimate
aspiration of the animal liberation movement is to free animals of human
domination and exploitation and to develop an ethical relationship to the animal
Other, we need to ask ourselves if the approach we utilise is consistent with, and
allows for, such an outcome. 
Within a society characterised by an uneven balance of power and ensuing
oppression and domination, we find various approaches that seek to remedy this
structure and strive towards the ideal of ‘equality’. The most prominent approach
is grounded in rights theory and aims to reach a state of equality by allocating
certain rights to subjects. The modern concept of animal rights was developed less
This article is based on research conducted for my LLM dissertation entitled ‘Thinking outside the*
cage: Sacrifice, equality and the plight of the animal’ for which I am currently registered at the
University of Pretoria under the supervision of Prof Karin van Marle.
BComm (Law) (Cum Laude) LLB (Cum Laude) (Pretoria). Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence,**
Unisa.
Carroll Alice’s adventures in wonderland and through the looking glass (1993) 52.1
4.
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than 40 years ago and finds theoretical, ethical and philosophical grounding in the
pioneering work of scholars like Peter Singer,  Steven Wise,  Gary Francione  and2 3 4
Tom Regan.  Although an approach based in rights theory is easily distinguishable5
from a more conservative welfarist theory, the rights movement has inherited the
human rights movements’ continuing battle to advance a united, terse conception
that captures the essence of the rights advocacy movement. Whilst it may not be
possible to provide a single coherent definition of animal rights, the approach is
undeniably characterised by a leitmotif of ‘similarity’ or ‘same-as’, the argument that
animals should be granted legal rights because they share certain human traits or
characteristics that warrant consideration and protection. The rationale behind the
similarity argument is that animals who possess capacities and characteristics
similar to that of humans should receive equivalent protection, as a just society
requires that similar entities be treated alike.6
The similarity argument is problematic, as it is essentially anthropocentric
and manifests in a hierarchical ordering of animals based on their perceived
similarity to humanness. In this article I will examine the way that animal rights
talk has developed, specifically focussing on the same-as characteristic as
facilitator of a human/animal dualism that deprecates the animal to subhuman
Other and supports the continued disfranchisement of animals. As an
appreciation of animal rights requires an understanding of the concept of ‘rights’
in general, the first part of this article will be devoted to a short philosophical
discussion of the notion of rights. In the second part I will argue that the current
conception of animal rights precludes the possibility of an ethical encounter with
the animal Other and manifests in a hierarchical ordering of animals. Finally I will
illustrate why this approach to animal liberation is irreconcilable with the ideals it
strives to realise and consequently internally paradoxical. 
Firstly, a note on terminology. Although the term ‘animal’ strictly speaking
refers to all beings belonging to the kingdom Animalia and thus includes human
beings, for the purposes of this article the term ‘animal’, unless otherwise stated,
will be used to denote animals that are not human. I have come to reject the term
‘nonhuman animal’ that is commonly used in literature on animal ethics, due to
the subordinate connotation that the term engenders. 
The term ‘animal rights’, and specifically the phrase ‘animal rights
movement’, is often used loosely to depict any attempt at addressing and
See Singer Animal liberation (1975).2
See Wise Rattling the cage: Toward legal rights for animals (2000) and Wise Drawing the line:3
Science and the case for animal rights (2002).
See Francione Animals, property and the law (1995) and Francione Rain without thunder: The4
deology of the animal rights movement (1996).
See Regan The case for animal rights (1983) and Regan Defending animal rights (2001).5
Bryant ‘Similarity or difference as a basis for justice: Must animals be like humans to be legally6
protected from humans?’ (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary Problems 207 at 207.
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bettering the plight of animals. For the purposes of this article the terms ‘animal
rights’ and ‘animal rights movement’ specifically refers to a theory or approach
based on the notion that animals should be rights-bearers in order to entitle them
to (legal) protection against violation. In reference to the social movement aimed
at liberating the animal, irrespective of the underlying theoretical or philosophical
foundation, I will use the phrase ‘animal liberation (movement)’.
2 The language of rights
We need firstly to understand why it is indeed possible to extend rights to animals.
As we will see, the very nature and make-up of rights which allow for animals to be
rights-bearers also poses a challenge to the conceptualisation of an equable animal
rights theory. The notion of rights is part of the symbolic order of language and law
and it is within this sphere that the scope and capacity of rights is determined.
Rights do not stand in concrete relation to any specific thing or entity but rather
comprise of legal and linguistic signs, words, symbols and ideals.  Consequently,7
‘no person, thing or relation is in principle closed to the logic of rights [and] any
entity open to semiotic substitution can become the subject or object of rights; any
right can be extended to new areas and persons, or, conversely, withdrawn from
existing ones’.  Accordingly, we have seen civil rights being extended to socio-8
economic rights, and further to cultural and environmental rights and what were
once the rights of the white, heterosexual males can now also be claimed by blacks,
homosexuals and women. Anything that’s accessible to language can become the
object of rights and as Costas Douzinas jokingly remarks, ‘the right to free speech
or to annual holidays can be accompanied by a right to love, to party or to have
back episodes of Star Trek shown daily’.9
It is thus clear that it is indeed possible to extend rights to animals. But what
would be the basis of animal rights? Who would be entitled to them? What is an
animal? Despite just quoting Douzinas on the possibility of ceaselessly expanding
rights, my questions here are not meant to echo the superficial and ill conceived
critique that the realisation of animal rights would require that we grant animals
the right to vote and marry. Of course it is a non sequitur to argue that the
extension of some existing rights to animals requires the extension of all existing
rights. I am not concerned with the specific rights that animals would (or should)
have and what the scope of these rights would be. The question of including
animals in the community of rightsholders should not be confused with (related,
yet distinguishable) issues pertaining to the scope of rights. 
Rather, I want to argue that we need to think through the implications of
using terms like ‘human’ rights and ‘animal’ rights, each inherently embodying a
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problematic generalisation that affects the way we define our relationship with the
Other. Just as the term ‘human’ includes men and women and absorbs racial,
historical and gender differences, ‘animal’ refers to everything from lions to
caterpillars, chimpanzees to mice.  These terms bring about instability, ‘not just10
because of species diversity, but because its obvious supposed unimportance
makes us realise that these terms are, to put it bluntly, metaphysical categories
requiring all sorts of police work, and not simply useful conceptual tools, biological
generalisations, etc’.  The point, as David Wood articulates it, is that ‘there are11
no animals “as such”, rather only the extraordinary variety that in the animal
alphabet would begin with ants, apes, arachnids, antelopes, aardvarks,
anchovies, alligators, Americans, Australians ...’.  12
Reference to the ‘animal’ of rights already connotes a problematic
disengagement that perpetuates a human/animal dualism. The philosopher
Jacques Derrida has also rejected rights language as a way of advancing our
relation to animals and emphasised that rights theory signifies an attempt to
separate ourselves from other animals and even disavow our own animality:
The axiom of the repressive gesture against animals, in its philosophical form,
remains Cartesian, from Kant to Heidegger, Levinas or Lacan, whatever the
differences between these discourses. A certain philosophy of right and of human
rights depends on this axiom. Consequently, to want absolutely to grant, not to
animals but to a certain category of animals, rights equivalent to human rights
would be a disastrous contradiction. It would reproduce the philosophical and
juridical machine thanks to which the exploitation of animal material for food,
work, experimentation etc, has been practiced (and tyrannically so, that is,
through an abuse of power).13
Having no fixed, concrete meaning, the ‘animal’ of rights, just as the ‘human’
of rights, is a floating signifier, ‘a word and discursive element that is neither
automatically nor necessarily linked to any particular signified or meaning’ and
consequently ‘it cannot be fully and finally pinned down to any particular
conception because it transcends and overlaps them all’.  As there is no14
undeviating connection between signifier and signified, meaning constantly shifts
as it is passed on from one signifier to another. Rights therefore do not belong to
humans or animals, but rather construct humans and animals.  Within the15
rhetoric of rights, a human ‘is someone who can successfully claim human
rights’,  and the same holds true for the ‘animal’ of animal rights. And therein lays16
Wood ‘Comment ne pas manger – deconstruction and humanism’ in Steeves (ed) Animal others:10
On ethics, ontology and animal life (1999) 16.
Ibid.11
Id 29.12
Derrida and Roudinesco For what tomorrow ...: A dialogue (2004) 71.13
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a major challenge for the proponents of the rights movement. Rights theory needs
to be conceived in a manner that is inclusive, respects difference and advances
the ethical relation without perpetuating hierarchy. The current conception, I will
argue, unfortunately has several shortcomings in this regard.
3 Rights theory, the ethical relation and hierarchy
The current conception of animal rights theory is founded on the same idea that
propelled the civil rights movement, women’s rights movement and disability
rights movement: The idea that the striving towards the ideal of justice requires
that similar entities are treated alike.  As Gary Francione explains, the idea of17
animal rights is underpinned by the notion that (at least some) animals possess
rights that normatively correspond to the rights possessed by humans.  The18
rationale supporting this inference is at least twofold:
First, there is no characteristic or set of characteristics that is possessed by all
humans (whom we regard as persons) that is not possessed by at least some
animals. To put the matter a different way, those who support animal exploitation
argue that animals are qualitatively different from humans so animals can be kept on
the ‘thing’ side of the ‘person/thing’ dualism; animal rights advocates argue that there
is no such difference because at least some nonhumans will possess the supposedly
‘exclusive’ characteristic while some humans will not possess the characteristic ...
There is another related, more ‘positive’, reason to view animals as persons. Although
there will undoubtedly be borderline cases, it is clear that at least some animals
possess the characteristics that we normally associate with personhood.19
From this exposition we can identify two tenets that are central to the current
concept of animal rights. Firstly, the human (and personhood) is the standard against
which animals are to be measured to determine their worthiness of rights. Secondly,
only ‘some animals’ that embody and exhibit the essential humanlike characteristics
will be included in the community of rights holders. There are several problematic
consequences to this approach and I will henceforward discuss three of these
repercussions; the disavowal of otherness, the perpetuation of hierarchy and the
tension emanating from the dissonance between the practical implications of this
approach and the philosophy underlying animal liberation. 
3.1 The animal as symmetrical Other
Drucilla Cornell defines the ethical relation as ‘the aspiration to a nonviolent
relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes
responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her
Bryant (n 6) 207.17
Francione ‘Ecofeminism and animal rights: A review of Beyond animal rights: A feminist caring18
ethic for the treatment of animals’ (1996-1997) 18 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 95 at 98.
Ibid.19
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difference and singularity’.  An ethical encounter requires that we transcend the20
self and engage with the otherness of the Other from outside a framework that
employs the self as central point of reference. The Other is not similar to me and
she is not the opposite of me, we are absolutely separated. This means that I
cannot articulate my relationship to the Other in terms of sameness or opposition,
the Other exists outside of myself and my egocentric understanding of the world.
We are not of the same genus and consequently ‘I cannot compare [the Other]
to anything that I know, because then [the Other] would be in relation to me and
denied its absolute otherness’.  Rather than centralising the self, the focus21
should be on the Other and her qualities of singularity and otherness. 
Because the Other is an irreducible individual entity, the distance separating
the self and the Other is characterised by asymmetry. We can never eradicate
this distance, as it is this otherness of the Other that makes her other. Emmanuel
Levinas describes this asymmetrical characteristic of the Other as alterity.
Respect for the alterity of the Other requires that we not identify with her in terms
of the self, as this would ‘neutralise’ and reduce the Other to an object that cannot
affect me and create a state of ‘totality’.  The Other has an individual face that22
resists possession and it is this characteristic which, for Levinas, is fundamental
to being other: ‘Stranger means the free one. Over him I have no power. He
escapes my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal’.  23
In advocating that (some) animals are worthy of legal protection in the form
of rights, proponents of the rights movement articulate their claims by drawing
comparisons between the capacities of these animals and those of humans.
Steven Wise, for instance, argues that the test for personhood should be an
enquiry into three criteria, namely whether the person ‘(1) can desire; (2) can
intentionally act to fulfill her desires; and (3) possesses a sense of self sufficiency
to allow her to understand, even dimly, that it is she who wants something and it
is she who is trying to get it’.  As apes possess the mental capacities that allow24
them to meet these criteria, Wise argues that they should be regarded as persons
under the law. As we have seen, Francione also refers to the characteristics that
some animals embody that are associated with personhood and Peter Singer
finds common ground when it comes to a human’s and animal’s ability to suffer.
Following in the footsteps of fellow utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham, Singer
argues that ‘the nervous system of animals evolved as our own did [and that it is]
surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems that are virtually identical
Cornell The philosophy of the limit (1992) 62.20
Smith ‘Incommensurability and alterity in contemporary jurisprudence’ (1997) 45 Buffalo LR 50321
at 523.
Shepherd ‘Face to face: A call for radical responsibility in place of compassion’ (2003) 77 Saint22
John’s LR 445 at 484.
Levinas Totality and infinity (1969) 39. 23
Wise Rattling the cages: Toward legal rights for animals (2000) 32.24
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physiologically, have a common origin and common evolutionary function, and
result in similar forms of behaviour in similar circumstances should actually
operate in an entirely different manner ...’.25
Bentham’s famous call for the equal consideration of animals based on their
capacity to suffer is a golden thread that runs through literature on animal ethics.
For Bentham, a being’s ability to suffer is a precondition for having any
protectable interest.  The question, he argued, ‘is not Can they reason? nor Can26
they talk? But, Can they suffer?’  This threshold requirement is clearly more27
inclusive than a criterion of sex, race, sexual orientation or membership to a
specific specie, criteria used to marginalise women, blacks, homosexuals and
animals. The problem is that Bentham’s contribution is weakened when applied
as the basis of a comparative appraisal. The question ‘Can they suffer?’ can only
be meaningful when the suffering is registered on the sufferer’s terms.  Animals28
do not suffer like humans do, they suffer like animals do. And that should be
enough to grant them equal moral consideration. 
In drawing these comparisons between the self and the Other, these
theorists fail to respect the asymmetry that characterises the ethical relation and
consequently preclude the possibility of an ethical encounter:
Once I attempt to impose a logical relation between myself and the other, I will
have connected the other to me within my schematic thought. Once this
connection, this grasping, is made, I hold the other hostage by denying its very
qualities of otherness or alterity. I renounce its identity as other. In order to be
other, it must be wholly other, without relation or connection to me. Once I
introduce a relation to the other, I exterminate its identity as an other by rendering
it an object of phenomenon within my world. In order to preserve alterity, the terms
I and Other cannot be brought together.29
The Other is thus absolutely other to the self. In order to appreciate this
otherness, I firstly need to recognise and conceptualise myself as an individual and
thereafter grant the Other the same recognition. The interplay between ethical
asymmetry and phenomenological symmetry that I elsewhere  articulated is once30
again evident and emphasises that ‘I’ am the point of departure to the ethical
Singer Animal liberation (2009) 11. It is important to note that, whilst Singer’s approach to animal25
liberation is grounded in utilitarian theory and not rights theory, his work has provided a moral
foundation for animal rights theorists and played a vital role in the creation of many animal rights
organisations, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the world’s largest
animal rights organisation. 
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MacKinnon ‘Of mice and men’ in Sunstein and Nussbaum (eds) Animal rights: Current debates28
and new directions (2004) 271.
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See De Villiers ‘Towards an ethical relation to the nonhuman Other: Deconstruction, veganism30
and the law’ (2012) 1 SAJHR 18. 
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relation. As Levinas explains, ‘alterity is possible only starting from me’.  This does31
not mean, however, that ‘I’ am the central point of reference for my relation to the
Other. To relate to the (animal) Other in terms of the (human) self is to appropriate
the Other and disregard the absolute distance separating the self and the Other.
The other cannot be minimised to an articulation of the self, because ‘what is
absolutely other does not only resist possession, but contests it’.  32
Simone de Beauvoir has emphasised the dangers of women being
subjugated to man’s Other ‘from being considered not positively, as she is for
herself, but negatively, such as she appears to man’.  For De Beauvoir, this33
strips the woman of her singularity and denounces her to an object that is ‘devoid
of meaning without reference to the male’.  Similarly, animal rights theory34
appropriates animals as man’s Other by defining animals in relation to humans.
When we ground our ethical responsibility in the likeness between the (human)
self and (animal) Other, we ‘privilege similarity over difference and selfness over
alterity’ and thereby fail to heed the call of the Other.  Ultimately we do not35
recognise the singularity of the Other but rather appropriate her as a reflection of
the self and thereby collapse the ethical relation into absolute symmetry. 
The ethical relation should rather, as Levinas emphasises, remain ‘a relationship to
the other as other, and not a reduction of the other to the same. It is transcendence’.36
Otherwise the question becomes: Is the Other like me? The dominant figure becomes
the norm and ‘that women are like men and animals are like people is thought to
establish their existential equality, hence their right to rights’.  To be clear, I am not37
disputing that there are similarities between humans and animals. The question,
rather, is why do animals have to be like us to escape the gross acts of barbarity that
we inflict on them? The recognition of women’s rights on male terms has done little
to recalibrate the social status of women as sub-male and one can ask how much
being seen as sub-human will benefit the animal liberation movement?  38
3.2 Hierarchical ordering
An approach that measures animals against a standard of humanness is clearly
anthropocentric as it reflects a deeply imbedded perception that we are the centre
and most important creatures on earth, the measuring-stick against which all
other creatures’ needs, interests and abilities are to be measured. The hierarchy
Levinas (n 23) 40. 31
Id 38.32
De Beauvoir The second sex (2009) 167. 33
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Lopez Lerma ‘Law in high heels: Performativity, alterity and aesthetics’ (2011) 20 Southern35
California Interdisciplinary LJ 290 at 300.
Levinas Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other (1998) 173-174.36
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emanating from this approach manifests on various levels: humans occupy a
space at the top tier of the speciesist ladder with other animals being
subordinately ranked below us. The similarity argument however also creates a
pecking order amongst animals based on their proximity to humanness, thereby
perpetuating both a human/animal divide and an inter-species hierarchy. 
Catherine MacKinnon argued some eight years ago that animal rights, like
women’s rights, ‘are poised to develop first for a tiny elite’ because of the ‘like us’
analysis.  In retrospect her words were prophetic, as recent legal developments39
realised her prediction. The Spanish parliament passed a resolution in 2008 which
granted legal personhood to the Great Apes. The resolution makes the killing of
an ape,  our closest nonhuman relative, a crime and bans their use in medical40
experiments, circuses and films and television commercials. Whilst the resolution
brings about a vital crack in the species barrier that we have erected between
ourselves and other animals, it also illustrates the hierarchical materialisation of
the similarity argument.
Once we deem certain animals to be ‘more equal than others’ based on their
propinquity to humanness, we can forecast the outcome. George Orwell
illustrated the dire consequences of that mindset in Animal farm more than half
a century ago.  That was a contradictory ending to the egalitarian uprising in the41
book and, likewise, it will be an antithetical ending to the animal liberation
movement. After decades of research the Great Apes (or at least the few that are
lucky enough to find themselves within the Spanish borders) enjoy legal
protection similar to humans, because they have been proven to be similar
enough to humans to merit such protection. One can only wonder how long the
road for dogs, rabbits, chickens and fish will be, how long it will take to prove that
they are sufficiently similar to humans to be granted rights.  42
The extension of rights to dogs, rabbits, chickens and fish is of course not
a definite progression of animal rights theory under the same-as characteristic.
Because no specific (human) characteristic is logically prescribed the choice
remains arbitrary and can be changed to include or exclude certain animals as we
see fit. The same argument used to grant rights to some animals, can thus be
used to deny others of the same protection:
Animals may feel pain, but cognitively process it differently or manage it more
effectively. Animals may think, but not in the way humans do. If an animal lacks self-
consciousness or the cognitive ability to anticipate his life in the future, the loss of
his life may be deemed less meaningful than the loss of a human’s life because
humans do have self-consciousness and can project themselves into the future.43
Ibid.39
Includes gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans.40
Orwell Animal farm (2004). 41
Bryant (n 6) 216.42
Id 211-212.43
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When animals are proven to possess certain (humanlike) characteristics that
are not valued by humans, this can even have an adverse effect. In a patriarchal
society that favours masculinity over femininity and everything that is traditionally
associated with this, the ability to suffer might actually be seen as a sign of
weakness and not of communality that puts animals on equal footing with humans. 
Ultimately then, it seems there are right (and wrong) capacities to possess and
a right (and wrong) way of feeling, being and thinking. JM Coetzee accurately
illustrates the absurdity of this anthropocentric way of valuing animals. Through his
alter ego, Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee gives a fictional account of the story of
Sultan, one of the apes used by psychologist Wolfgang Köhler in his experimen-
tations into the mental capacities of primates.  After being caught on African soil44
and shipped overseas to participate in a scientific experiment, the apes underwent
a process of training aimed at humanising them.  To this end, Sultan was placed45
in a cage and one day, without warning or any apparent reason, deprived of the
food that he was previously fed at regular intervals. A wire was then spun over his
cage and bananas attached to the wire. After being supplied with three wooden
crates, he was left to his own devices:
Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think. That is what the bananas up there
are about. The bananas are there to make one think, to spur one to the limits of
one’s thinking. But what must one think? One thinks: W hy is he starving me? One
thinks: W hat have I done? W hy has he stopped liking me? One thinks: W hy does
he not want these crates any more? But none of these is the right thought. Even
a more complicated thought – for instance: W hat is wrong with him, what
misconception does he have of me, that leads him to believe that it is easier for
me to reach a banana hanging from a wire than to pick up a banana from the
floor? – is wrong. The right thought to think is: How does one use the crates to
reach the bananas?46
Realising this, Sultan positioned the crates under the dangling bananas,
stacked them on top of the other, climbed to the top and brought down the
bananas. After passing the first test, Sultan was faced with an increased
challenge the next day. The exercise was repeated but this time the crates were
filled with heavy rocks, rendering them immovable. Once again Sultan had to
respond:
One is not supposed to think: W hy has he filled the crates with stones? One is
supposed to think: How does one use the crates to get the bananas despite the
fact that they are filled with stones?47
Sultan then emptied the crates and repeated the process of stacking the
crates so that he could reach the bananas. It was clear to Sultan that he was
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being tested and it was a test that he had to pass if he wanted to silence his
hunger. The test was of course not over and the next day, the bananas were
placed a metre outside of his cage and a stick thrown into his cage. 
The wrong thought is: W hy has he stopped hanging the bananas on the wire? The
wrong thought (the right wrong thought, however) is: How does one use the crates
to reach the bananas? The right thought is: How does one use the stick to reach
the bananas?48
These tests, as Coetzee remarks, propelled Sultan away from interesting,
speculative thought and towards lower, practical reason.  What he (really)49
thought or wanted to think was not only indeterminable, but irrelevant. What
mattered is that he thought and acted as Köhler wanted him to. Sultan’s value
was measured against his ability to demonstrate a predetermined capacity
possessed and valued by humans. That predetermined capacity, in this case the
ability to transfer insight and solve a problem, is of course arbitrary and can be
changed to one that animals cannot possess. 
Through this deconstruction of Köhler’s experiment, Coetzee firstly illustrates
the pragmatic limitations of research into the cognitive capacities of animals.  This50
approach of measuring and comparing animals is thus fundamentally unstable, as
there can be no definitive data upon which to ground any affirmative or dissenting
conclusion of similarity. Secondly, Coetzee highlights how this approach can,
depending of the capacity employed for comparison, as easily be used to prove
dissimilarity to animals as it can be used to prove similarity. Finally, Coetzee also
exposes an internal contradiction to an approach that seeks to liberate animals by
way of a modus operandi that requires that research be done on animals. In her
closing remarks on Sultan, Coetzee has Costello say the following:
In his deepest being Sultan is not interested in the banana problem. Only the
experimenter’s single-minded regimentation forces him to concentrate on it. The
question that truly occupies him, as it occupies the rat and the cat and every other
animal trapped in the hell of the laboratory or the zoo, is: W here is home, and how
do I get there?  51
4 The same-as characteristic and animal
experimentation
The use of animals for the purpose of research has always been a concern of
animal advocates. Yielding to public outcry against the inhumane treatment of
animals in laboratories, Britain adopted the first anti-vivisection law in 1876 and
Id 29.48
Ibid.49
Bryant (n 6) 213.50
Coetzee (n 44) 30.51
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the anti-vivisection movement formed soon after during the 1880s.  The use of52
animals in science remains a primary concern of animal rights organisations to
this day. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is synonymous with
the landmark ‘Silver Spring monkeys’ case, a battle against animal exploitation
that gained momentum and transformed a group of friends committed to animal
liberation into the world’s largest animal rights organisation.  53
The similarity argument requires that research be done on animals in order
to prove that they are sufficiently similar to humans to warrant protection. The
dissonance between this approach and the goal of freeing animals from exploitive
research is obvious. Mere observations of animals avoiding painful stimuli and
limping have in the past not been seen as sufficient evidence to prove that
animals experience – and react to – pain in a way similar to humans.  If we54
furthermore consider the probable consequences of the realisation of animal
rights  coupled with the high value that society places on data stemming from55
research that is done under ‘controlled conditions’, it is clear why mere obser-
vations of animals in their natural surroundings will not suffice as satisfactory
proof of similarity.  Captivity and exploitive research are inescapable ramifi-56
cations of the similarity argument. 
Past use of animals in scientific research paints a gruesome picture of mice
being irradiated to cause lung cancer, rabbits being injected in their knee joints
to induce chronic inflammation and electric shocks being administered to the
tooth pulp of dogs, to name but a few examples.  Experiments conducted to57
determine animals’ ability to feel pain have not been any less invasive and what
is of even more concern, is that the findings of these experiments have not
provided conclusive insight into the cognitive processing of pain by animals.58
There is still room for debate and more painful research. 
But even if there was a humane way to determine animals’ capacity to feel
pain, we need to bear in mind that they cannot meaningfully consent to being
participants in these experiments aimed at advancing ‘an idea of “chimpanzee-
ness” or “goldfishness” or “animalness”’.  Whilst the motives behind these59
Garvin ‘Constitutional limits on the regulation of laboratory animal research’ (1988) 98 Yale LJ 36952
at 371.
This case lead to the first raid of a research laboratory in the USA on 1981-09-11, with police53
confiscating 16 Macaques monkeys and one Rhesus monkey. Dr Edward Taub was charged with
17 counts of animal cruelty and found guilty on six counts on 1981-11-23. The convictions were
later reversed. See Pacheco ‘The Silver Spring monkeys’ in Singer (ed) In defence of animals
(1985) 135-147. 
Bryant (n 6 214.54
This would ultimately require that we abjure the use of all animal products and lead a vegan55
lifestyle.
Bryant (n 6) 220.56
See Ryder ‘Speciesism in the laboratory’ in Singer (n 53) 81-82. 57
Bryant (n 6) 213 - 214.58
Id 221.59
91
52 (2012) 27 SAPL
experiments might be noble, this approach ultimately preserves a view of animals
as objects and consequently perpetuates the very mentality it seeks to rupture. 
5 Conclusion
Whilst Douzinas describes rights as ‘one of the noblest liberal institutions’ he also
regards their triumph as the ideology of postmodernity to be something of a
paradox, reminding us that ‘our era has witnessed more violations of their
principles than any of the previous and less “enlightened” epochs’.  For60
Douzinas, this paradox is the result of a historical and theoretical gap, one that
he addresses and fills almost entirely in his body of work.  I had neither the61
capacity nor the intention to tackle such a mammoth task in this article. My goal,
rather, was to specifically focus on the similarity characteristic of the current
concept of animal rights which I believe renders it theoretically and philosophically
inconsistent with the ideal of animal liberation. 
To this end I started off by examining the make-up of rights and its expansive
potential that paves the way for animals to be the bearers of rights. I also
highlighted the challenge that this poses to proponents of the movement in the
formulation of an inclusive theory of rights. In the second part of this article I
examined the human/animal interaction from the perspective of an ethical relation
and illustrated what recognition of – and respect for – the otherness of the Other
demands. I argued that the same-as approach denies the otherness of the Other
and amounts to a reduction of the (irreducible) animal Other to a symmetrical
reflection of the self which, as Levinas reminds us, is evidence of a fundamental
ethical failure.  62
The similarity argument also facilitates the formation of hierarchies according
to the degree to which animals possess arbitrarily identified human
characteristics. As illustrated by the degree to which animal rights are currently
recognised, the nature of this approach allows for it to be as easily employed for
the discountenance of some animals as for the protection of others. Finally I
highlighted the practical limitations and ideological inconsistencies of the same-as
approach and illustrated why this course is incongruent with the ultimate goal of
animal liberation. 
In conclusion I would like to emphasise that I share the view that animals will,
despite the problematic aspects of the current conception, undoubtedly be better
off with rights than without them.  The road of rights will indeed take us63
‘somewhere’, and that place will be better than the one animals find themselves in
Douzinas (n 7) 446.60
See inter alia Douzinas ‘The end of human rights’ (2000) and Douzinas ‘Human rights and empire:61
The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism’ (2007).
See Levinas (n 23).62
MacKinnon (n 28) 271.63
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now. But just as the present concept of rights has not, to date, been able to
significantly change the social status of women and adequately address the
emanating oppression, I do not believe that the current approach to the idea of
animal rights allows for the realisation of the ultimate goal of the animal liberation
movement. As long as our anthropocentric outlook persists and we employ
humanness as the exclusive reference point from which to establish similarity and
an ensuing right to rights, animals will without fail be subjugated; just as blacks will
always, despite being rights bearers, be othered when whiteness is the norm,
women when maleness is the measure and homosexuals within a heteronormative
configuration. 
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 This article undertakes a critical analysis of subjectivity and exposes the 
metaphysical and anthropocentric quasi-transcendental conditions that 
give rise to the construct(ion) of the Subject. I locate a critical moment 
for the metaphysical Subject in the work of Martin Heidegger which, 
whilst sadly not sustained in his later writings, provides a point of 
departure for an examination of the significance that animality plays in 
the metaphysical tradition and its constitutive relation to the construct of 
subjectivity. I discern this relation to be violent and sacrificial and draw 
on Jacques Derrida's nonanthropocentric ethics against the background 
of Drucilla Cornell's ethical reading of deconstruction to construct a 
critique of approaches that assimilate animals to the traditional model of 
subjectivity in order to represent their identity and interests in the legal 
paradigm. The main argument that I seek to advance is that such an 
approach paradoxically re-constructs the classical humanist subject of 
metaphysics and re-establishes the subject-centred system that silences 
the call of the animal Other, thereby solidifying and extending the 
legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social regulation that is 
fundamentally anthropocentric. I examine how we can address, 
incapacitate and move beyond this schemata of power through a 
rigorous deconstruction of the partitions that institute the Subject and 
how deconstruction clears a space for a de novo determination of the 
animal "subject" that can proceed from different sites of 
nonanthropocentric interruption. What follows is a call to refuse the 
mechanical utilisation of traditional legal constructs and I argue in favour 
of an approach to the question of the animal (in law) that identifies and 
challenges anthropocentrism as its critical target. I ultimately propose a 
critical engagement with the underlying metaphysical support of animal 
rights at a conceptual level, rather than simply utilising the law 
pragmatically as an instrument of immediate resolution. 
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Animal liberation theorists' engagement with the law has largely been a 
depthless and uncritical one. Relying on scientific accounts of animals to 
uncover and support claims about their moral standing and legal subjectivity, 
scholars have been turning to existing legal constructs and frameworks in an 
attempt to bring animals into the realm of legal consideration and protection. 
Rather than questioning the way in which the law (in its most general sense) 
continues to exercise anthropocentric power and silence the call of the animal 
Other, animal rights discourse labours under the unexamined supposition 
that existing legal constructs provide a suitable framework within which to 
effect changes in our thinking and relation with animals. There has, rather 
paradoxically, been little sustained engagement with the philosophico-
juridical register of animal rights and a larger jurisprudential positioning of the 
animal in law and right(s). Whilst a plethora of moral and ethical philosophies 
on animal rights provides refined arguments in favour of the expansion or 
reformation of humanist liberatory discourse to ground the animal's moral and 
ethical agency, there has been a glaring neglect of engagement with the 
complexity of the subject, the being whose interests are to be protected 
through right(s). In short, the animal subject has been neglected in 
jurisprudence.  
Whilst I am aware that there are multiple theoretical-philosophical 
approaches to animal rights theory and consequently don't wish to claim the 
existence of a single model, there are indeed recurring structural tenets that 
undergird the salient current models.2 Most notably for the purpose of my 
focus in this article, they all ultimately revert to a subject-centred model that 
functions at the junctures of highly problematic homogenising categorisations 
(human / animal, subject / object, owner / property, rational / irrational) that 
validate and sustain the anthropocentric and carno-phallogocentric 
                                            
* Jan-Harm de Villiers. BCom (Law) (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM (Jurisprudence) 
(cum laude) (UP). Senior Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence, University of South 
Africa. E-mail: dvillj@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Poem by Friedrich Rolf Huber quoted in Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 142. 
2  See Regan Case for Animal Rights; Regan Defending Animal Rights; Wise Drawing 
the Line; Francione Animals as Persons. 
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metaphysical structure from which the very notion of subjectivity not only 
emanates, but upon which it is reliant.  
The main purpose of this article is to (re)turn the discourse of animal rights to 
its dependency on the event of subjectivity through a modest and focussed 
engagement with the most fundamental pre-condition of rights: the question 
of the Subject. What follows is a call to refuse the mechanical utilisation of 
traditional legal constructs and to argue in favour of an approach to the 
question of the animal (in law) that identifies and challenges 
anthropocentrism as its critical target. It is a call to engage with the underlying 
metaphysical support of animal rights at a conceptual level, rather than simply 
to utilise the law pragmatically as an instrument of immediate resolution. I am 
thus reiterating a previous call for a critical approach of slowness.3 Animal 
rights theorists' eagerness to simply add animals into existing legal 
frameworks in the hope of effecting immediate change is understandable, 
given the almost unimaginable suffering that millions of animals endure every 
day. My project, however, stems from the premise that animal liberation will, 
unfortunately, inevitably be a slow and gradual process. Any approach that 
fails to take on the laborious, time-consuming task of confronting 
metaphysical anthropocentrism will foreclose the possibility of destabilising 
and moving beyond the very interpretation of the human (as subject) that lies 
at the heart of animal subjugation.  
This article can roughly be divided into two parts, and unfolds as follows: In 
the first part I undertake a critical philosophical analysis of the subjectivity that 
undergirds rights, specifically focussing on the metaphysics of subjectivity 
and presence. I argue that the construct of subjectivity inevitably requires that 
the animal be assimilated to the prototypical and ground symbolic of the 
(hu)man of rights, ultimately reinforcing the containment of the animal in an 
identification as sub-human Other. In the second part of the article I examine 
how deconstruction clears a space for a re-conceptualisation of the animal 
"subject" in terms of subjection, substitution, hostage, and ultimately 
responsibility. I draw on Derrida's deconstructive gestures against the 
background of a previous engagement with Cornell's reconceptualisation of 
deconstruction to illustrate that deconstruction exposes a limit, in turn 
preserving the possibility of another thought of relation and ultimately another 
law. As such, I regard a deconstructive approach as vital to unweaving the 
anthropocentrism woven into the fabric of legal constructs and holding open 
the possibility of a post-subjective space that is non-anthropocentric. 
                                            
3  See De Villiers 2015 SAPL. 
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2 The anthropomorphic hegemony of subjectivity 
Animal rights theorists effectively seek a displacement of the line that 
separates the (legal) subject from the (legal) object so that animals can be 
endowed with the substratum of (legal) subjectivity from which rights and 
correlative legal protection flow. Legal rights are internally linked with the 
metaphysics of subjectivity in its chronological conception and 
complementarity; rights are the legal validation of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity.4 Metaphysics – meta (over or beyond) ta physica (the physical 
material world) – is the study of that which lies beyond the immediate physical 
realm. Metaphysics aims to describe and make sense of the disorder that 
unknowables (like existence and possibility) confront us with, and to master 
finitude, which, as Heidegger5 remarks, "is not some property that is merely 
attached to us, but is our fundamental way of being". 
We find the foundation of metaphysics in the classical Greek philosophers' 
reversal between the sensible and the intelligible, reaching its completion in 
Plato; the phenomenal world reflected as shadows against the dim wall of the 
cave and true reality existing in the sunlit world of ideas and forms. Beyond 
chaotic nature, which abounds with phenomena and appearances, lies the 
truth, which can be approached through philosophical dispositions of reason 
or logos.6 For Heidegger,7 the origin of metaphysics overlaps with the 
establishment of a certain humanism in which the human "move[s] into a 
central place among beings". Here human beings are defined, within a 
metaphysically established system of beings, as animal rationale and lead 
"to the liberation of their possibilities, to the certitude of their destiny, and to 
the securing of their 'life'".8  
Heidegger9 finds in Plato's thinking "a change that becomes the history of 
metaphysics". For Heidegger, Plato relinquishes the essence of 
"unhiddenness" and initiates a shift in the essence of truth. No longer is truth 
understood as the unhiddenness or unconcealment of beings themselves, 
but unhiddenness becomes "harnessed in a relation to looking, 
apprehending, thinking, and asserting".10 Truth is sequentially re-located in 
the correct narration and depiction of "objects" by the human "subject". If this 
understanding of truth finds its genesis in Plato, we see it reach its grand 
                                            
4  Douzinas End of Human Rights 241. 
5  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 6. 
6  Douzinas End of Human Rights 202. 
7  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181.  
8  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181. 
9  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 181. 
10  Heidegger "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" 182. 
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finale in Decartes' search for a fundamentum absolutum inconcussum 
veritatis - an absolute, unshakeable foundation of truth - which he locates in 
the self-present human subject.11  
The word subject stems from the Latin subjectum, literally meaning "that 
which is thrown under". The subject thus designates a fundamental stratum 
for the affirmation of qualities, predicates and attributes. The Latin subjectum 
was translated from the Greek hupokeimenon, "that which lies under", a term 
that Aristotle used to refer to "that of which all other entities are predicated 
but which is itself not predicated of anything else".12 Hupokeimenon ascribes 
a foundation upon which all entities become intelligible, and a determination 
of the subject as hupokeimenon is a claim to the meaning of Being – defined 
as the foundation upon which entities are grasped as such. Heidegger 
pointed out that every conceptualisation of the subject, irrespective of its 
affirming substantialisation, continuously postulates an ultimum subjectum or 
absolute foundation, rendering any determination of subjectivity 
fundamentally metaphysical.13 Decartes' cogito ergo sum placed this 
foundation on humanity and, according to Heidegger, decisively turned 
classical metaphysics into anthropology by identifying the subjectum with the 
human subject, the final point of reference and ultimate ground of all that 
exists.14 Nietzsche punctuated and solidified the infection of rationality. For 
Heidegger, Nietzsche's inversing figuration of the human as animal rationale 
simply reinforces the metaphysical framework within which human 
subjectivity is constructed. Rather than moving beyond a metaphysical 
determination of the subject, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's thought 
remains grounded in a subjectivist understanding of values and his re-
prioritisation of man's animality (over rationality) merely signals an inversion 
of the classical metaphysical definition and, with that, the closure of the 
metaphysical tradition's potentiality.15 At this closure, where "the Being of 
being human is exclusively presented in terms of the conscious subject, who 
sets the world forth and understands it through reduction of being to (self)-
representation", we find the human as the relational centre of all that is.16  
Heidegger understood that metaphysics has ab initio been concerned with 
one guiding question, namely what is an entity (in its Being)? Critchley17 notes 
                                            
11  Calarco 2004 Cont Philos Rev 178. 
12  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 51. 
13  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
14  Douzinas End of Human Rights 204. 
15  Calarco Zoographies 32. 
16  Douzinas End of Human Rights 205. 
17  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
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that metaphysics is not a regional ontology that asks after the Being of a 
region of entities like living things (biology) or physical matter (physics), but 
rather concerns itself with the question of the Being of an entity as such. The 
question of Being (or Seinsfrage) is thus the guiding question of philosophy 
for Heidegger and the philosophical tradition stretching from Plato to 
Nietzsche involves the unfolding of theses on the meaning of Being that 
progressively obfuscate its original sending.18 Metaphysics has thus always 
been a metaphysics of the subject to the extent that philosophy has always 
sought to designate the subjectum, the ultimate foundation from which 
entities become intelligible. In this sense, all the master words of pre-modern 
metaphysics (eidos, ousia, causa sui) are subjects and the subject is also 
always the subject of metaphysics.19 
For Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition is guilty of a forgetfulness or 
oblivion of Being. This forgetfulness is embodied in a failure to ask the 
question of Being (in itself) and a synchronal development and determination 
of a concept of subjectivity. As explained above, the history of philosophy can 
be seen as a meditation on the subjectum as foundation for an understanding 
of entities and what is at stake in this tradition, for Heidegger, is a 
displacement of this metaphysical foundation. No longer residing in a form, 
substance or deity, the foundation is ultimately found in the human 
understood as subject.20 He writes: 
The Meditationes de prima philosophia provide the pattern for the ontology of 
the subiectum constructed from the perspective of a subjectivity defined as 
conscientia. Man has become the subiectum. He can, therefore, determine and 
realize the essence of subjectivity – always according to how he conceives and 
wills himself.21 
Heidegger ultimately forces us to reflect on the significance of the 
metaphysical baggage accompanying the unfolding conceptualisation and 
concluding identification of man as subject. I would like to further 
problematise this schema by approaching it from an interdependent, but 
differentiated vantage point, shifting the focus from the implications of the 
human becoming subject, to the significance of the human becoming subject. 
Recalling Critchley's assertion that metaphysics is concerned with the 
question of the Being of an entity as such, to what extent, if at all, is the 
metaphysical tradition concerned with the particular question of the animal's 
                                            
18  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 52. 
19  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 53. 
20  Critchley Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity 53. 
21  Heidegger "Age of the World Picture" 84. 
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Being? What significance does animality play in the metaphysical tradition 
and in what relation does it stand to the construct of subjectivity?  
By recognising that human(ity) was consistently juxtaposed to animal(ity) 
throughout the development of Western metaphysics - from Plato's22 view of 
humans as creatures "different and more divine, pastur[ing] other kinds of 
living creatures more lowly than themselves", to Aristotle's23 acquiescent 
sentiment that animals are inferior beings that "should be under subjection to 
man…" and Decartes'24 well-known account of animals as automata or 
"machine[s] made by the hands of God" - we can begin to reflect on the 
anthropomorphic hegemony of subjectivity and its implications for discourses 
and institutions that evoke this construct. My aim is to illustrate that the 
construct(ion) of subjectivity is a violent, exclusionary process of othering. It 
is important to note that not only animals occupy a space of marginalisation 
within the metaphysical tradition, as classical concepts of subjectivity have 
excluded a plethora of Others. The earlier citation from Aristotle that I 
suspended with an ellipse highlights another dimension to the conjunctive 
sacrificial structure of the metaphysical tradition:  
… so is it naturally with the male and the female, the one is superior, the other 
inferior; the one governs, the other is governed… Those men therefore who are 
as much inferior to others as the body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, 
as the proper use of them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists.25 
Aristotle's justification for the appropriation and ingestion of the juxtaposed 
Other's body has profound significance for the structure of subjectivity, and I 
will return to this argument below. The point that I am trying to make here, 
which is not unrelated to the main argument being developed, is that the 
subject has been constituted through various relations of hierarchy, each 
reflecting a particular form of power. Any challenge to these hegemonic 
constructs requires a radical re-thinking of the subject so as to avoid the 
paradox of challenging a form of power whilst accepting its own terms of 
reference. I am in particular concerned with anthropocentrism as a guiding 
thread of the metaphysical tradition and its implications for an attempt to 
assimilate animals to the existing model of legal subjectivity. If, as Heidegger 
has extensively argued, the metaphysical tradition has failed to adequately 
attend to the question of Being and the essence of the human is lost in the 
process of man’s being conceived of as subject, what would the implications 
                                            
22  Plato "Statesman" 313. 
23  Aristotle "Treatise on Government" 17.  
24  Descartes "Discourse" 44. 
25  Aristotle "Treatise on Government" 17. 
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be if the philosophical and legal concept of subjectivity were applied to other 
animals?  
Heidegger's writings, specifically his early work, reflect a certain appreciation 
and consideration of the salience of metaphysical anthropocentrism. Despite 
his failure to sustain his early challenge to ontotheological anthropocentrism, 
Heidegger's reflections on the being of animal life nevertheless mark an 
important critical moment for the metaphysical subject, and the lines of inquiry 
opened up by his work provide a suitable point of departure for an 
engagement with the pervasiveness of metaphysical anthropocentrism.  
3 Heidegger and metaphysical anthropocentrism 
Heidegger's26 first seminal work, published in 1927, provides no more than 
brief fragmented references to the animal. Yet the question of animal Being, 
though neither pursued nor explicitly contextualised, lingers as a faceless 
subtext. Heidegger27 calls for a reciprocal relationship between philosophy 
and the positive sciences, arguing that an ontological foundation can assist 
science by "leap[ing] ahead into some area of Being, disclos[ing] it for the first 
time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the structures 
within it, mak[ing] these available to the positive sciences as transparent 
assignments for their inquiry". With this, Heidegger acknowledges the need 
for projects that determine Being beyond Dasein. Later in this text 
Heidegger28 articulates a concern with beings as a whole and calls for a 
project on life, which would logically once again include other animals, as "a 
kind of Being in its own right". However, he immediately qualifies and 
positions the project of developing such an ontology of life as accessible only 
in Dasein and as a site of lack to be interpreted against the absence of 
qualities that differentiate Dasein's distinct Being. Heidegger insists on a 
privative interpretation and rejects an ontological definition of Dasein as 
"life… plus something else".29 This ground for analysis exposes more than a 
delineation of the entry point or scope of Heidegger's project at that specific 
time; it divulges a subtle yet pervasive anthropocentrism that would guide all 
his future writings, often in dissonance with his explicit opposition to certain 
anthropocentric leitmotifs of the metaphysical tradition that shape and 
legitimise the humanism that he finds so problematic.  
                                            
26  Heidegger Being and Time.  
27  Heidegger Being and Time 30-31. 
28  Heidegger Being and Time 75. 
29  Heidegger Being and Time 75. 
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The essence of the animal and her specific manner of being enjoy 
significantly more attention in his lecture course30 delivered shortly thereafter 
in 1929, and whilst the question of the human/animal distinction is addressed 
(to varying degrees) in several of his writings,31 Heidegger's most sustained 
engagement with an ontology of animal life is to be found in this text. Here 
his thesis on the reciprocity between philosophy and science is once again 
emphasised, complicated and refined, inter alia through an engagement with 
the relationship between Zoology and the philosophical project of determining 
the animal's essence. His interpretation, Heidegger holds, is valid for the 
relationship between philosophy and all the sciences and it elucidates an 
association of communal cooperation and reciprocal enlightening. 
Heidegger32 calls the relation between metaphysics and the positive sciences 
"an ambiguous one" and I read this characterisation as a problematisation of 
the tendency in both philosophy and the sciences to claim absolute autonomy 
over certain processes and objects of inquiry, a tendency that renders both 
isolated disciplines wanting. Addressing "the magnitude of difficulties 
surrounding a metaphysical interpretation of life" requires a twofold discursive 
shift: a repositioning of philosophy seen as a purely transcendental discourse 
capable of determining the essence of an entity without recourse to biological 
science and, concomitantly, of science seen as a positivistic uncovering of 
"facts" without any need for interpretation or ontology. It is through an 
engagement with the phenomenon of "world" that Heidegger aims to initiate 
this reciprocal relation and distinguish human Dasein from other animals by 
exposing their respective modes of Being.33  
3.1 Heidegger and the question of world 
Heidegger's engagement with the question of world starts with the 
supposition that humans are not merely part of the world, but moreover have 
world. But what about other beings that are also part of the world, like the 
animal, plant and stone? Heidegger34 proposes that certain distinctions 
immediately manifest themselves, "however crudely", upon undertaking a 
comparative examination:  
                                            
30  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 
31  See inter alia Heidegger Being and Time; Heidegger What is Called Thinking?; 
Heidegger On the Way to Language; Heidegger "Origin of the Work of Art"; Heidegger 
Parmenides; Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'".  
32  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 188. 
33  Lewis 2017 Cosmos and History 52-53. 
34  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 177.  
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[1.] The stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] 
man is world-forming. 
In explaining his thesis that the animal is poor in world whilst man is world-
forming, Heidegger35 insists that this comparison "allows no evaluative 
ranking" and that it is not founded in the questionable habitual assessment 
that man has a higher or greater completeness of experiences and 
accessibility than animals. For Heidegger, anthropocentric hierarchical 
evaluations of essence and capacities are not only problematic in their denial 
of the complexities of animal relations (considering, for example, how the 
falcon's sense of sight and the canine's sense of smell surpass that of the 
human), such evaluations furthermore preclude an appreciation of the 
specificity of animals' world relations with other beings and are grounded in 
the very problematic premise that we can indeed compare human and animal 
world relations through the variegation of collective (dis)similarities. 
It is in Heidegger's commitment to a thinking of animality on the animals' own 
terms that we find his most progressive digression from the metaphysical 
tradition that he extensively critiqued. Heidegger's36 assertion that the 
determination of the animal's world relations "cannot be decided by 
reflections on language but only by taking a look at animality itself" signals a 
radical withdrawal from the anthropocentric prism through which the animal 
has traditionally been approached in Western philosophy. It is, however, also 
at this very juncture of trying to distinguish between the human and animal 
relation to world that Heidegger reasserts some of the most dogmatic and 
problematic tenets of traditional metaphysical discourse.37 
It needs to be noted that Heidegger's entire engagement with animality is 
aimed at articulating the unique relational structure of human Dasein and that 
his analysis of the animal's world-lessness serves to demarcate, through 
contrast and comparison, the essence of man's world-forming capacity.38 
"World" here designates for Heidegger a relational realm in which entities or 
beings are reciprocally present and accessible. The stone has no world; it 
does not "touch" the earth in any proper sense but merely "crops up" 
wherever it falls, having no relational force or access to the world in which it 
finds itself.39 The animal, by contrast, does have a relational structure and 
access of some kind. The lizard basking in the sun has not just cropped up 
in the world. When removed from the rock on which she is lying, the lizard 
                                            
35  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 194. 
36  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 195, own emphasis. 
37  Calarco Zoographies 22-23. 
38  Calarco "Heidegger's Zoontology" 20.  
39  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 197. 
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will start looking for her stone again, as she is accustomed to doing. The 
crucial point of differentiation, however, is that the lizard has no mode of being 
that allows her to penetrate the Being of an entity; to relate to the rock as a 
rock, or the sun as the sun. It is the lack of this relational "as" structure that, 
for Heidegger,40 renders the animal poor in world and precludes a capacity 
for ek-sisting:  
The manifestness of beings as such, of beings as beings, belongs to world. This 
implies that bound up with world is the enigmatic 'as,' beings as such, or 
formulated in a formal way: 'something as something,' a possibility which is quite 
fundamentally closed to the animal. 
For Heidegger,41 Ek-sistenz is thus inextricably linked to the dis-closive 
aptitude of Dasein; his specific way of relating to himself, others, and "mere 
possibility as Idea". Heidegger42 denotes (such) ek-sistence as "standing in 
the clearing of being", adding "this way of being is proper only to the human 
being". Heidegger's conceptualisation of "world" thus ultimately assumes (or 
perhaps rather subsumes) the ability to ek-sist.43 It is pertinent to reflect on 
the relevance of Heidegger's insistence that only man ek-sists, for it is a point 
that he repeatedly accentuates. Whilst it is clear that Heidegger is advancing 
the thesis that the metaphysical tradition has always been forgetful of Being 
and ignored what he deems to be man's essence, Heidegger is also 
solidifying a disconnection between animalitas and humanitas. Here it is 
important to recall Heidegger's rigorous critique of Nietzsche's thinking as the 
fulfilment and closure of the Western metaphysical tradition.  
I share the view that Heidegger not only fails to see the critical promise of 
Nietzsche's ontology, but that his critique furthermore exposes the very blind 
spot in his own thinking that encloses his project within the confines of 
metaphysical thought.44 Heidegger's critique is articulated against his view of 
the history and culmination of metaphysics as the subjectivisation of Being. 
What Heidegger failed to account for, however, is that the history of modern 
metaphysics is the progressive subjectivisation of (the) human-Being. For all 
                                            
40  Heidegger Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 274. 
41  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 249. 
42  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 247. 
43  This conceptualisation entrenches the essential gulf or "abyss" that, for Heidegger, 
separates humans and animals. He states "in any case living creatures are as they 
are without standing outside their being as such and within the truth of being, 
preserving in such standing the essential nature of their being. Of all the beings that 
are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living creatures, because on the 
one hand they are in a certain way most closely akin to us, and on the other they are 
at the same time separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss". Heidegger 
"Letter on 'Humanism'" 248. 
44  For an extensive explication of this position, see Calarco Zoographies 31-43. 
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Heidegger's efforts to uncover the essence of Dasein through a clear 
delineation and demarcation of the chasm that separates man from animal, 
it is the concretisation, implementation and perpetuation of this metaphysico-
anthropocentric axiomatic that frustrates and ultimately obstructs the 
possibility of moving beyond the metaphysics of subjectivity. Just as the 
tradition that preceded him, Heidegger's engagement with animals and 
animality serves to develop an understanding of the human's specificity and 
essence, and not as beings to be considered in their own right or on their own 
terms. This is not merely an inescapable modus that accompanies an inquiry 
that takes the human being as focal point; Heidegger is at pains to 
conceptualise man's separateness in opposition to the threat that the animal 
poses to that particularity.45 Heidegger's46 critique of the metaphysical 
humanism that "does not set the humanitas of the human being high enough" 
is thus deeply rooted in an essentialist logic of opposition between human 
and animal, and his project of displacing the metaphysical interpretation of 
man ultimately leaves us with a more rigorous delimitation of man that is 
grounded in highly problematic oppositions that remain inadequately 
questioned. Derrida's47 assertion that Heidegger's discourse "disrupt[s]… a 
certain traditional humanism" whilst ultimately remaining a "profound 
humanism" should be read from this perspective.  
4 Thinking at the limit of the subject 
If Heidegger's Dasein comes before the (dedomiciling of entities into object 
and) subject, who or what comes after the subject? In order to elucidate what 
is at stake in the contestation of this limit, I (re)turn to Nancy's interview with 
Derrida on the notion of subjectivity that I have previously engaged with.48 
Responding to Nancy's question "Who comes after the subject?" Derrida 
immediately delineates two concerns with Nancy's formulation. The first is 
intended as a response to prevailing criticisms or doxa on the "simple 
liquidation" of the subject and the second as a reproach to the unquestioned 
anthropocentrism that continues to emblematise the post-humanist tradition.  
Derrida firstly argues, contra popular neo-humanist notions, that the 
discourses of Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Freud, Marx and Nietzsche present 
a questioning, re-interpretation and re-positioning of the subject in its 
historico-cultural complexity. Far from "liquidating" the subject, the radically 
                                            
45  Calarco Zoographies 53. 
46  Heidegger "Letter on 'Humanism'" 251. 
47  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 113. 
48  De Villiers 2012 SAJHR.  
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decentered subject invites reflection on the consequences of such 
displacements for various institutions. The call for a "return to the subject" is 
thus confused in its misunderstanding of the constitution of the subject, as if 
there is indeed a Subject to return to. "There has never been The Subject for 
anyone", reminds Derrida.49 "The subject is a fable… but to concentrate on 
the elements of speech and conventional fiction that such a fable 
presupposes is not to stop taking it seriously (it is the serious itself)". 50 There 
is no authorial-authoritarian subject that is not confronted with a certain 
disruption or différance at its core. The condition of deconstruction is thus not 
an extraneous thematic that is being imposed on the thinkers of subjectivity, 
but a fundamental force at work in the authorial functions of the subject.51 
Once the subject has been "re-interpreted, displaced, decentered, re-
inscribed", the challenge for thought is firstly to work through the implications 
for institutions that presuppose the subjectum in its Cartesian and post-
Cartesian forms, and secondly to attend to the determination of the who or 
what responding to the question "who" (comes after the subject)?52 The latter 
point, against which Derrida raises his second apprehension, informs my 
central concern.  
Derrida is careful to keep a critical distance from post-humanist theorists who 
sustain and reproduce an unquestioned anthropocentrism. For Nancy,53 the 
"who" designates a locus post-subjectivity, "that place 'of the subject' that 
appears precisely through deconstruction itself" and he elaborates by asking, 
"What is the place that Dasein, for example, comes to occupy?" Derrida54 
remains highly sceptical of a simple overcoming of the metaphysical closure, 
warning that the substitution of "a very indeterminate 'who' for a 'subject' 
overburdened by metaphysical determinations" is not likely to result in a 
decisive displacement, and Heidegger's all too human Dasein remains, for 
Derrida, enclosed in the occlusion of metaphysical humanism and - 
anthropocentrism. Derrida55 is especially critical of the remnants of self-
presence implicit in Dasein's phenomenological (as such) relational mode 
and its function of radically and rigorously separating Dasein from other 
animals. The analytic of Dasein invokes conceptual oppositions that have not 
been adequately interrogated and the critical project of addressing and 
moving beyond the metaphysical problematic of the subject is located at the 
                                            
49  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 102. 
50  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 102. 
51  Calarco 2004 Cont Philos Rev 186. 
52  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 98. 
53  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 98. 
54  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 100.  
55  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 105. 
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borders of these oppositions. Here we find supposedly essential and 
exclusive qualities, attributes and phenomena that are fragile, surreptitious 
and volatile; and a deconstruction of these "propers" opens a space in which 
we can begin to re-determine and re-articulate the "who" (after the subject). 
To quote Derrida:56 
In order to recast, if not rigorously re-found a discourse on the 'subject,' on that 
which will hold the place (or replace the place) of the subject (of law, of morality, 
of politics…), one has to go through the experience of a deconstruction. This 
deconstruction (we should once again remind those who do not want to read) 
is neither negative nor nihilistic; it is not even a pious nihilism, as I have heard 
said. A concept (that is to say also an experience) of responsibility comes at 
this price. We have not finished paying for it. I am talking about a responsibility 
that is not deaf to the injunction of thought. 
The concept and experience of responsibility that Derrida speaks of here 
have complex relations to questions of animality, time, memory, ethics, law 
and justice. Derrida is emphasising the responsibility and importance of 
thought; of "ceaselessly analysing the whole conceptual machinery, and its 
interestedness, which has allowed us to speak of the 'subject' up to now".57 I 
read Derrida as emphasising that we need to "take responsibility" for the 
historical trajectory of the subject in all its complexity, for the violence 
embedded in its historicity, by critically engaging with the borders of the 
rupture between "this 'I-we' and what we call animals",58 between the 
(anthropo-centric) Subject and those beings excluded from being Subject. 
Derrida59 reminds us that the heterogeneous border of this rupture has a 
complex history, that "one can speak here of history, of a historic moment or 
phase, only from one of the supposed edges of the said rupture, the edge of 
an anthropo-centric subjectivity that is recounted or allows a history to be 
recounted about it, autobiographically…". I have previously illustrated that the 
borders that institute the subject are unstable and argued that our ethical duty 
towards other animals demands that we position and include the critical 
project located at these borders in relation to concepts of time, memory and 
justice.60 A genealogical reflection on the creation and reproduction of these 
borders not only exposes the inexactness of its constitutive functioning, but 
also sheds light on the hegemony of the trajectory of subjectivity and the 
violent spaces that various Others occupy (with)in the subjectile of the rupture 
and across the divide.  
                                            
56  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 107-108. 
57  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 109. 
58  Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 30. 
59  Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 31. 
60  De Villiers 2012 SAJHR. 
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Derrida's concept of carno-phallogocentrism that I previously discussed61 
underlines and further complicates the violence embedded in the partitions 
that institute the anthropo-centric Subject and highlights another problematic 
of a superimposed shared subjectivity between humans and animals. I have 
been arguing that the Subject has been constructed on an underlying 
foundation of man's non-identity with juxtaposed Others, particularly women 
and animals. There is, however, also a constitutive scheme of ingestion that 
underlies the relation between subjectivity and the animal's body. Derrida's 
neologism "carno-phallogocentrism" captures this ingestion of the Other that 
is intrinsic to the founding and solidification of humanistic subjectivity and 
emphasises that this operation is both symbolic and real when the body or 
corpse of the animal is concerned: 
I would want to explain carno-phallogocentrism, even if it comes down to some 
sort of tautology or rather hetero-tautology as a priori synthesis, which you could 
translate as 'speculative idealism,' 'becoming-subject of substance,' 'absolute 
knowledge' passing through the 'speculative Good Friday': it suffices to take 
seriously the idealizing interiorisation of the phallus and the necessity of its 
passage through the mouth, whether it's a matter of words or of things, of 
sentences, of daily bread or wine, of the tongue, the lips, or the breast of the 
other.62 
Carnophallogocentrism identifies the intentional subject (and the discourse 
from which he emanates) with constitutive requisites of carnivorism, 
masculinity and rationality. My concern is with the violence that cultivates and 
nourishes the borders of these requisites, both in its symbolic form of "words 
or sentences" and its materialising expression in the consumption of the 
"breast of the other". The point at issue is that the actual consumption of the 
animal is essential to the constitution of subjectivity, "the subject does not 
want just to master and possess nature actively. In our cultures, he accepts 
sacrifice and eats flesh".63 Man's becoming-subject derives from historical 
and continuing violence that extends far beyond the privative space that the 
animal occupies at the border of the human (subject) / animal (object) rupture. 
The structure of subjectivity feeds on the animal's flesh. The metaphysics of 
subjectivity is thus not only a conceptual violence that facilitates and 
legitimates our continued oppression of the animal Other, but it is 
fundamentally antithetical to her interests. By attempting to strategically 
tweak the boundaries and simply add animals into the legal construct of 
                                            
61  See De Villiers 2012 SAJHR. 
62  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 113. 
63  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 114. The essential link between carnivorous 
sacrifice and the structure of subjectivity highlights another dimension to the 
deconstructive potential of veganism that I previously proposed. See De Villiers 2012 
SAJHR. 
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subjectivity in its given state we are not challenging the status quo, but rather 
solidifying and extending the legitimacy of a discourse and mode of social 
regulation that is fundamentally anthropocentric. My argument is that these 
theorists and activists are simply re-constructing the classical humanist 
subject of metaphysics and re-establishing the subject-centered system that 
silences the call of the animal Other. We can only address, incapacitate and 
move beyond this scheme of power through a rigorous deconstruction of the 
partitions that institute the Subject and "a reinterpretation of the whole 
apparatus of limits within which a history and a culture have been able to 
confine their criteriology".64 
It is pertinent at this point to briefly revisit and highlight the ethical significance 
and positioning of my deconstructive project, specifically in relation to the 
larger themes of law and responsibility. My previous engagement with 
Cornell's ethical reading and renaming of deconstruction illustrates how 
deconstruction seen as a philosophy of limit intimates the quasi-
transcendental conditions constituting any system as a system and in turn 
exposes the inevitability of a "beyond" to a system, that which the system 
inescapably excludes.65 Cornell's project allows us to better understand the 
philosophical concept of deconstruction and her (re)conceptualisation 
clarifies the responsibility that deconstruction calls for in relation to a legal 
system. This responsibility, which Cornell66 perhaps more accurately 
designates as a locus of accountability, relates to our memories and the 
future that we promote in the act of remembrance. Derrida67 repeatedly 
accentuates the historical and interpretative memory fundamental to 
deconstruction, reminding us that "this is not only a philologico-etymological 
task or the historian's task but the responsibility in face of a heritage that is at 
the same time the heritage of an imperative or of a sheaf of injunctions". 
Genealogy, then, forms part of judicial integrity and the critical observer holds 
the tradition or system to task through the remembrance of its exclusions and 
partialities.68 Cornell recalls the history in which women were denied 
autonomy over their own bodies and, in a similar vein, I am here educing the 
violent sacrificial relation between subjectivity and animality. The structure of 
subjectivity (re)presents a very real limit to the striving for justice, specifically 
in its perpetuation of an anthropocentric order. Any striving for justice 
demands that we expose the limits of what has come to be instituted as law 
                                            
64  Derrida "Force of Law" 247. 
65  See De Villiers 2012 SAJHR. 
66  Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 149. 
67  Derrida "Force of Law" 248. 
68  Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 149. 
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through the preservation of the legal system.69 To quote Derrida:70  
This responsibility before memory is a responsibility before the very concept of 
responsibility that regulates the justice and appropriateness [justesse] of our 
behavior, of our theoretical, practical, ethicopolitical decisions. This concept of 
responsibility is inseparable from a whole network of connected concepts 
(propriety and property, intentionality, will, freedom, conscience, 
consciousness, self-consciousness, subject, self, person, community, decision, 
and so forth). All deconstruction of this network of concepts in their given or 
dominant state may seem like a move toward irresponsibility at the very moment 
that, on the contrary, deconstruction calls for an increase in responsibility.  
Deconstruction reconceived as the philosophy of the limit helps us to better 
understand justice as the limit to a system of positive law and the attendant 
increase in responsibility, precisely because it underlines the ethical 
aspiration behind the exposure of the system's limit and Other. Cornell's 
reading of deconstruction is grounded in profound insight into the limitrophe 
nature of deconstruction and the significance of the way in which 
deconstruction exposes the limit of a system or concept. The limit cannot be 
positively described as an oppositional cut or self-limitation and thereby 
reduced to a dichotomy or excess that can be incorporated into the system. 
The work of deconstruction is not to efface a limit, but rather to complicate 
the limit(s). Cornell's reading of deconstruction forcefully resonates in 
Derrida's71 later claim in relation to the question of the animal, that "limitrophy 
is therefore [his] subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or 
grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what 
feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and complicates it". It is within the 
complexity of limitrophy that deconstruction exposes why and how the Other 
is other to the system and this exposure, as Cornell reminds us, is driven by 
an ethical aspiration to observe the call of the Other. 
The single oppositional man (subject) / animal (object) limit has not only 
functioned to solidify anthropocentric hegemony, but has eradicated the 
plethora of existences and relational structures on both sides of the rupture. 
Beyond the partitions that construct the human lies "a heterogeneous 
multiplicity of the living", complex relations of organisation that are 
increasingly difficult to dimidiate.72 These relations resist simple dissociation, 
reductive categorisation and homogenisation, rendering the conflation of the 
singular animal Other to a generalised occasion of "the Animal" problematic 
on several levels. On an ethical level, reliance on these metaphysical 
                                            
69  Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 150. 
70  Derrida "Force of Law" 248. 
71  Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 29. 
72  Derrida The Animal That Therefore I Am 31. 
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categories embodies inherent violence to otherness. Recalling Cornell's73 
description of the ethical relation as "the aspiration to a nonviolent 
relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes 
responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny 
her difference and singularity", we can see how homogenisation and 
appropriation of "the animal" (or animal in general) betrays the most 
fundamental characteristic of the ethical relation. As I have also previously 
argued, subjectivity as building block for rights inherently relies on reductive 
disengagements that privilege similarity over difference and grounds ethical 
responsibility in likeness.74 The need for a thinking of différance rather than 
opposition is once again emphasised.  
On an ontological level, the violent functioning of the metaphysical human / 
animal dualism necessitates a new non-anthropocentric perspective of 
singularity that resists reductive and privative accounts of being(s) and strives 
to embrace animals on their own terms. The genesis of such an alternative 
thought is, as I have already suggested, located at the border of the human / 
animal limit and will succeed a rigorous deconstruction of the functioning of 
the limit and its relation to different concepts and practices. I use the word 
genesis deliberately as the philosophy of the limit is not simply a disruptive 
and destabilising exercise that leaves us stranded before an exposed 
obstruction, but provides us with a space of origin and a mode of formation. 
It confronts us with an occasion and, more importantly, the responsibility to 
think (again). "There is a duty in deconstruction", reminds Derrida.75 "There 
has to be, if there is such a thing as duty. The subject, if subject there must 
be, is to come after this".76 The deconstruction of metaphysics thus opens up 
a space for a de novo determination of the "subject"77 that proceeds from 
different sites of interruption. There is indeed life following the displacement 
and decentring of the classical metaphysical subject and the question 
concerning the "who" inevitably remains.  
5 The post-deconstructive "who" 
In the same interview with Nancy, Derrida makes the following two intriguing 
statements towards a possible new determination or location of the who-
                                            
73  Cornell Philosophy of the Limit 62. 
74  See De Villiers 2012 SAPL. 
75  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 108. 
76  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 108. 
77  Like Derrida, I feel a certain discomfort with the word "subject" and agree that it might 
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the word to some extent". Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 105. 
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"subject":  
There is another possibility that interests me more at this point: it overwhelms 
the question [who comes after the subject] itself, re-inscribes it in the experience 
of an 'affirmation,' of a 'yes' or of an 'en-gage' … that 'yes, yes' that answers 
before even being able to formulate a question, that is responsible without 
autonomy, before and in view of all possible autonomy of the who-subject, etc.78 
To be brief, I would say that it is in the relation to the 'yes' or to the Zusage 
presupposed in every question that one must seek a new (postdeconstructive) 
determination of the responsibility of the 'subject.'79 
Derrida's reference to the Zusage stems from his critical reading of Heidegger 
in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,80 in which he inter alia takes 
Heidegger to task for his privative account of the animal's relation to "world", 
as discussed above. Regarding the Zusage (promise or pledge), however, 
Derrida's aim is to locate a dimension of responsibility in language. Even 
though a comprehensive discussion of this text falls beyond the scope of this 
article, a brief explanation is needed to contextualise the succeeding 
discussion and conclusions. For Heidegger, it is clear that language has 
already been granted before any question is put to language. All questioning 
compels the preceding Zusage (pledge) of that which is being put to language 
and he therefore finds the primary datum of language in das Hören der 
Zusage (listening to the pledge of language) rather than the experience of 
questioning. Derrida emphasises that Heidegger thus understands the 
Zusage as a moment of affirmation, a "yes".81 The question is necessarily 
already a response to and a responsibility for that which is prior to the 
question and consequently "one might say that the origin of language is 
responsibility".82 
Readers who are familiar with the work of Emmanuel Levinas will likely detect 
a loud echo of Levinasian ethics in Derrida's words. Levinas' project of 
displacing the humanist subject of classical metaphysics is already taken up 
in his first major work in which he critiques the Western philosophical 
tradition's striving for totalisation. Here Levinas83 focusses on the Other, 
whose "face" interrupts from a dimension of irreducible "infinity" that 
interrupts the "totality" of the subject's reductive existence and in doing so 
gives rise to the subject's inescapable ethical responsibility for the Other. The 
                                            
78  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 100. 
79  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 105. 
80  See Derrida Of Spirit. 
81  Critchley "Question of the Question" 96. 
82  Critchley "Question of the Question" 97. 
83  See Levinas Totality and Infinity. 
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face does not present itself in the form of evidence to be seen. It breaks with 
the sensible by soliciting a relationship that resists expression in terms of 
knowledge. The alterity of the Other, which is not her individual difference but 
an unencompassable transcendence, remains outside comprehension. Yet 
despite resisting conceptualisation the face is vulnerable and against its 
limitless consequences expresses the commandment "Though shalt not kill". 
To the extent that my subjectivity is founded in and as a response to the 
Other's ungraspable infinity, Levinasian ethics is the experience of a call to 
responsibility. An attempt to comprehend and conceptualise the Being of the 
Other is a negation of her alterity and a rejection of this call. The Other's 
incomprehensible character resists relations of comprehension and 
synchronisation to the self and any thought of the Other thus carries within 
itself an excess that inevitably escapes me; "the infinite is the radically, 
absolutely, other" and "in thinking infinity the I from the first thinks more than 
it thinks".84 Levinas accordingly rejects ontology as a totalising violence that 
strips the Other of her radical otherness. 
It is Levinas' second seminal work, however, which presents a defence of 
subjectivity that is written from the context of a poststructuralist critique, that 
bears a closer relation to Derrida's determination of the who-"subject". 
Indeed, there are scholars85 who conjecture that this work can be seen as a 
re-reading (of his first major work) that responds to Derrida's critique in 
"Violence and Metaphysics".86 Derrida's critique here, in short, concerns 
Levinas' ineluctable reliance on the language of ontology whilst attempting to 
move beyond metaphysics. Whereas the point of exteriority that Levinas 
locates in the face of the Other is initially articulated within the constraints of 
ontological language, the title of Levinas' second major work, "Otherwise than 
Being, or, Beyond Essence", presents a dual transformative translation of the 
Platonic Good beyond Being and explicitly identifies the intention of his 
project to overcome ontology. Here Levinas portrays the radical passivity of 
subjectivity and primordial exposure to the Other through a distinction 
between the saying (le Dire) and the said (le Dit).  
For Levinas, there are two dimensions of language. There is a saying or 
foreword that precedes language before silence is broken by verbal (or 
written) signs in the said. "Language does not begin with the signs that one 
gives, with words. Language is above all the fact of being addressed."87 The 
(ethical) saying is therefore a pre-condition of the (ontological) said and I am 
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already exposed, addressed and dedicated to the Other before I direct myself 
toward her. For Levinas,88 "the responsibility for another is precisely a saying 
prior to anything said." Very importantly, this being-for-the-Other does not 
stem from my decision, agreement or autonomy; my responsibility was 
already there before I discovered it and I am more radically constituted by 
this unique, infinite response-ability than my autonomy. This infinite 
responsibility is furthermore inescapable; whilst I may decide not to answer 
the Other's call that originates responsibility, I cannot silence her. I am 
hostage to the Other and her interruption derives from a past removed from 
my consciousness and will, "the core of human subjectivity is the extreme 
passivity of someone who always comes too late to accept his task and 
autonomy."89 
There is clear consonance between Levinas' interpretation of subjectivity as 
responsibility and Derrida's location of the who-"subject" in the "'yes, yes' that 
answers before even being able to formulate a question". There is, however, 
also critical dissonance between the two thinkers on the very question of 
responsibility, specifically regarding the limits of responsibility. Derrida holds 
that Levinasian ethics, despite displacing the self-present ego at the core of 
traditional humanism, ultimately remains tributary of metaphysical humanism 
in its reliance on anthropocentric metaphysical oppositional limits and carno-
phallogocentristic in its sacrificial structure. The Levinasian discourse that a 
priori institutes the Other as man is firmly grounded in (unquestioned) 
metaphysical distinctions that guide an anthropocentric determination of 
animal Being in relation to the human. In remaining uncritically beholden to 
the dogmatic metaphysical axiom that allows for "a noncriminal putting to 
death"90 of other animals, Levinas fails to "sacrifice sacrifice"91 and remains 
bound to the metaphysics of subjectivity that he seeks to displace.  
This dogmatic anthropocentrism of Levinas' thought betrays an internal 
contradiction that he is never able to resolve. When directly provoked with 
the question of animality, specifically regarding the possibility of the "Thou 
shalt not kill" commandment being expressed in the face of the animal, 
Levinas92 (rather surprisingly and confusingly) grants that the animal does 
indeed have a face and goes on to say that "without considering animals as 
human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings". These statements are 
surprising considering the anthropocentrism that emblematises his body of 
                                            
88  Levinas Otherwise than Being 43. 
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91  Derrida and Nancy "'Eating Well'" 113. 
92  Levinas "Paradox of Morality" 171-172. 
114
J-H DE VILLIERS PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  22 
work and become increasingly confusing in the light of his ensuing remarks. 
When asked about the distinctiveness of the human face and the origin of our 
obligations (if any) towards animals, Levinas makes the following assertions:  
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one 
understands, for example, a dog. Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, 
but in the human face. We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in 
accordance with Dasein. The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form 
in the dog.93  
We do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly and so on. But the 
prototype of this is human ethics. Vegetarianism, for example, arises from the 
transference to animals of the idea of suffering. The animal suffers. It is because 
we, as human, know what suffering is that we can have this obligation.94 
Levinas' privileging of the human is not only problematic in its unwillingness 
to "sacrifice sacrifice", but also discordant with his defence of subjectivity as 
the direct response(ability) to a call preceding my consciousness and any 
form of conceptualisation that would foreshadow the "transference" of an 
"idea" in the said. The problematic of the animal and the ethical in Levinas'95 
thought is further complicated when he states that "a more specific analysis 
is needed" before he can say whether a snake has a face, as if the Other is 
not wholly other and the face does not express an infinity that resists any 
appropriation within cognition. Ultimately it is clear that Levinas never 
rigorously considers the question of animal Being and the provocation to 
reflect on the place of animals in his work unearths the deeply entrenched 
metaphysical anthropocentrism that is dogmatically reasserted. The animal 
is not afforded the alterity that would place her in an asymmetrical relation to 
the self, her Being is deduced privatively in plurality against the measure of 
the human. It is this anthropocentrism to which Derrida has been very 
observant that leads him to claim that Levinas' thinking, like that of Heidegger, 
remains profoundly humanistic. I want to suggest, however, that Derrida's 
deconstruction of Levinas can itself be read ethically; as an intervention that 
directs us to the centre of the subject and aims to guard against the failure to 
protect the Other's otherness that Levinas' concept of the ethical relation is 
so attentive of.96 
To this end, Derrida97 is most notably at pains to problematise the 
oppositional human / animal binary embedded in Western philosophical 
                                            
93  Levinas "Paradox of Morality" 169. 
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95  Levinas "Paradox of Morality" 172. 
96  Drucilla Cornell also proposes such a reading of Derrida's critique of Levinas on 
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discourse inter alia by situating a responsibility that is irreducible to the 
traditional construct of the Subject, precisely by demonstrating how his 
disruptive motifs (différance, trace, iterability, ex-appropriation, etc.) "are at 
work everywhere, which is to say, well beyond humanity". Again, Derrida 
does not simply uncritically expand the Levinasian ethical to include other 
animals, but provides a framework to think through and overcome the 
anthropocentric milieu shaped by dominant discourses. Who, then, is the 
"who" in Derrida's texts and by what right, if any, should we employ this 
translation?  
6 Towards a non-anthropocentric refiguration 
The "who" is most importantly a singularity (rather than an individuality or 
atom identical to itself) "that dislocates or divides itself in gathering itself 
together to answer to the other, whose call somehow precedes its own 
identification with itself."98 This "who" is en-gaged in responsibility prior to 
self-presence and autonomy; overwhelmed by the trace, différance, ex-
appropriation and signature in the affirmation of having already answered to 
the "yes, yes" in (in)capacity of irreplaceable singularity. The question 
emanating from this analytic of singularity concerns the appropriateness of 
its translation into a "who", a question that is particularly complex in its 
chronological, philosophical and grammatical topology. In continuing to 
address this issue, I would like to suggest that the question of "Who?" cannot 
and should not be separated from the deconstruction of the Subject, as if 
deconstruction is a singular, linear event unaffected and unrelated to the 
trace. We should thus guide our intervention into the problematic of the 
Subject by asking to what extent the question "Who?" displaces or conversely 
re-introduces the structure of the classical Subject.  
Derrida's concern is that this thought of singularity might resist translation into 
the grammatical form "who", because the latter postulates inadequately 
examined conceptual oppositions that are fundamentally contributory to the 
very problem at hand and necessitate renewed and ceaseless deconstruction 
by and of themselves. Any post-deconstructive determination of the "Subject" 
should guard against positing itself in a way that is naively pre-deconstructive 
in the reconstitution of "an illegitimately delimited identity… in the name of a 
particular kind of rights".99 Deconstruction, rather, "lets itself be called by a 
more exacting articulation of rights" that, in a different way, prescribes more 
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responsibility.100 The duty in deconstruction that Derrida speaks of presents 
itself in the form of responsibility to think again; to think radically new 
discourses and determinations of "subjectivity" that destabilise the 
problematic of the Subject from a context that it no longer controls at its 
centre. This might very well require that we "forget" the unforgettable word 
("Subject") by no longer speaking of it, but rather writing it, "writ[ing] 'on' it as 
on the 'subjectile,' for example".101 This need arises because the discourse 
on the Subject inevitably remains expressive of its constitutive 
presuppositions and is destined to link subjectivity with the human, even if it 
predicates the disruptive force of différance, trace, inadequation etc. A further 
problematic inherent to the determination of the "who" as Subject relates to 
the call of the Other which, in order to remain singular and other, must remain 
un-appropriated and un-subjected. We are faced with this challenge to 
thought precisely because the responsibility to protect the otherness of the 
Other is, as Derrida102 repeatedly reminds us, not simply a theoretical 
directive. 
The problematic of the Subject is pronounced in its translation into law and 
remains marked by all the constraints that I have recalled. In order to put 
forward the interests of animals in the legal paradigm, scholars have to 
communicate and structure their reasoning and claims in keeping with the 
categories provided by the legal system. Within the subject-centered model 
of law, the result is that animal rights theorists are ultimately forced to 
establish rights for animals as Subjects by assimilating a human-like 
subjectivity, thereby (re)producing a different form of anthropocentric 
subjectivism that simply re-establishes the borders of ethical and legal 
consideration at an(other) equally problematic annexation whilst naively 
reinforcing the anthropocentric structure they seek to destabilise and 
eradicate. This approach of promoting a future of animal liberation by 
employing the very same hegemonic constructs that have historically 
functioned to subjugate animals is tragically paradoxical. A deconstructive 
engagement with the historical functioning of animality enumerates the 
exclusionary limitations of and concomitant need for radically new 
discourses, language, politics, ethics and law. The experience of 
deconstruction exposes the limits of our existing legal frameworks and clears 
the space for a rethinking of the concept of right that can proceed without 
indebtedness to the interpretation of man that is being called into question. 
Like Derrida I do not believe in a simple "miracle of legislation" and, identifying 
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metaphysical anthropocentrism as the critical target, I am ultimately calling 
for an engagement with law at a conceptual level. It is in the "beyond" to the 
reconsideration of the history of law and right(s) that we can allow ourselves 
to see and be seen by all animals looking us in the face. 
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LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS v MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
JAN-HARM DE VILLIERS
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of South Africa
INTRODUCTION
The academic field of animal law has grown exponentially over recent years,
largely in response to the relentless efforts of the animal liberation movement.
Yet, despite a growing academic interest and increasing legislative reform, it
is hard to find evidence of meaningful change in the lives and deaths of
animals. Theoretical and practical efforts have predominantly focused on
legal reform as the key that will unlock the cage of oppression. In turn, these
efforts bear witness to the fact that the law fails adequately to incorporate the
animal’s fundamental interests. The object or property status of animals is
widely regarded as foundational to the problem of animal subjugation, and a
considerable amount of ink has been spilled on the scientific and moral
(il)logic of this categorisation in the face of morally relevant and subjectlike-
traits manifested by so many animals (see Gary Francione Animals, Property
and the Law (1995); Gary Francione Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the
Animal Rights Movement (1996); Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights
(1983); Tom Regan Defending Animal Rights (2001)). The law has however
resisted embracing and protecting the animal as a legal subject.
The recent decision by the Constitutional Court in National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC) reflects a radical shift in the
traditional legal approach to the animal, and could potentially facilitate much
needed change in our treatment of animals. In assessing the applicant’s right
to privately prosecute cases of animal cruelty, the court considered the plight
of the animal and in the process of doing so, made significant pronounce-
ments that destabilise the substratum of the animal’s legal status. This position
is however not consistently maintained and the ruling ultimately reflects the
court’s struggle to metabolise logically its construction and destruction of
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INTRODUCTION
The academic field of animal law has grown exponentially over recent years,
largely in response to the relentless efforts of the animal liberation movement.
Yet, despite a growing academic interest and increasing legislative reform, it
is hard to find evidence of meaningful change in the lives and deaths of
animals. Theoretical and practical efforts have predominantly focused on
legal reform as the key that will unlock the cage of oppression. In turn, these
efforts bear witness to the fact that the law fails adequately to incorporate the
animal’s fundamental interests. The object or property status of animals is
widely regarded as foundational to the problem of animal subjugation, and a
considerable amount of ink has been spilled on the scientific and moral
(il)logic of this categorisation in the face of morally relevant and subjectlike-
traits manifested by so many animals (see Gary Francione Animals, Property
and the Law (1995); Gary Francione Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the
Animal Rights Movement (1996); Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights
(1983); Tom Regan Defending Animal Rights (2001)). The law has however
resisted embracing and protecting the animal as a legal subject.
The recent decision by the Constitutional Court in National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC) reflects a radical shift in the
traditional legal approach to the animal, and could potentially facilitate much
needed change in our treatment of animals. In assessing the applicant’s right
to privately prosecute cases of animal cruelty, the court considered the plight
of the animal and in the process of doing so, made significant pronounce-
ments that destabilise the substratum of the animal’s legal status. This position
is however not consistently maintained and the ruling ultimately reflects the
court’s struggle to metabolise logically its construction and destruction of
207









LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS v MINISTER OF JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
JAN-HARM DE VILLIERS
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of South Africa
INTRODUCTION
The academic field of animal law has grown exponentially over recent years,
largely in response to the relentless efforts of the animal liberation movement.
Yet, despite a growing academic interest and increasing legislative reform, it
is hard to find evidence of meaningful change in the lives and deaths of
animals. Theoretical and practical efforts have predominantly focused on
legal reform as the key that will unlock the cage of oppression. In turn, these
efforts bear witness to the fact that the law fails adequately to incorporate the
animal’s fundamental interests. The object or property status of animals is
widely regarded as foundational to the problem of animal subjugation, and a
considerable amount of ink has been spilled on the scientific and moral
(il)logic of this categorisation in the face of morally relevant and subjectlike-
traits manifested by so many animals (see Gary Francione Animals, Property
and the Law (1995); Gary Francione Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the
Animal Rights Movement (1996); Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights
(1983); Tom Regan Defending Animal Rights (2001)). The law has however
resisted embracing and protecting the animal as a legal subject.
The recent decision by the Constitutional Court in National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC) reflects a radical shift in the
traditional legal approach to the animal, and could potentially facilitate much
needed change in our treatment of animals. In assessing the applicant’s right
to privately prosecute cases of animal cruelty, the court considered the plight
of the animal and in the process of doing so, made significant pronounce-
ments that destabilise the substratum of the animal’s legal status. This position
is however not consistently maintained and the ruling ultimately reflects the
court’s struggle to metabolise logically its construction and destruction of
207









LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRUELTY T NIMALS v MINISTER OF JUS ICE
AND CONSTITUTIO AL DEVELOPMENT
JAN-HARM DE VILLI RS
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of South Africa
INTRODUCTION
The academic field of animal law has grown exponentially over recent years,
largely in response to the relentless efforts of the animal liberation movement.
Yet, despite a growing academic interest and increasing legislative reform, it
is hard to find evidence of eaningful change in the lives and deaths of
animals. Theoretical and practical efforts have predominantly focused on
legal reform as the key that will unlock the cage of oppression. In turn, these
efforts bear witness to the fact that the law fails adequately to incorporate the
animal’s fundamental interests. The object or property status of animals is
widely regarded as foundational to the problem of animal subjugation, and a
considerable amount of ink has been spilled on the scientific and moral
(il)logic of this categorisation in the face of morally relevant and subjectlike-
traits manifested by so many animals (see Gary Francione Animals, Property
and the Law (1995); Gary Francione Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the
Animal Rights Movement (1996); Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights
(1983); Tom Regan Defending Animal Rights (2001)). The law has however
resisted embracing and protecting the animal as a legal subject.
The recent decision by the Constitutional Court in National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Develop-
ment & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC) reflects a radical shift in the
traditional legal approach to the animal, and could potentially facilitate much
needed change in our treatment of animals. In assessing the applicant’s right
to privately prosecute cases of animal cruelty, the court considered the plight
of the animal and in the process of doing so, made significant pronounce-
ments that destabilise the substratum of the animal’s legal status. This position
is however not consistently maintained and the ruling ultimately reflects the
court’s struggle to metabolise logically its construction and destruction of
207
J : J rt : : : ri : :
/first/J t /j t / J rt / t s
( rt )
I I : I I
I I I I I
O A I I I J TI
I I N
J I I
e i r ect rer i , i ersit f t fric
I I
i l f i l l s r ti ll r r t rs,
l r l i r s s t t r l tl ss ff rts f t i l li r ti t.
t, s it r i i i t r st i r si l isl ti r f r , it
is r t i f m i f l i t li s t s f
i ls. r ti l r ti l ff rts r i tl f s
l l r f r s t t t ill l t f r ssi . I t r , t s
ff rts r it ss t t f t t t t l f ils t l t i r r t t
i l’s f t l i t r sts. j t r r rt st t s f i ls is
i l r r s f ti l t t r l f i l s j ti ,
si r l t f i s s ill t s i ti r l
(il)l i f t is t ris ti i t f f r ll r l t s j tli
tr its if st s i ls (s r r i i ls, r ert
t e ( ); r r i i it t er: e I e l g f t e
i l ig ts e e t ( ); e se f r i l ig ts
( ); efe i g i l ig ts ( )). l s r
r sist r i r t ti t i l s l l s j t.
r t isi t stit ti l rt i ti l ciet f r t e
re e ti f r elt t i ls i ister f J stice stit ti l e el -
e t t er ( ) ( ) r ts r i l s ift i t
tr iti l l l r t t i l, l t ti ll f ilit t
i r tr t t f i ls. I ss ssi t li t’s ri t
t ri t l r s t s s f i l r lt , t rt si r t li t
f t i l i t r ss f i s , si i t r
ts t t st ilis t s str t f t i l’s l l st t s. is siti
is r t sist tl i t i t r li lti t l r ts t
rt’s str l t t lis l i ll its str ti str ti f
6.
124
JOBNAME: SALJ 19 Part 2 PAGE: 2 SESS: 20 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 2 11:15:00 2019
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2019−Part2/00notes
‘the animal’. At issue, as I have previously illustrated, is anthropocentrism as a
quasi-transcendental limit of legal discourse (see Jan-Harm de Villiers
‘Metaphysical anthropocentrism, limitrophy, and responsibility: An explica-
tion of the subject of animal rights’ (2018) 21 PER/PELJ 1). Being unable to
erase or circumvent this inherent characteristic of the law, the ruling
entangles discordant ideologies and embodies inconsistencies that render it
puzzling and paradoxical.
In the first part of this note I position the National Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (‘the NSPCA’) historically and ideologi-
cally within the animal advocacy movement in order to contextualise the
issues before the court and facilitate a discussion of the theoretical and
ideological incongruences of the judgment. I then summarise the facts and
litigation history in the second part, tracing how the trial developed from the
high court to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and ultimately the Constitu-
tional Court. Lastly, I critically analyse the Constitutional Court’s judgment.
I first comment on the court’s approach to the dualistic private prosecution
scheme set out in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’),
arguing that the court erred in not addressing the constitutionality of s 7(1)(a)
of the CPA. I then discuss the court’s engagement with the question of the
animal, which forms the focus of this note. I argue that whilst there is much
to admire in the court’s ruling, and that it has the potential radically to
transform the legal status of the animal, it confuses and vacillates between two
incompatible perspectives and is ultimately unable to navigate successfully
the challenges that the question of the animal poses.
BACKGROUND
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (‘the SPCA’) looms
large in the history of a unified effort at addressing the plight of animals — a
movement which originated in the eighteenth century. Prior to that time,
animal protectionism was sporadic and we mainly find isolated examples of
lone acts of kindness towards animals, like the 1567 decree of Pope Pius V
that condemned bullfighting. Organised attempts to protect animals were
however largely absent (Helena Silverstein Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning
and the Animal Rights Movement (1996) 29). The structured animal advocacy
movement came to force in the 1800s and divided into two camps soon after
its formation, one calling for an improvement of the conditions in which
animals live and die, and the other advocating the total abolition of human
(ab)use of animals. These two branches are respectively known as the animal
welfare or humane movement, and the animal rights movement (which
originated as the anti-vivisection movement).
Following a sixty-year period of anti-animal-cruelty literature, the 1800s
saw the formation of a united attempt aimed at addressing the plight of
animals in England. These works condemned blood sports like cock
throwing and cockfighting, and advanced the notion that humans have a
moral duty of care and compassion towards animals (ibid at 30). Even though
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these works were written from the fringes and widely regarded as ‘eccentric’,
they slowly penetrated the general public and laid important groundwork for
change: ‘the writers were, so to speak, the artillery bombarding a position
from a reasonably safe distance; the brunt of the fighting had to be done by
the Members of Parliament’ (Charles D Niven History of the Humane
Movement (1967) 55).
The fight for humane legislation commenced in 1800 when a Bill aimed
at the suppression of bullbaiting was introduced into Parliament by Sir W
Pulteney. Although the majority of Parliament opposed the Bill, it neverthe-
less stimulated considerable public debate on the issue of animal welfare (ibid
at 58). In 1809 a more comprehensive Bill aimed at preventing ‘wanton and
malicious cruelty to animals’ passed in the House of Lords before it was
rejected in the House of Commons (Gerald Carson Men, Beasts, and Gods:
A History of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals (1972) 49). England’s first animal
protection legislation criminalising cruelty to animals would only see the
light of day several years later in 1822 when Richard Martin saw through the
adoption of the Martin’s Act, which specifically forbade cruelty to cattle
(Roderick Nash The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (1989)
25). While Martin initially aimed for a broader scope, the final act only
protected larger domesticated animals and excluded owner-inflicted cruelty
to animals (ibid). This period also saw a rise in structured efforts outside of the
legislature and in 1824 Martin, together with other English humanitarians,
organised the SPCA with the main objective of utilising the newly enacted
legislation to improve the welfare of animals (Carson op cit at 53). The SPCA
is widely considered to be the first animal protection organisation and
recognised as the founding father of the animal welfare movement (Silver-
stein op cit at 31). Despite struggling early on, the SPCA started gathering
momentum in 1840 when Queen Victoria directed that the society become
the Royal SPCA. This facilitated the formation of new branches and similar
organisations across Europe (Carson op cit at 54).
The 1860s saw the birth of a new branch of animal advocacy that extended
its scope of concern beyond the welfare movement’s now narrow focus on
domesticated animals. The anti-vivisection movement, led by Frances
Power Cobbe, focused on protecting animals used in scientific experimenta-
tion (Silverstein op cit at 31). Soon after its formation, the anti-vivisection
movement split into two camps, one demanding the complete eradication of
scientific experimentation on animals, and the other striving to minimise the
suffering inflicted on animals used in experiments. This dissonance also
effected a more significant split in the larger animal advocacy movement,
solidifying a division between the anti-vivisectionists and the animal welfare
camp. Notwithstanding these schisms, the anti-vivisectionists achieved signi-
ficant success, passing a bill aimed at protecting laboratory animals in 1876 and
forming several new anti-vivisection groups across Europe (ibid).
Animal welfare advocacy quickly spread to the United States where Henry
Bergh, inspired by events in England, introduced the philosophy of animal
welfare during the 1860s. Bergh’s labours culminated in the first anticruelty
statute being adopted by the New York state legislature in 1866, stipulating:
NOTES 209
126
JOBNAME: SALJ 19 Part 2 PAGE: 4 SESS: 20 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 2 11:15:00 2019
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2019−Part2/00notes
‘Every person who shall, by his act or neglect, maliciously kill, maim, wound,
injure, torture or cruelly beat any horse, mule, cow, cattle, sheep or other
animal belonging to himself or another, shall upon conviction be adjudged
guilty of a misdemeanor.’ (Cited in Niven op cit at 108.)
Bergh also founded the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, which was the first humane society in the Western hemisphere
(ibid). Shortly thereafter in 1872, the Cape of Good Hope SPCA was
established as the first animal welfare organisation and founder of the SPCA
movement in SouthAfrica. Today we find close to one hundred autonomous
SPCAs across South Africa, governed by the Societies for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act 169 of 1993 (‘the SPCAAct’).
The SPCA Act requires that all members register with the NSPCA, a
juristic person established in terms of s 2(1) of the Act. Section 3 of the Act
sets out the objects of the NSPCA, which include the prevention of
ill-treatment of animals (s 3(c)), taking cognisance of laws affecting animals
and making representations to appropriate authorities against this back-
ground (s 3(e)), and doing anything reasonably necessary for the achievement
of its objects (s 3(f)). Section 6 of this Act bestows powers on the NSPCA in
order to achieve its objectives, including the appointment of skilled persons
as inspectors and employees (s 6(2)(c)), the confiscation of an animal
reasonably believed to be ill-treated (s 6(2)(d)(vi)) and the power to defend
and institute legal proceedings in connection with its functions (s 6(2)(e)).
These functions and correlative powers are far-reaching, especially when
interpreted against the larger animal welfare legislative framework.
The SPCA Act should be read and interpreted alongside the Animals
Protection Act 71 of 1962 (‘the APAct’), the latter being the primary piece of
animal protection legislation aimed at consolidating and amending laws
relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals. Section 6(1) of the SPCA
Act specifically classifies the NSPCA as a society for the prevention of cruelty
to animals for the purposes of s 8 of the AP Act. The AP Act sets out a broad
list of animal cruelty offences (s 2(1)(a)–(r)) and once again endows any
society for the prevention of cruelty to animals with a broad range of powers
(s 8(1)(a)–(d)).
Despite these wide-ranging functions, or perhaps precisely because of the
lack of delineation, the NSPCA has historically struggled to implement the
AP Act, and their efforts to facilitate the prosecution of animal cruelty have
been frustrated by the National Prosecuting Authority (‘the NPA’). Uncer-
tainty about the NSPCA’s nature, mandate and powers contributed to its
impotence. Certain state agencies have labored (or rather lazed) under the
assumption that the NSPCA is authorised to enforce the AP Act on the
government’s behalf, whilst other have interpreted the SPCA Act as merely
regulating the NSPCA as a juristic person under private control rather than
creating a licensed statutory body as such (Michelè Pickover Animal Rights in
South Africa (2005) 71; see also Hansard, 25 November 1993 at 14066).
This state of affairs becomes more disconcerting if one considers the high
number of animal cruelty incidences and the absence of a government
(2019) 136 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL210
127
JOBNAME: SALJ 19 Part 2 PAGE: 5 SESS: 20 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 2 11:15:00 2019
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2019−Part2/00notes
agency with the intention or capacity to implement the AP Act effectively.
The matter of animal welfare supposedly rests with the Department of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (‘the DAFF’), yet there is no branch
assuming responsibility for this issue (Pickover op cit at 71). The DAFF
however finds itself in a precarious position, being simultaneously tasked
with the exploitation of animals and the implementation of animal protec-
tion legislation. It has for a long time been voicing unease about ‘being both
player and a referee’, and has expressed the intention to pass the legislation
back to the Department of Justice, which was previously tasked with the
administration of animal welfare legislation (ibid at 8). The question of
capacity forms another central issue. The Minister of Agriculture already
expressed concern about the state of animal welfare when the SPCA Act was
enacted in 1993, stating (Hansard, 25 November 1993 at 14065):
‘The responsibilities of animal welfare organizations are becoming greater as
urbanisation in South Africa accelerates, and animals in many disadvantaged
communities are in dire need of basic animal care. The State is and will
probably remain unable to provide these services. This poses an enormous
challenge to the SPCAs to extend their services to these disadvantaged
communities ... .’
Notwithstanding this set of circumstances, the NSPCA has been faced
with state opposition in attempts to fulfil its statutory mandate. Unsatisfied
with the NPA’s unwillingness to prosecute what the NSPCA alleges to be
clear crimes of animal cruelty, the NSPCA has repeatedly attempted to
institute private prosecutions in terms of the CPA. The CPA distinguishes
two categories of private prosecution. Section 7 of the CPA permits private
prosecution on the basis of a certificate nolle prosequi, providing as follows:
‘(1) In any case in which a director of public prosecutions declines to
prosecute for an alleged offence —
(a) any private person who proves some substantial and peculiar interest
in the issue of the trial arising out of some injury which he
individually suffered in consequence of the commission of the said
offence; ...
may ... either in person or by a legal representative, institute and conduct a
prosecution in respect of such offence in any court competent to try that
offence.
(2)
(a) No private prosecutor under this section shall obtain the process of
any court for summoning any person to answer any charge unless
such private prosecutor produces to the officer authorised by law to
issue such process a certificate signed by the [director of public
prosecutions] that he has seen the statements or affidavits on which
the charge is based and that he declines to prosecute at the instance of
the State.
(b) The [director of public prosecutions] shall, in any case in which he
declines to prosecute, at the request of the person intending to
prosecute, grant the certificate referred to in paragraph (a).
(c) A certificate issued under this subsection shall lapse unless proceed-
ings in respect of the offence in question are instituted by the issue of
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the process referred to in paragraph (a) within three months of the
date of the certificate.
(d) The provisions of paragraph (c) shall apply also with reference to a
certificate granted before the commencement of this Act under the
provisions of any law repealed by this Act, and the date of such
certificate shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, be deemed to be
the date of commencement of this Act.’
Section 8 of the CPA regulates private prosecution under statutory right,
stating:
‘(1) Any body upon which or person upon whom the right to prosecute in
respect of any offence is expressly conferred by law, may institute and
conduct a prosecution in respect of such offence in any court competent
to try that offence.
(2) A body which or a person who intends exercising a right of prosecution
under subsection (1), shall exercise such right only after consultation with
the [director of public prosecutions] concerned and after the [director of
public prosecutions] has withdrawn his right of prosecution in respect of
any specified offence or any specified class or category of offences with
reference to which such body or person may by law exercise such right of
prosecution.
(3) A [director of public prosecutions] may, under subsection (2), withdraw
his right of prosecution on such conditions as he may deem fit, including a
condition that the appointment by such body or person of a prosecutor to
conduct the prosecution in question shall be subject to the approval of the
[director of public prosecutions], and that the [director of public prosecu-
tions] may at any time exercise with reference to any such prosecution any
power which he might have exercised if he had not withdrawn his right of
prosecution.’
After becoming aware of the sacrificial slaughtering of two camels by a
religious group in November 2010, NSPCA inspectors attended the site and
observed what they considered to be cruel and inhumane treatment that
clearly contravened the AP Act. During the sacrifice, the two camels had to
endure eight and three attempts respectively at slicing open their throats so
that they could bleed out. After witnessing this, an inspector stepped in and
shot both camels in order to relieve them of their suffering (National Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development (CC) para 4). Following this incident, the NSPCA referred the
matter to the NPA for prosecution and furnished the prosecutors with
supporting evidence. After the NPA declined to prosecute the case, the
NSPCA applied for a certificate nolle prosequi in terms of s 7(1)(a) of the
CPA in order to institute a private prosecution. As in previous instances, the
NPA refused to issue the certificate, arguing that only a ‘private person’ can
institute a private prosecution in terms of s 7 of the CPA.
LITIGATION HISTORY
The high court’s decision
The NSPCA brought a constitutional challenge to this interpretation of
s 7(1)(a) of the CPA in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v
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Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2014] ZAGPPHC 763. The
NSPCA reasoned that there is no rational basis for the dissimilar treatment of
juristic persons and natural persons, arguing that juristic persons are conse-
quently deprived of equal protection and benefit of the law. Relying on
s 9(1) and s 38(a) and (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, the NSPCA argued that the differentiation does not serve a legitimate
governmental purpose and is therefore irrational and unconstitutional
(para 4).
The court confirmed the position as set out in Barclays Zimbabwe Nominees
(Pvt) Ltd v Black 1990 (4) SA 720 (A) at 726H and held that ss 7 and 8 of the
CPA empower only natural persons and public bodies with the right of
private prosecution, whilst companies and other legal persons are excluded
from this right (para 15). In terms of s 8(4) of the Constitution, the court
considered the nature of the right in question and the nature of the particular
juristic person in order to determine whether the juristic person was entitled
to the right. The right provided by s 7 of the CPA constitutes an exception to
s 179(1) of the Constitution, which provides for a single NPA established in
terms of an Act of Parliament. The purpose of s 7 of the CPA is to allow those
who have some substantial or peculiar interest in the offence at hand to
vindicate their private interests, and simultaneously to prevent natural and
juristic persons without such interests from doing so (paras 14–16). Taking
into account the objects, functions and powers of the applicant, the court
confirmed its nature as a juristic person to be that of a public body performing
a public function, rather than a private company (para 21).
After accepting that s 7(1)(a) of the CPA contains a differentiation which
amounts to discrimination, the court proceeded to determine whether such
discrimination is unfair or not, emphasising at the outset that not all rights in
the Bill of Rights are for the benefit of juristic persons. Considering the
factors identified in Harksen v Lane NO & others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), the
court concluded (in para 28) that ‘the differentiation as well as the discrimina-
tion is not unfair, but is designed to serve a legitimate governmental purpose. It
also appears that there is a rational relationship between this purpose and the
differentiation.’The court hence upheld the constitutionality of the provision.
The court also observed in passing that the purpose of s 8 of the CPA is to
allow public bodies that have been conferred the right of private prosecution
through statute ‘to institute a private prosecution in instances where offences
have been committed which concern the public interest as determined by
legislation’ (para 29). Whilst the NSPCA is indeed a public body, the court
lamented that s 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act does not confer such right of private
prosecution on the NSPCA, commenting that ‘if such a right were to be
conferred upon the applicant, it would enable the applicant to more
effectively execute its functions’ (ibid).
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision
The NSPCA appealed the high court decision and continued its constitu-
tional challenge to s 7(1)(a) of the CPA. In National Society for the Prevention of
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Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2016 (1)
SACR 308 (SCA) the appellant contended that s 7(1)(a) of the CPA is
non-compliant with ss 1(c) and 9(1) of the Constitution, and asserted that
both natural and juristic persons ought to be capable of enforcing the right to
institute a private prosecution (para 13). The relief claimed by the appellant
was to have the word ‘private’ excised from s 7(1)(a) of the CPA (para 6).
The court first commented on the materiality of s 8 of the CPA, noting
that the NSPCA was previously expressly authorised to institute private
prosecution by s 12 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 8 of 1914,
which was repealed by the APAct. Reading s 8 of the CPA together with the
SPCA Act, the court emphasised that the NSPCA is not authorised to
institute private prosecution under statutory right (paras 10–12).
The court then applied the test articulated in Prinsloo v Van der Linde &
another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 25 to determine whether the differentia-
tion inherent in s 7(1)(a) of the CPA is rational in serving a governmental
purpose and thus in line with the rule of law and the principle of equality
before the law, as entrenched respectively in ss 1(c) and 9(1) of the
Constitution (paras 14–16). Since the appellant conceded that the regulation
of private prosecution constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose, the
court focused on establishing whether a rational connection can be estab-
lished between this purpose and the provisions of s 7(1)(a) of the CPA. The
court articulated the legal position as follows in para 19:
‘The rationality threshold is low. The connection must not be arbitrary but
must be based on a reason that does not have to be the most efficient or the only
reason. Put differently, the question is whether there is an acceptable reason for
the limitation of private prosecutions contained in s 7(1)(a). This question must
be answered within the context of the whole s 7 and s 8 of the CPA, s 179 of
the Constitution and the provisions of the [National Prosecuting Authority Act
32 of 1998].’
The court concluded that a decision by the NPA to decline prosecution,
which constitutes a prerequisite for a private prosecution, must be grounded
in sound reasons and that the policy of limiting private prosecutions to
exceptional cases thus ‘c[ould] not be faulted’ (para 25). The court strongly
reiterated that ‘private prosecutions in terms of s 7 of the CPA are only
permitted on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity’ and that this
forms the rationale behind s 7(1)(a) of the CPA and the exclusion of juristic
persons from instituting private prosecutions (para 28). As the exclusion of
private prosecutions not stemming from the infringement of human dignity
was, in the court’s view, ‘rationally related to the legitimate government
purpose of limitation of private prosecutions’, the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of s 7(1)(a) of the CPA (para 28).
The Constitutional Court’s decision
In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development & another 2017 (1) SACR 284 (CC) the NSPCA
appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal and, in addition to the
(2019) 136 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL214
131
JOBNAME: SALJ 19 Part 2 PAGE: 9 SESS: 20 OUTPUT: Fri Aug 2 11:15:00 2019
/first/Juta/juta/SALJ−2019−Part2/00notes
constitutional challenge to s 7(1)(a) of the CPA, advanced an alternative
argument based on s 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act read with s 8 of the CPA.
Section 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act provides:
‘(2) In order to perform its functions and to achieve the objects of the Council
the board may — ...
(e) defend legal proceedings instituted against the Councils and institute
legal proceedings connected with its functions, including such
proceedings in an appropriate court of law or prohibit the commis-
sion by any person of a particular kind of cruelty to animals, and assist
a society in connection with such proceedings against or by it.’
The applicant argued that s 8 of the CPA empowers statutory bodies to
conduct private prosecutions under a statutory right, and since the NSPCA is
indeed a ‘statutory body performing a statutory public interest function’, the
power to ‘institute legal proceedings’ as set out in s 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act
encompasses the authority to institute criminal proceedings (para 21). The
court emphasised that its approach of interpreting legislation within constitu-
tional bounds ‘requires that a statute be read holistically as constitutionally
compliant where possible’, and identified the issue before the court as
necessitating that the NSPCA be correctly situated within the private
prosecution framework provided by the CPA (para 26). The court
approached this inquiry by first looking for the NSPCA’s potential prosecu-
torial powers in s 8 of the CPA, emphasising that its nature as a statutorily
created public body made this the appropriate point of departure (paras
26–7).
Section 8 of the CPA requires that the right to institute private prosecution
be ‘expressly conferred by law’. The court held that use of the term
‘expressly’ in legislation does not necessarily require explicit articulation
through the use of specific words and that ‘it may indicate that the meaning
of a provision must be clear and inconvertible, being conveyed with
‘‘reasonable clearness’’ or ‘‘as a necessary consequence’’ ’ (para 33). The court
followed a purposive and contextual interpretive approach to s 6(2)(e) of the
SPCA Act by holistically considering ‘the specific statutory language; its
textual, historical, and social context; and the constitutional values which
underpin it’ (para 34). The court found the NSPCA’s statutorily conferred
power to ‘institute legal proceedings connected with its functions’ under
s 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act to be ‘broad and permissive’, neither distinguishing
between civil and criminal proceedings, nor excluding either (para 36). In
order to determine the types of legal proceedings that the NSPCA is
empowered to institute, its functions as determined by the SPCA Act and
surrounding statutory scheme needed to be considered (para 37).
The AP Act establishes the animal welfare framework within which the
NSPCA operates and explicitly empowers societies for the prevention of
cruelty to animals (of which the NSPCA forms the primary example) to
effect the culture of animal welfare envisaged by theAPAct (paras 38–9). The
larger part of the provisions in the AP Act relates to animal cruelty offences,
which logically suggests that the legal proceedings emanating from this piece
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of legislation will mainly be criminal cases. As the NSPCA is specifically
tasked with promoting the objectives of the AP Act, the power to ‘institute
legal proceedings connected with its functions’ has to be interpreted to
include the prosecution of offences (para 46). The court took into consider-
ation that the right of private prosecution was previously explicitly conferred
on the NSPCA by the 1914 SPCAAct, and that the AP Act, which repealed
that earlier Act, is intentionally silent on the question of private prosecution.
At the time of the AP Act’s enactment in 1962, the Minister of Justice
opposed the provision bestowing the right to privately prosecute without the
safety valve of supervision by the prosecutorial authority. As the current CPA
provides for such oversight in s 8(2) and 8(3), the basis for excluding the
power of private prosecution in 1962 is no longer applicable (paras 49–50).
This interpretation best harmonises the NSPCA’s powers and objectives
within the legislative framework and its historical development, and gives
effect to the primary objective of the NSPCA: to prevent animal cruelty
(para 53).
The court considered the significance of the NSPCA’s critical role in the
history of animal protection and the value of animal welfare in our current
constitutional dispensation, explicitly connecting animal welfare with ‘the
right to have the environment protected’under s 24 of the Constitution (para
58). Tracing a lineage of animal cruelty cases that started in 1929, the court
emphasised the progressively robust protection of animal welfare by South
African courts (paras 54-9). Whilst solidifying the animal’s legal status as
property, the court in R v Smit 1929 TPD 397 held that an animal had to be
killed in a ‘humane’ way which caused minimal suffering. The purpose of
animal welfare legislation was considered in R v Moato 1947 (1) SA 490 (O)
and held to protect the finer sensibilities and emotional wellbeing of humans
rather than animal interests per se, an approach which was upheld in S v
Edmunds 1968 (2) PH H398 (N). The minority judgment in National Council
of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339
(SCA) para 38 departed from this view, arguing that animal protection
legislation ‘recognises that animals are sentient beings that are capable of
suffering and of experiencing pain. And they recognise that, regrettably,
humans are capable of inflicting suffering on animals and causing them pain.’
(For a wider discussion of the implications of this judgment, see Arthur van
Coller ‘The minority defending the interests of the vulnerable [An evalua-
tion of the minority judgment in NCSPCA v Openshaw 2008 5 SA 339
(SCA)]’ (2011) 22 Stellenbosch LR 306.) This sentiment was upheld in South
African Predator Breeders Association v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism [2009] ZAFSHC 68 and South African Predator Breeders Association v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [2011] 2 All SA 529 (SCA), whilst
the court in S v Lemthonghtai 2015 (1) SACR 353 (SCA) para 20 emphasised
the duty ‘to protect and conserve our biodiversity’, and held that ‘constitu-
tional values dictate a more caring attitude towards fellow humans, animals
and the environment in general’.
The court argued that the historical trajectory of animal welfare protection
and the unique and critical role of the NSPCA in our polity demand a
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contextual and purposive reading of the SPCAAct, which ‘must be taken to
include the right to prosecute’ (para 61). The court subsequently set aside the
orders of the high court and Supreme Court of Appeal, and declared that
s 6(2)(e) of the SPCA Act read with s 8 of the CPA conferred the statutory
right of private prosecution upon the NSPCA (para 65). Regarding the
constitutionality of s 7(1)(a) of the CPA, the court followed the approach in
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Constitutional Development
& others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) para 222, which determined that the core
responsibility of a court is the adjudication of ‘live disputes’ and that it is
‘possibly an intrusion into the role of the legislature for a court to pronounce
judgments on constitutional issues in the absence of a dispute affecting the
rights of the parties to the litigation’. The court argued that the constitution-
ality of s 7(1)(a) of the CPA was no longer a ‘live dispute that implicates the
NSPCA’s rights’, as the power to privately prosecute had already been
conferred in the judgment (para 63). Consequently, the constitutionality of
s 7(1)(a) of the CPA was not considered.
ANALYSIS
The dualistic private prosecution scheme in the CPA
As the decision in the Constitutional Court does unfortunately not give clarity
on the constitutionality of s 7(1)(a) of the CPA, we will likely see further
litigation aimed at empowering juristic persons to institute private prosecu-
tion. It has already been argued, in response to the high court ruling in 2014,
that there is a need for legal reform in this regard and it has been recommended
that the law be amended expressly to confer the right of private prosecution on
companies, as is the case in countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia,
Zimbabwe and Kenya (see Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi ‘Private prosecutions and
discrimination against juristic persons in South Africa: A comment on National
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development & Another’ (2015) 15 AHRLJ 580).
The court’s approach of considering private prosecution under s 8 of the
CPA as a neutral alternative to private prosecution under s 7 of the CPA
however warrants closer inspection. Some scholars have argued that prosecu-
tion under statutory right in s 8 of the CPA, whilst identified as a ‘private
prosecution’ in the CPA, is not a true private prosecution (J J Joubert (ed)
Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed (2017) 86). A body or person intending to
institute private prosecution under s 8(1) first has to consult with the director
of public prosecutions concerned who, secondly, has to withdraw ‘his right
of prosecution in respect of any specified offence or any specified class or
category of offences with reference to which such body or person may by law
exercise such right of prosecution’ (s 8(2) of the CPA). The director of public
prosecutions may furthermore, under s 8(2), ‘withdraw his right of prosecu-
tion on such conditions as he may deem fit, including a condition that
the appointment by such body or person of a prosecutor to conduct the
prosecution in question shall be subject to the approval of the director of
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public prosecutions, and that the director of public prosecutions may at any
time exercise with reference to any such prosecution any power which he
might have exercised if he had not withdrawn his right of prosecution’ (s 8(3)
of the CPA). It is thus clear that private prosecution under s 8 of the CPA
remains completely under the control of the director of public prosecutions,
and that the NSPCA’s prosecutorial powers could potentially be substantially
curtailed under this section.
Reflecting on the reason why the NSPCA was denied the power of
private prosecution when the SPCA Act was enacted in 1962, the court,
somewhat ironically, explicitly found that the CPA of 1955 did not provide
for a dualistic prosecution scheme under both a statutory right and a
certificate nolle prosequi (paras 49–51). The ‘safeguard of [director of public
prosecutions] supervision’ about which the Minister of Justice was concerned
at the time, has been incorporated into s 8 of the current CPA, and by
granting the NSPCA the power of private prosecution under this section the
historical concern was rendered immaterial. The court however failed to
appreciate the effect of such ‘oversight by the prosecutorial authority’ on the
NSPCA and why prosecution under s 7 might be preferable to s 8. Put
simply, the difference between ss 7 and 8 of the CPA does not merely
concern the body upon which the right of private prosecution is conferred.
The NSPCA is disenfranchised under s 8, and the court’s failure to take this
into account and regard the constitutional challenge to s 7(1)(a) as a ‘live
dispute’ constitutes an oversight, in my opinion.
The question of the animal
The court’s concern with the animal as a subject of legal knowledge and its
willingness to address the question of the animal in relation to law is
remarkably progressive and, considered from this perspective, renders this
decision a landmark ruling in the South African jurisprudence. The question
of the animal is notably absent from the high court and Supreme Court of
Appeal’s rulings, whilst the Constitutional Court’s decision clearly situates
and responds to the animal in relation to the animal’s marginal legal status.
(For a differentiation between human-centric and animal-centric approaches
to animal protection, see Bonita Meyersfeld ‘Non-human animals and the
law: The fable of power’ (2012) 27 SA Public Law 54.) In the process of doing
so, the court also inevitably exposes law’s (in)ability to metabolise logically its
construction of animal life and the problematic surrounding the representa-
tion of animals in a (legal) system that is fundamentally anthropocentric.
After tracing the development of case law on animal cruelty, the court
summarised the progression as follows (para 57):
‘Therefore, the rationale behind protecting animal welfare has shifted from
merely safeguarding the moral status of humans to placing intrinsic value on
animals as individuals.’
This is a momentous pronouncement and I believe its implications should
be carefully considered so that we can meaningfully reflect on law’s relation
to animal subjugation, both as architect of what might be called an
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anthropocentric culture, and as possible facilitator of animal liberation (see
Karin van Marle ‘Law’s time, particularity and slowness’ (2003) 19 SAJHR
239 on the value of slowness and critical reflection in contemplating the
different dimensions that configure a particular situation and engaging law
accordingly). In sketching the background to this case, I illustrated that the
SPCA has always advocated a welfarist approach and has focused on
legislative reform aimed at ensuring that the animals we utilise are treated
humanely. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach can be found in
utilitarian philosophy, which has embraced the animal on account of
sentience; that is, the animal’s aptitude for experiencing pain and pleasure,
and concomitant preference in avoiding the former and pursuing the latter.
Animal welfarists thus acknowledge that the animal’s interest in avoiding
suffering merits protection, but it is essentially a qualified interest in not
suffering ‘unnecessarily’. No particular practice causing suffering or even
death can be ruled out in advance within the utilitarian framework. Rather
than eradicating suffering, the utilitarian welfare approach seeks to balance
the (animal) suffering against the (human) pleasure derived from the
utilisation (of the animal). It ultimately centers on a utilitarian balancing: ‘the
right choices will be those that produce the largest aggregate balance of
pleasure over pain or ... the largest net balance of satisfaction over dissatisfac-
tion’ (Martha Nussbaum ‘The capabilities approach and animal entitlements’
in Tom Beauchamp & R G Frey (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics
(2011) 236). If we examine the current AP Act, we see that the word
‘unnecessarily’ or ‘unnecessary’ appears at least eight times in s 2 alone.
Section 2(1)(b) only prohibits a person from ‘confin[ing], chain[ing], tether-
[ing] or secur[ing] any animal unnecessarily or under such conditions or in
such a manner or position as to cause that animal unnecessary suffering’.
Similarly, s 2(1)(c) only forbids ‘unnecessarily starv[ing] or under-feed[ing] or
deny[ing] water or food to any animal’. This conversely means that it may be
necessary and permissible to starve the animal under certain circumstances.
As ‘unnecessary’ is not defined in the Act, standard practices constitute the
norm and ‘necessity’, and only acts of gratuitous violence are ultimately
recognised as contravening the Act.
The court supported a utilitarian philosophy in parts of the judgment, inter
alia when it emphasised that ‘the prevention of unnecessary cruelty to animals
— including those which we may use for service or food — is a goal of our society’
(para 45, emphasis supplied). Here the court reinforces the object or utility
status of animals, and it needs to be noted that the necessity of human use of
animals as such is never questioned. As is characteristic of the welfarist model,
‘only questions about the necessity of particular acts in relation to the
presumed entitlement of humans to use animals’ are addressed (Taimie
Bryant ‘Sacrificing the sacrifice of animals: Legal personhood for animals, the
status of animals as property, and the presumed primacy of humans’ (2008) 39
Rutgers LJ 249). Notably, the utilitarian aggregation of consequences does
not recognise every individual life as an end in itself, but allows for lives to be
utilised as means for the ends of others (Nussbaum op cit at 237).
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This approach can be starkly juxtaposed with the animal rights approach,
which demands that we view animals as inviolable subjects with intrinsic
worth and categorically abolish all human use of animals. Animal rightists
reject utilitarian balancing and argue that the rightness of an action towards
the animal is reliant upon recognition of, and respect for, the animal’s moral
rights. This approach is grounded in natural law and natural rights theory, and
views animals as inviolable subjects with inherent worth separate from their
usefulness to humans. Animal rightists reject any utilisation of the animal and
argue that a craving for meat consumption, leather products and hunting
cannot justify violation of the animal’s bodily integrity. Whilst the interest in
not suffering undoubtedly warrants protection, animal rights theorists argue
there are other (and indeed more fundamental) interests at stake that need to
be recognised and protected as well. The interest in not suffering is indeed
secondary to the interest in not being treated instrumentally in a system of
institutionalised exploitation when the suffering emanates from that very
utilisation.
By regarding animals as possessing moral rights, these theorists bestow a
distinctive moral status on animals. This moral status fundamentally counters
a view of animals as utility objects or the property of humans, a view that
welfarists readily accept. By recognising the animal as an ‘individual’ with
‘intrinsic value’, the court thus also suggests, albeit paradoxically, that the
foundation for animal protection has shifted from an external utilitarian
calculus towards an understanding of animals as individuals whose experien-
tial lives fare well or ill for them independent of their usefulness to others.
The notion of animals as ‘subjects-of-a-life’ developed by pioneering
animal-rights philosopher Tom Regan resonates here, and the most obvious
transference concerns a destabilisation of the (human) subject/(animal)
object dichotomy entrenched in our law (see Regan The Case for Animal
Rights op cit at 243). Regan’s egalitarian ethics advances a shared subjectivity
as the ethically relevant property possessed by both human beings and
animals that establishes animals as individual co-subjects with rights that
cannot be overridden or violated in the pursuit of maximum utility. This
subjectivity (or being subject-of-a-life) is a more intricate property than the
simple sentience grounding utilitarian claims, highlighting different dimen-
sions of animal life and foregrounding the advanced abilities and complex
existence of animals that extend beyond the preference for avoiding pain. As
Regan Defending Animal Rights op cit at 42–3 states:
‘Like us, [animals] possess a variety of sensory, cognitive, conative, and
volitional capacities. They see and hear, believe and desire, remember and
anticipate, and plan and intend. Moreover, as is true in our case, what happens
to them matters to them. Physical pleasure and pain–these they share with us.
But they also share fear and contentment, anger and loneliness, frustration and
satisfaction, and cunning and imprudence; these and a host of other psychologi-
cal states and dispositions collectively help define the mental lives and relative
well-being of those humans and animals who (in my terminology) are ‘‘subjects
of a life’’.’
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Similarly, other theorists have also critiqued welfare theory against ‘the
complex cognitive and social lives of animals’, arguing that many valuable
experiences like self-recognition and mourning are not forms of pain or
pleasure as understood within the utilitarian framework and that utilitarian-
ism consequently ‘gives us a weak, dangerously incomplete way of assessing
our ethical choices’ (Nussbaum op cit at 236). Animal rights theorists like
Regan thus aim to remove animals from the category of objects or
receptacles, and to award them non-instrumental, inherent value as subjects
(see Regan The Case for Animal Rights op cit at 232–65). This status as subject
is accompanied by protection that reaches well beyond the interest in not
suffering (unnecessarily). The dissonance between these two perspectives can
forcefully be illustrated through an engagement with the set of facts that
ultimately gave rise to the NSPCA’s application. Under a utilitarian welfare
perspective, the religious slaughtering of the two camels cannot be pro-
hibited as an a priori rule or principle. At issue, rather, is the question of
maximum aggregative utility with regard to the practice of religious
slaughtering. In contradistinction to the utilitarian welfare approach, the
animal rights framework regards the two camels as individual subjects with
certain rights that can in principle not be violated in pursuit of the greatest
good for the greatest number. The camels are granted these rights precisely
because they are considered beings with intrinsic value, rather than mere
resources that should be figured in our calculative deliberations. The
practical implications of the rights view are abolitionist rather than reformist.
If (as the court proclaimed) ‘the rationale behind protecting animal welfare
has shifted ... to placing intrinsic value on animals as individuals’, the
pertinent question is by what right can we continue to engage with animals as
objects to be used as we see fit? The two ideologies that respectively regard
animals as utility objects and individuals with intrinsic worth are fundamen-
tally at odds, rendering the court’s judgment internally fissured and philo-
sophically unsound.
The court’s vacillation between what I have previously argued to be two
ideologically incompatible perspectives (see Jan-Harm de Villiers ‘Animal
rights theory, animal welfarism and the ‘‘new welfarist’’ amalgamation: A
critical perspective’ (2015) 30 SA Public Law 406) is a symptom of the law’s
struggle to incorporate and embrace that which is other to the system. The
law originates in fundamentally anthropocentric discourse that has ab initio
legitimised animal exploitation and is antithetical to the animal’s interests.
Law’s struggle logically and ethically to take account of its construction and
destruction of the animal relates to its limitation of only being able to digest
legally acceptable terms and concepts. Whilst the court acknowledges the
nuanced problematic surrounding the legal categorisation and treatment of
animals as objects, a meaningful response to this realisation inevitably
requires the considerable effort of bending legal constructs so that they can
accommodate animal life. The court’s integrative approach of absorbing
animal suffering into the environmental right in the Constitution reflects one
such effort (see paras 57–8). Whilst an extensive discussion of the short-
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comings of this approach falls beyond the scope of this note, it needs to be
emphasised that this approach ultimately entails a rather creative (re)inter-
pretation of a human right rather than recognition of the animal as individual
with intrinsic value, thus presenting another theoretical and ideological
incongruence in the court’s approach. I furthermore find the approach of
resorting to the construct of human rights to protect the interests of animals
to be a tragic contradiction. Human rights are grounded in the very structure
of subjectivity that has been constructed on an underlying foundation of
man’s non-identity with animals and affirms precisely the interpretation of
man that has been used to refuse animals moral standing for centuries (see
Jacques Derrida & Jean-Luc Nancy ‘ ‘‘Eating well,’’ or the calculation of the
subject: An interview with Jacques Derrida’ in Eduardo Cadava, Peter
Connor & Jean-Luc Nancy (eds) Who Comes after the Subject? (1991) 96–119;
Matthew Calarco Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to
Derrida (2008) 1–14, 103–49).
As could be expected, the animal (subject) presented the court with
various dilemmas and I believe the ruling illustrates my previous argument
that any meaningful transformation towards animal liberation would require
fundamental changes in forms of subjectivity and relationality at a conceptual
level, rather than a resort to existing discourses and constructs that remain
expressive of their anthropocentric constitutive presuppositions (see De
Villiers 2018 PER/PELJ op cit). Such an approach fails adequately to frame
and address the pertinent issues at stake in the contestation of animal
subjugation. The subjugated status of the animal is the result of complex
schemata of power and domination that span numerous historical, institu-
tional, and cultural discourses and practices. My central concern is that
approaches that fail to take on the laborious, time-consuming task of
confronting anthropocentrism, or the ‘set of relations and systems of power
that are in the service of those who are considered by the dominant culture to
be fully and properly human’ (Matthew Calarco Thinking Through Animals:
Identity, Difference, Indistinction (2015) 25) will foreclose the possibility of
destabilising and moving beyond the classical humanism that lies at the heart
of animal subjugation. There is undeniable congruence between law and
anthropocentric culture and to the extent that the legal order continues to
celebrate and sustain the very oppression in question, my sense is that we
need a rigorous problematisation of law and right(s) rather than a pragmatic
utilisation of the law in the hope that more law might be better law. My
intention with this note was to make a small contribution in service of this
ambitious purpose.
CONCLUSION
Although the ruling arguably raises more questions than it provides answers,
it is especially pertinent and timely given the review of the animal protection
legislation that is presently underway. The current AP Act thoroughly
reflects, in both philosophy and language, a view of animals as objects that
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exist for human utilisation and mechanises the animal, inter alia through
repeated references to the ‘destruction’ of the animal (see ss 3(1)(a), 4(3)(b)
and 5(1) of the AP Act). With this, the animal is deprived of the dignity of
being able to ‘die’ and relegated to the status of an object that can only be
destroyed. The apposite questions, then, are to what degree will the court’s
pronouncement on the shift in the law’s view of animals be transposed into
the new legislation, and how will animal liberation advocates utilise this
judgment going forward?
Whilst I remain cautious and sceptical of a resort to (existing) legal
constructs in service of animal liberation, I locate the primary significance of
this judgment at the level of potentially facilitating a shift towards the
extension of legal rights to animals, rather than mere increased (private)
prosecution of animal cruelty cases. This opinion inevitably raises several
important questions regarding law’s limits, whether or not law can be
reflexive and ethically consistent. The task of thinking becomes increasingly
essential and with that, the ethical imperative to place the animal at the centre
of enquiry and to challenge the institution of law itself as a mechanism of
social change.
IS IT TIME TO RECONSIDER THE BAN ON NON-
THERAPEUTIC PRE-IMPLANTATION SEX SELECTION?
DONRICH W THALDAR
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
INTRODUCTION
Parents who use in vitro fertilisation (‘IVF’) can have their in vitro embryos
tested for several genetic characteristics. This is referred to as pre-
implantation genetic testing (‘PGT’). The word ‘pre-implantation’ means
‘occurring or existing between the fertilization of an ovum and its implanta-
tion in the wall of the uterus’ (Oxford English Dictionary (on-line edition) s v
‘pre-implantation’, accessed on 14 October 2018). Based on the results of
PGT, in vitro embryos with the desired genetic characteristics can be selected
for transfer to the prospective mother’s uterus. PGT currently takes the
following forms (regarding terminology, see F Zegers-Hochschild,
G D Adamson, S Dyer et al ‘The international glossary on infertility and
fertility care, 2017’ (2017) 108 Fertility and Sterility 393 at 404):
• Testing for aneuploidy (‘PGT-A’). Aneuploidy means an abnormal
number of chromosomes. Chromosomes are the structures in a cell that
contain the genetic material. A normal human cell contains 46 chromo-
somes grouped in 23 pairs. The 23rd pair are the sex chromosomes —
biological females have two X chromosomes, and biological males have
one X and one Y chromosome at pair 23. The chromosomes in pairs 1 to




Prolegomenon on the Role of the
Polyphonic Novel for (Animal) Law: J.M.
Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, the Voice
of Refusal, and the Subversive
Performativity of the Novel
Jan-Harm de Villiers
Abstract, This article reflects on the capacity of literature to
problematize the authority of traditional philosophical and legal
discourses and circumvent some of the theoretical and ethical
constraints that they pose in relation to the question of the animal. It
draws on Mikhail Bakhtin’s critical work on the novel in order to put
forward a reading of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals as polyphonic
novel and analyze the protagonist’s voice of refusal while illustrating how
Bakhtin transformed fundamental aesthetic principles into the foundation
of a coherent ethical theory. Literature and its potential to destabilize
meaning and challenge the authority of a singular interpretation are
central to the argument being developed. The article explores how a
politics of refusal is fundamentally engaged in the task of exposing a
limit, in turn preserving the possibility of an alternative thought of
human–animal relationality and ultimately another law.
Keywords, animal ethics,
Mikhail Bakhtin, polyphony,




I should think that today we are at least far from the ridiculous
immodesty that would be involved in decreeing from our corner
that perspectives are permitted only from this corner. Rather has
the world become “infinite” for us all over again, inasmuch as we
cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite
interpretations. Once more we are seized by a great shudder.1
The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking
perhaps begins there.2
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My aim in this article is to offer tentative reflections on ways in which litera-
ture might begin to open up new potentialities and risks for thought in relation
to the question of the animal (in law). I offer a reading of J.M. Coetzee’s The
Lives of Animals as polyphonic novel by analyzing what I interpret to be the
protagonist’s voice of refusal. My project speaks to the pervasiveness of meta-
physical anthropocentrism as quasi-transcendental limit of philosophical and
legal discourses, and this reading continues to engage with one of my concomi-
tant concerns, namely the silencing of the animal Other’s call. I have previously
argued that the utilization of fundamentally anthropocentric constructs in ser-
vice of animal liberation has the paradoxical effect of retaining and reinforcing
the conceptuality of theses discourses and I urged for their radical displacement
at the conceptual level.3 This article explores how we might begin to problem-
atize the authority of traditional philosophical and legal discourses and circum-
vent some of the theoretical and ethical constraints that they pose. My
reflections here are not meant to bring closure, but rather to begin engaging
issues that broach larger philosophico-juridical concerns and could potentially
facilitate a shift towards a much needed alternative thought of human–animal
relationality.
I examine what literature brings to law through the lens of literary theorist
Mikhail Bakhtin’s writings on the dialogical properties of the novel. A
Bakhtinian approach to the relationship of law and literature de-emphasizes the
role and importance of literary content or subject matter in favor of increased
attention to the style and structure of the novel, which is fundamental to under-
standing the nature of literature and its implications for other discourses. The
structure of the novel abets various layers of meaning and perspectives and is
inherently dedicated to formal and linguistic indeterminacy.4 Central to
Bakhtin’s critical work on the novel is the idea of literature and aesthetic mean-
ing as a social or collective act. For Bakhtin, the novel is not a circumscribed
text, but a dynamic and communal process in which meaning is pluralistically
conversed and collectively constructed by multiple voices that subsist in a con-
stant relation of dialogicality. This aesthetic experience confronts us with a com-
plexity and ambiguity that manifests the particularity of beings and experiences,
and undermines interpretative closure by a single voice of authority. While the
law encompasses various sources and a multiplicity of perspectives, principles,
and voices across different fields, they ultimately coalesce into a monologic voice
of authority. The polyphonic novel, in contrast, is dialogic precisely because its
structure can meaningfully accommodate continuous dynamic and open engage-
ment with distinctive counter-voices in and outside the novel. My interest here
centers on the voice(lessness) of the animal.
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Bakhtin used his insights into the destabilizing effects of dialogism in the
novelistic tradition, specifically the way in which it manifests the particularity of
relations, as the basis for conceptualizing a coherent ethical theory. The self, for
Bakhtin, is a spatially and temporally structured event. Perception is shaped by
a distinct position in existence and, correspondingly, the meaning of any observa-
tion is shaped by locality. Bakhtin links the dialogic history of the novel with a
development in self-consciousness, foregrounding multiplicity and variety (as
opposed to singularity and unity) as criteria for a higher degree of consciousness
that is not marked by increased awareness of the self as a unique self, but rather
“manifests the self’s discovery of the other.”5 We are in constant dialogue with
the world around us and we enact a narrative function in relation to the Other.
For Bakhtin, the ethics of the novel are located in the instability and incomplete-
ness of our identification with the Other which, as we shall see, is an eth-
ical imperative.
The relativity of relations and concomitant destabilization of meaning and
resistance to interpretative closure that Bakhtin locates in the narrative
method inherently challenges the authority of a singular interpretation and
has the potential to alter our interpretative approach and stance on legal
rules. From this vantage point, attentiveness to narrative in law requires rec-
ognition that the legal rule, by and of itself, cannot foretell its application in
a particular circumstance. For Bakhtin, the inherent structural instability and
incompleteness of the novel serve as comprehensive critique of authority as
such, with “the novel’s mixity of high and low … of common and stylized
language cast[ing] a new and shifting light upon all claims to a transcendent
and objective authority, whether legal, political, or spiritual.”6 This character-
istic of the novel and its coterminous potential to beckon alternative
approaches to the question of the animal (in law) forms my central interest
in this article.
I draw on Karin van Marle’s call for a politics of refusal and Jacques
Derrida’s deconstructionist interventions into animality in order to explicate
what is at stake in this project. As such, I am supporting a multidisciplinary
critical approach to the task of thinking through the anthropocentric substruc-
tures of the discourses that we have inherited. The struggle for compassion
that we are facing requires, as Derrida has so aptly phrased, that “we think
the war we find ourselves waging.”7 Derrida is once again positioning the
question of the animal as a transgressal and transgressive experience of limit-
rophy, one that is situated at and exposes the limits of philosophy and law
and that demands another relational thinking of animality. Refusal, as I read
it here, is fundamentally engaged in this task of exposing a limit, in turn pre-
serving the possibility of another thought of relation and ultimately
another law.
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THE LIVES OF ANIMALS AS POLYPHONIC NOVEL, THE ANIMAL’S LITERARY
VOICE, AND THE SUBVERSIVE CAPACITY OF LITERATURE
J.M. Coetzee presented the Tanner lectures at Princeton University in 1997 and,
rather than delivering a conventional lecture, read a novella that would later be
published as The Lives of Animals.8 Here Coetzee again made use of the character
Elizabeth Costello, whom he first introduced a year earlier while delivering the
Ben Belitt lecture at Bennington College, speaking on the question “What is real-
ism?”9 This lecture would later be incorporated as Chapter/lesson 1 of the novel
Elizabeth Costello,10 with the two chapters comprising The Lives of Animals being
incorporated as Chapters/lessons 3 and 4. In this article I shall focus on The Lives
of Animals, as the structure and style of this novella (read as a whole) present dis-
tinctive characteristics that disclose unique literary capacities and possibilities.
Costello is an Australian-born novelist best known for her pathbreaking fem-
inist fiction novel The House on Eccles Street and is visiting Appleton College,
where her son John lectures physics and astronomy, to present the annual Gates
lecture. Instead of speaking about herself and her literature, she elects to
address the theme of animal ethics in both her lectures, respectively titled “The
philosophers and the animals” and “The poets and the animals.” Coetzee employs
a complex literary design that has been described as “a lecture-narrative in
which the writer distances himself from his material by attributing the views
conveyed on the presentational surface of the narrative to a character,”11 a “cross
between a campus novel and a Platonic dialogue,”12 and a “metafiction version of
the academic novel, related to the philosophical dialogue.”13 These descriptions
foreground the novella’s dialogic structure that accommodates a multiplicity of
voices, none of which is domineering or conclusive, and invites a Bakhtininan
reading as polyphonic novel.
Bakhtin situates the literary text within a larger socio-historical context and
illustrates how the voice of a character cannot be foreclosed inside the language
of the novel. Bakhtin rejects the myth of a single or unitary language by illus-
trating the distance between language and reality, emphasizing that the literary
word not only has a direct, objectivized meaning, but is inevitably “oriented …
toward another’s word as well.”14 We are called to look for and listen to the
Other’s voice outside the narrow domain of our own language. Bakhtin thus con-
ceives of the literary word and utterance as inclusive of the Other’s response,
centering attention on consciousness that is freed “from the tyranny of its own
language and its own myth of language.”15 This understanding of the literary
word contributes to the dynamism and unfinalizability (of both the self and our
relationships) that Bakhtin is at pains to illustrate.
Within the dialogic interaction of the novel, each voice holds distinct weighted
validity and resists conflation into a single worldview. The novel presents us
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with a multiplicity of voices that are in a continuous relation of dialogicality
through narration, rewriting, appropriation, retrospection, representation of
utterance, quotation, and so forth. The novel’s double-voicedness and capacity for
polyglossia are also located in the distinctive interaction between the various dis-
cursive levels of the genre: the voices of the authors, narrators, characters, and
literary tradition are interlaced with contemporary societal voices and language,
discourses of memory, and sociocultural perspectives.16 History (or society) is
inserted into a text and the text into history.17 This means that the literary lan-
guage of the novel “lies on the borderline between oneself and the other” and is
not neutral or impersonal, but rather “overpopulated with the intentions of oth-
ers.”18 Bakhtin thus accentuates that the voices of the novel manifest internal
instability and ambivalence that is transfigured by contexts of speech, perspec-
tive, and utterance.
Bakhtin’s insights into the linguistic indeterminacy and instability of perspec-
tive intrinsic to literature have important implications for the way in which we
approach the novel. First, it cannot be understood through linguistics alone. A
trans-linguistic science grounded in the inherent dialogism of language19 is
required in order to grasp intertextual relationships, which has been labeled the
“social value” or “moral message” of literature.20 From this vantage point the dis-
course of a character cannot be resolved or fixed by way of characterization or
plot development, nor can it serve as mouthpiece for personal ideologies of the
author; “the consciousness of a character is given as someone else’s consciousness,
another consciousness, yet at the same time it is not turned into an object, is not
closed, does not become a simple object of the author’s consciousness.”21
We can furthermore discern a certain tension that is evident between the rule-
bound nature of law and the polyphonic novel’s approach to relations as relative
and incalculable in its irreducibility to formulae and principles. Dialogism stands
in opposition to the “legal logic” that understands juxtaposition to be causal.22
Rather, dialogism moves us towards another logic of distance, analogy, and non-
exclusive opposition that replaces the concepts of substance and causality by
assimilating them into relationality.23 The dialogism that we find in the novelistic
genre thereby performs resistance to law’s demand for interpretative and norma-
tive closure, always preserving the possibility of new and unanticipated meanings
that warrant de novo consideration and calls a judgment into question. The form
and experience of the novel thus encourage us to rethink our approach to the ani-
mal and the subjugated space that she occupies within the legally concretized
social hierarchies manifested as a result of the (anthropocentric) assumptions of
legal discourse. This tension and break from the predictability of law may lead to
changes in the way we think about animals and also the law.
My previous reflections on a jurisprudence of slowness resonate here.24 To the
extent that the novel resists the penchant to generalize the particular and to
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make the concrete abstract, we can say that the novel’s time is one of slowness.
In contrast to law’s time, marked by a need to establish and resolve through the
construction and application of rules, the novel holds open differently inflected
truths and allows for a nuanced understanding of relational particularity by
resisting the haste of interpretative closure. The novel engages a world of becom-
ing, facilitating a reading–writing of the Other’s development in an unfinished
aperture to the world. Oppositions are non-exclusive and dichotomies (man/ani-
mal, subject/object, self/other) subsist in dynamic interplay rather than fixed
juxtaposition.
Very importantly, this allows for an engagement with the animal’s voice in a
way that both exposes and circumvents a fundamental anthropocentric limitation
of the law. Here animal Being resists the finalizing reduction and translation
required to fit into legally digestible language and constructs (such as proof,
standing, and legal subjectivity) in order to be “heard.” These constructs inevit-
ably remain expressive of their constitutive presuppositions and reinforce the
unquestioned metaphysical anthropocentrism of traditional humanism that lie at
the core of animal subjugation.25 I am, in particular, concerned with the ethical
and theoretical difficulties posed by the construct of (animal) rights. The tacit
anthropocentric constraints of legal subjectivity compel a determination of ani-
mality in accordance with the same human-centered criteria that have historic-
ally been used to deny animals moral and legal concern. I regard the reluctance
to consider alternative channels for developing a more sophisticated ethical dis-
position towards animals as both a symptom of the hegemony of the legal order
and a failure of imagination on the part of animal ethicists. I locate the primary
ethical potential of the novel for animal ethics at this level of gesturing an alter-
native mode of thinking our relation to others, and also our approach to the law.
The interrelatedness of the novel’s space and transmutations requires recog-
nition that “everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance, and untrue
outside of its own place, time, circumstance.”26 For Bakhtin the novel, and indeed
language itself, is intrinsically dialogic, situational, and context dependent.
Meaning does not result from individual utterance, but from the dynamic and
interminable translation between particular speakers and contexts. Twentieth
century literary criticism has contributed an understanding of the morality ema-
nating from the aesthetic experience of the novel as situated in its very amoral-
ity, its embrace of the particularity of relations, and resistance to
finalized judgment.27
Bakhtin locates the birth of this novelistic structure that allows the expres-
sion of diverging views through a multiplicity of voices, which he calls the poly-
phonic novel, in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s works. For Bakhtin, the voices of
Dostoevsky’s characters carry equal narratological weight and stand alongside
his authorial voice in extraordinary independence:
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Characters are polemicized with, learned from; attempts are
made to develop their views into finished systems. The character
is treated as ideologically authoritative and independent; he is
perceived as the author of a fully weighted ideological conception
of his own, and not as the object of Dostoevsky’s finalizing
artistic vision … [T]he direct and fully weighted signifying
power of the characters’ words destroys the monologic plane of
the novel and calls forth an unmediated response – as if the
character were not an object of authorial discourse, but rather a
fully valid, autonomous carrier of his own individual word.28
The narrative structure accordingly needs to be approached through a logic of
distance and relationship – which indicates a becoming – rather than fixed caus-
ally deduced determinations of being.29 My sense is that such an approach holds
great liberatory potential for those beings occupying the struggling end of a
power relationship. The animal has been represented in written literature for
thousands of years. As in law, however, animals in literature have predominantly
been exiled to voiceless spaces as objects rather than subjects. Catherine Elick
locates the beginning of a gradual shift towards literary subjectivity in the
English-language children’s literature of the modern period,30 identifying “animal
characters struggling to become true subjects, not objects, whose worth and wel-
fare are not entirely dependent upon humans and whose power relations with
people are more productively unstable than hierarchical.”31 These fictional worlds
are said to mirror the social transition from animal welfare to animal rights
advocacy that occurred in the twentieth century.32 Opting to focus exclusively on
literature in which animal characters are anthropomorphized or endued with the
ability of speech, Elick employs Bakhtin’s theory to consider specifically how ani-
mal characters gain authority by expressing and defining “themselves”
through language.
Anthropomorphization undoubtedly empowers animal characters and enables
them to express independent consciousness in a unique and valuable way; the
caterpillar in Alice in Wonderland is able simultaneously to question Alice’s iden-
tity and assert his own (mere three inches tall) presence authoritatively,33 Stuart
(from Stuart Little) effectively destabilizes the human/animal oppositional dichot-
omy,34 and Charlotte (from Charlotte’s Web) forcefully provokes thought on the
belief system that allows us to love some animals and eat others.35 The modal
relationships within the dialogical structure of the polyphonic novel can, how-
ever, accommodate the animal voice on another (and I shall henceforth argue
more primordial) level.
The interplay between the subject of enunciation and the subject of utterance
can be organized in several ways, each arrangement holding distinct narrative
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signification.36 Anthropomorphized animal characters can indeed overwrite their
vulnerabilities and instead be depicted as “capable of unbalancing human hierar-
chies and enjoying equitable relationships with people.”37 Yet it is precisely in
the animal’s finitude and embodied vulnerability that we can locate the primor-
dial disruptive force that calls for compassion. Like Derrida, I am more con-
cerned with the voice(lessness) of the flamingo used as a croquet mallet in Alice
in Wonderland who, without uttering a word, “would twist itself round and look
up in [Alice’s] face, with such a puzzled expression” just as she was about to give
the rolled-up hedgehog (acting as croquet ball) a blow with its head.38
“How can an animal look you in the face?” asks Derrida. This question does
not point towards the animal’s (in)ability to speak, “but whether one can know
what respond means.”39 Whom and what does Alice come into contact with when
she picks up the flamingo? The flamingo is both subject and object, co-habitant
and participant in an other-worlding (human–animal) interaction. Donna
Haraway compellingly illustrates how embodied engagement with animals is a
practice of becoming worldly, a becoming with, that “bind[s] intra-acting critters,
including people, together in the kinds of response and regard that change the
subject – and the object.”40 In a similar vein, Bakhtin also emphasizes the rela-
tional nature of being, ethically conceiving of the self as an unfixed and unfinaliz-
able “yet-to-be,” with “the real center of gravity of my own self-determination”
being situated in the future.41 We attend and intend an environment and dialogic
space that reaches well beyond the written and spoken word of the human realm
and our answerability follows:
In Bakhtin, the difference between humans and other forms of
life is a form of authorship, since the means by which a specific
ratio of self-to-other responsibility is achieved in any given action
– a deed being understood as an answer – comes about as the
result of efforts by the self to shape a meaning out of the
encounter between them. What the self is answerable to is the
social environment; what the self is answerable for is the
authorship of its responses. The self creates itself in crafting an
architectonic relation between the unique locus of life activity
and the constantly changing natural and social environment
which surrounds it. This is the meaning of Bakhtin’s dictum that
the self is an act of grace, a gift of the other.42
There is once again resonance with Haraway’s insistence that animals are co-
“meaning-making figures” who “gather up those who respond to them into unpre-
dictable kinds of ‘we’.”43 The unfinalizability of identity inherent to the multi-
voiced style and structure of the polyphonic novel has ethical significance. The
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intersubjective space separating the authorial voice and the character of whom
that voice speaks and endows with meaning “from beyond the horizon of his own
consciousness” is an ethical imperative.44 As everyday authors we give form and
substance to the lives of others; not through assimilation of perspectives, but
through an affirmation and preservation of what the Other negates in herself.
Dialogical narrative is ethical, then, “not because we see what the hero sees but
because we see what the hero, within the spatial and temporal limits of his own
consciousness, cannot.”45 In this sense we read and write the Other. Very import-
antly, the ethical essence and significance of the novel is located in the incom-
pleteness and open-endedness of that identification, which stimulates a reaction.
For Bakhtin, the ethical potential of literature lies at the level of provoking a
response to an Other who is written in an incomplete, fragmented, and unstable
openness that resists any finalized account. The novel thus presents a vehicle for
enacting our ethical responsibility towards the Other. These insights into the
complex relativity of relations also alter our stance on rules. From this perspec-
tive, literature does not impart abstract judgment and cannot be reduced to facts
about the world it conveys, as the dynamic nature and absolute singularity of
beings and circumstances manifested through narrative erodes and subverts the
possibility of interpretative closure. Attentiveness to narrative in law moves us
towards a rejection of rule-fetishism, as it requires acknowledgment that the rule
inevitably cannot dictate its application at a particular time and under a
particular circumstance.46
The inherent critique of the narrative method is not unrelated to Derrida’s
first aporia of justice, the epokhe of the rule. As Derrida reminds us, “each case
is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely unique interpret-
ation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely.”47 The
novel rejects abstract judgment in support of a more nuanced grasp that is
grounded in the particularity of an experience and sensitive to the numerous dis-
courses that configure it.48 This dynamism undercuts the attainability of inter-
pretative closure and destabilizes authority from within.
For Bakhtin, the structural instability that is generated by the novel’s
“complex stratification of language into genre, register, sociolect, dialect, and the
mutual interanimation of these forms”49 operates as a critique of authority as
such. The historical trajectory of the novel not only leans towards a problem-
atization of pontifical authority, but also places the novel’s own authority (and
indeed its own limits of understanding) into question, imbuing an ironic self-cri-
tique of authority.50 Because languages and discourses are not socially equal, the
complex stratifications involve “dialogic interaction in which the prestige lan-
guages try to extend their control and subordinated languages try to avoid, nego-
tiate, or subvert control,”51 generating structural instability and incompleteness.
The inherent instability and indeterminacy hold great ethical value in the face of
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unequal power relations, precisely because they reveal its volatile nature and
susceptibility to interruption and inversion. Bakhtin’s notions of the
“carnivalesque,” the liberating potential of laughter, and its relation to Socratic
dialogue are important for understanding this ethical dimension.
The Socratic Model, Carnival, and Laughter
Bakhtin identifies the genre of the Socratic dialogue as simultaneously originat-
ing both scientific thinking and an artistic prose composition from which the
novel evolved.52 He specifically focuses on the early, oral Socratic developmental
stage and situates this stage within a carnivalistic lineage.53 The Socrates that
we find here engages several voices, none of which is conclusive. His primary
concern is with living rather than knowing and he elicits dialogue with the
objective of challenging people and ideas, rather than persuading others to adopt
a proposition.54 This reflects the dialogic nature of Socratic notions of truth and
of thinking about truth, which is counterposed to a monologic, “ready-
made truth.”55
Socratic dialogue engages an assemblage of voices through two basic stylistic
devices, syncrisis and anacrisis. Syncrisis confronts several discourses through
“the juxtaposition[ing] of various points of view on a specific object” while anacri-
sis is “a means for eliciting and provoking the words of one’s interlocutor, forcing
him to express his opinion and express it thoroughly.”56 A “carnival sense of the
world” comes to the fore here and distinguishes Socratic dialogue from traditional
rhetorical genres. While Socrates is testing the multiplicity of perspectives, “the
dialogic testing of the idea is simultaneously also the testing of the person who
presents it,” including Socrates himself, “against a dialogizing background of
other ideas.”57 Socrates is living a “carnivalistic life” of collaborative dialogue in
which “everyone is an active participant, everyone communes in the carnival
act”58 and in no way presents closure or resolution to the dialogic interaction.
Carnivalistic suspension of restrictions and hierarchies is one of the primary
characteristics transposed into literature. Medieval life was characterized by a
two-world condition of existence and participation in official life and carnival life.
In contrast to official culture, “infused with elements of fear, weakness, humility,
submission, falsehood, hypocrisy, or on the other hand with violence, intimida-
tion, threats, prohibitions,”59 carnival culture resisted immortalization and com-
pletion and “celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from
the established order, it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privi-
leges, norms, and prohibitions.”60 Carnival was “the second life of the people,
who for a time entered the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and
abundance.”61 Laughter played a crucial role in carnival culture and gave form
to carnival rituals. Bakhtin characterizes carnival laughter as communal
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laughter “of all the people” that is aimed at everyone, “including the carnival’s
participants.”62 Carnival laughter is not, however, merely farcical, it is as tragic
as it is comic. The subversive power of carnival laughter lies in its ambivalence,
its potential simultaneously to exalt and deride; “it asserts and denies, it buries
and revives.”63 This dualistic ambivalence captures the essence of the carnival-
esque, “the pathos of shifts and changes, of death and renewal.”64 Structure and
hierarchy are relative and temporary; the crowning of the carnival king is a dual-
istic ambivalent act that always already embodies the idea and turn towards his
immanent decrowning.65 Laughter can thus degrade (and inaugurate) power by
destabilizing authority and effectuating power shifts. This destabilizing capacity
inherent to the carnival tradition and effected by carnivalized literature lies cen-
tral to the argument being developed here.
ELIZABETH COSTELLO AS SOCRATIC FIGURE AND VOICE OF REFUSAL
The Lives of Animals comprises two parts, each with several scenes. The first
part, “The philosophers and the animals,” primarily consists of four scenes:
Costello being received at the airport and hosted by John; Costello’s first lecture;
the question and answer session; and the dinner at the Faculty Club. The second
part, “The poets and the animals,” involves seven scenes: John and his wife
Norma’s conversation following the first lecture and dinner; John handing over
and then reading Abraham Stern’s letter to Costello; the question and answer
session following Costello’s second lecture; John and Costello’s conversation en
route to her last engagement; Costello’s debate with Thomas O’Hearne; John and
Norma’s conversation following the debate; and John driving Costello to the air-
port the following morning.
The structure and style that Coetzee employs forcefully assert the capacity of
fiction as a vehicle for ethical issues, which is itself a major theme in this nov-
ella. Despite large parts of the narrative being dedicated to Costello’s lectures, a
mode that is typically monological, Coetzee has Costello engage a polyphony of
independent voices throughout. The novella is narrated in the third person
through John’s consciousness, maintaining a remarkably unobtrusive narratorial
presence. John’s narration itself is dialogized in its observation and anticipation
of responses and seamless transitions from narration to the independent voices
of other characters. Costello not only interacts with these independent voices in
the novella and her own past, present, and future, but also with literary, histor-
ical, and philosophical discourses that extend well beyond the text. Coetzee inter
alia makes use of academic references, thereby invoking the voices of scholars
such as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Gary Francione, Franz Kafka, Thomas Nagel,
Mary Midgley, and even Coetzee himself. The dialogical performance of the nov-
ella’s language is exteriorized, thereby resisting collapse into a monologic ideal
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and solidifying a certain distance that separates the author and his characters
who, like Dostoevsky’s characters, are “free people, capable of standing alongside
their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling
against him.”66
Despite being the central conversing figure, Costello does not assume a con-
trolling position (as “teacher”) and remains merely one independent participant
in the spoken dialogue, which is subsumed in the dialogized story. In what fol-
lows I shall argue, as others have done before me,67 that Costello represents a
Socratic figure; a midwife assisting in the birth of new ideas68 in the image of a
wise (wo)man “wearing the popular mask of a bewildered fool.”69 According to
Bakhtin, “this combination produces the ambivalent image of wise ignorance”
characteristic of “the ambivalent self-praise in the Socratic dialogue: I am wiser
than everyone, because I know that I know nothing.”70 Costello undermines and
critiques authority in the novella by drawing it into a space of familiarity where
it can be investigated freely. The entry point to this investigation is contempor-
ary reality, “the living people who occupy it together with their opinions.”71
Costello elicits and provokes these opinions through what Karin van Marle terms
a “politics of refusal” by utilizing the plot situation of the dialogue alongside ana-
crisis, provoking “the word by the word, for the same purpose,” as is typical of
Socratic dialogue.72
The Politics of Refusal and Alternative Spaces of Thinking
I find theoretical grounding in Karin van Marle’s reflections on a politics of
refusal as a mode of abnegation that destabilizes traditional ways of theorizing
and engaging politics and law. The central tenet to emphasize at the outset is
that refusal, as conceptualized by van Marle, is not a spontaneous reaction or an
outright extemporary rejection. On the contrary, the notion of critical thinking
lies central to the notion of refusal and “the kind of politics, law and legal
approach that might result from refusal is one inspired by- and imbued with
thinking and reflection.”73 Refusal beckons alternatives precisely because it does
not fix or close off; it is tentative and, I would argue, dialogic in its engagement
with life, truth, and limits in that it resists singular reified approaches that pro-
claim possession of prefabricated, irrefutable truth by calling for unexpurgated
and open-ended dialogical discourse. Refusal is not static but rather, in embrac-
ing uncertainty and humility, invites the kind of movement that facilitates pol-
yphony. Indeed, van Marle’s jurisprudence stems from her concern with the way
in which the law silences female voices and the prospect of a subversive feminine
space wherein women can tell their own tales in their own voices. Drawing on
Adriana Cavarero’s74 retelling of the narrative of Penelope as creating a space
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for refusal, van Marle translates a critical approach to the negotiation of
power relations.
Penelope weaves in the weaving room during the day and she unweaves dur-
ing the night, constructing her own rhythm by means of that act. She neither
wishes to be part of Odysseus’ world, nor does she submit to the role imposed on
her as woman – that of producing clothes. By unweaving and abrogating,
Penelope is refusing the relational structure dictated by patriarchy and disrupt-
ing an established power structure. The weaving room becomes a space of polit-
ical action through the refusal of secondhand interpretations and definitions that
finalize women’s lives and deaths. In refusal Penelope belongs to herself and her
consciousness becomes equally valid. We are ultimately left with an alternative
space of thinking that challenges and resists the hegemony of objectification; a
space in which engagement with women requires recognition of their autonomous
consciousnesses and voices through dialogue as opposed to their objectifying
transformation into mouthpieces or puppets that enact a patriarchal narrative.
Central to van Marle’s argument, and as we shall later see also Costello’s, is
the notion of Western philosophy as a predominantly male activity. For the
Greek male hero Odysseus, being is marked by death and adventure while
Penelope, in contrast, values birth and rootedness.75 Relying on Cavarero, van
Marle recalls Western philosophy’s preoccupation with the separation of body
from soul, its insistence that “pure thought” could help the living untie the soul
from the body (albeit temporarily and imperfectly) until death definitively effects
this disentanglement. With this, the entity constituting the human is split in
two: consisting of the body, belonging to the living world, and the soul, associated
with thinking and belonging to the world of ideas.76 From this perspective, the
moment of birth is seen as an imprisonment or a “fall” to earth; “turn[ing] the
place of origin from which each person actually enters the world into a simple
(and devalued) place of appearance ‘on earth’ … Life on earth originates pre-
cisely when, by falling into the body, the soul ties itself to it, and ends when the
soul releases itself from it, with the death of the body.”77 A soul/body duality is
engendered and through men’s association with the former (and women’s with
the latter), their claim to gender neutrality and universality is grounded.78 In
reweaving, Penelope ultimately ties together that which philosophy seeks to sep-
arate, thereby reintroducing thought to a life punctuated by birth and death.79
Not unrelated to this is Western philosophy’s failure to appreciate who someone
is, due to a fixation with what someone is, as explained by Cavarero in a later
work.80 Here she expounds an insightful argument on the relationship between
selfhood and narration and illustrates how literary and philosophical narrative
models can present new ways of reflecting on the construction of human identi-
ties. For Cavarero, a narrative politics that is not grounded in categorical or dis-
cursive norms can reveal the “who” and, just like Penelope’s unweaving and
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reweaving, create a space of resistance to patriarchal silencing of voices of differ-
ence and dissent.81 Once again a certain struggle for dialogic recognition and
participation in the face of monologic dominance is foregrounded.
In refusal, as with the carnivalesque, laughter plays an important role as a
mode of undermining and destabilizing hierarchical distance and creating a space
for free and familiar engagement. Laughter simultaneously brings the world
closer and detaches from fear, thereby facilitating an uninhibited investigation
“without which it would be impossible to approach the world realistically.”82
Plato narrated the anecdote of the philosopher Thales, who fell into a water well
while looking skywards in order to scrutinize the stars. A maidservant from
Thrace laughed at him and remarked that his eagerness to examine the heavens
gave rise to an ignorance of the world at his feet. For van Marle, this expression
of detachment (from the patriarchy engendered in the Western philosophical
tradition) effects a form of refusal that links with birth and renewal in the clear-
ing of a space that beckons an alternative political future.83 Bakhtin’s reading of
the role of laughter in grotesque realism reverberates here:
Laughter degrades and materializes … Degradation here means
coming down to earth, the contact with earth as an element
swallows up and gives birth at the same time. To degrade is to
bury, to sow, and to kill simultaneously, in order to bring forth
something more and better.84
It is the capacity “to bring forth something more and better” that forms my cen-
tral interest in this article. Refusal exposes a limit, in turn preserving the possi-
bility of another thought of relation and ultimately another law. As Drucilla
Cornell tells us repeatedly, the theme of limitation inherently shapes the hope
for a better future, “as this is crucial to the good news that the future, as what is
other to our present social reality, cannot be known in advance and already fore-
closed by some grand theory.”85 Limitation defends the prospect of an increas-
ingly ethical mode of being precisely because it “keeps open the impossibility of
knowing what is impossible,” thereby resisting interpretative closure to a future
that, in the here and now, “cannot be shown to be either illusory or fully
accessible.”86 Similarly, the voice of refusal “is situated at … an in-between
space” and resists any finalizing interpretation; “in other words, there is always
already another place but also another time to come.”87
Elizabeth Costello embraces the hopeful unknown of what can be expected of
each other by invoking refusal as a response to what she considers to be “a crime
of stupefying proportions”88 and reconfiguring the ideal of justice and equality.
Cornell reminds us that this approach is contra the scientific notions of Karl
Marx, who argued in favor of an analytic engagement with the primary
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contradiction and the development of social movements grounded in an expres-
sion of our present(ed) reality rather than our idealistic aspirations for an ethical
future.89 This might be why Coetzee’s character (perhaps ironically) named
Elaine Marx, a member of the English Department at Appleton College, asks
Costello the following question:
Are you not expecting too much of humankind when you ask us
to live without species exploitation, without cruelty? Is it not
more human to accept our own humanity – even if it means
embracing the carnivorous Yahoo within ourselves – than to end
up like Gulliver [from Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels], pining for a
state he can never attain, and for good reason: it is not in his
nature, which is a human nature?90
Costello’s Refusals, the Animal’s Finitude, and Risking Law
Costello questions the authority and limits of Western philosophy’s potential
to inform a non-anthropocentric understanding of our place in the world and des-
perately calls forth (the possibility of) an alternative ethical image of the world.
The discourse remains unfinalized and thoroughly double-voiced, with Costello
engaging other characters through dialogue and the complex double-voicing that
interconnects John’s narratorial voice with the voices of the other characters.
Like the Socrates from the early dialogues, Costello’s focal concern is with living
rather than knowing, and she enacts refusal to elicit voices and ideas (anacrisis)
that are effectively juxtaposed to other voices (syncrisis) in the search for and
testing of truth, often in disputatious dialogical interactions. The multiplicity of
voices, complimentary and contradictory alike, express their ideologies freely in
dialogue with Costello, herself the prime ideologist. Very importantly, it needs to
be noted that Costello and her ideas are also tested throughout. She is a fallible
figure who at times embodies contradictions,91 occasionally fails to engage in a
convincing or even logical manner,92 and invites ridicule.93 She does not always
converse from a position of authority grounded in rational epistemologies, readily
admitting “I don’t know what I think … I often wonder what thinking is, what
understanding is.”94 This can be explained by a reading of Costello as Socratic
midwife and wise fool who facilitates the search for a truth that is dialogical, cor-
relational, relative, and unfixed. To this end, I would like to focus on three
closely interwoven themes of refusal, as enacted by Costello: a refusal of the
rationalist tradition’s use of reason as philosophical mechanism of abstraction
that ground claims to humanist superiority; a refusal of disembodied intellectual-
ization; and a refusal to eat meat.
Costello is profoundly aware of her fellow humans’ capacity to grasp intellec-
tually that animals suffer and remain emotionally and ethically unresponsive to
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this awareness. She returns us, again and again, to “the places of death all
around us, the places of slaughter to which, in a huge communal effort, we close
our hearts,” adding that “as far as [she] can see, our moral being is untouched.”95
Costello locates the root of this passivity in the rationalist tradition’s privileging
use of reason above all other human faculties as a capacity or criterion to justify
subjugation. Costello attempts to destabilize the hierarchical mind/body, thought/
feeling, and man/animal dualities entrenched by the masculinity of this tradition.
She does not, however, attempt to effect a reprioritization or inversion; like
Penelope, Costello is weaving together what Western philosophy has struggled to
engage and untied, insisting on fullness or embodiedness rather than “a con-
sciousness of yourself as a kind of ghostly reasoning machine thinking thoughts
… a pea rattling around in a shell.”96 During her first lecture on “the philoso-
phers and the animals,” she says:
I could ask what Saint Thomas takes to be the being of God, to
which he will reply that the being of God is reason. Likewise
Plato, likewise Descartes, in their different ways. The universe is
built upon reason. God is a God of reason … And the fact that
animals, lacking reason, cannot understand the universe but
have simply to follow its rules blindly, proves that, unlike man,
they are part of it but not part of its being: that man is godlike,
animals thinglike … Even Kant does not pursue, with regard to
animals, the implications of his intuition that reason may be not
the being of the universe but on the contrary merely the being of
the human brain … Both reason and seven decades of life
experience tell me that reason is neither the being of the
universe nor the being of God. On the contrary, reason looks to
me suspiciously like the being of human thought; worse than
that, like the being of one tendency in human thought.97
Following her conclusion that reason pertains to only a specific spectrum of
human thinking, she asks “if this is so, if that is what I believe, then why should
I bow to reason this afternoon and content myself with embroidering on the dis-
course of the old philosophers?”98 For Costello, the rationalist tradition has con-
sistently generalized and subjugated the animal in opposition to an
anthropocentric standard of “thinking.” In response, she puts forward the faculty
of “sympathetic imagination” as a vehicle for grappling with the particularity of
an embodied engagement with another being, especially with an animal.
Knowing the other sympathetically involves a corporeal response to the individ-
ual other being and thus a refusal of generalizing abstractions.99 Costello turns
to Thomas Nagel’s famous essay titled “What is it like to be a bat?”100 in
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explicating her case for the sympathetic imagination. She reads Nagel as espous-
ing an anthropocentrically reductionist appreciation of the nature of conscious-
ness in support of his supposition that a bat is “a fundamentally alien form of
life.”101 Costello insists that “there is no limit to the extent to which we can think
ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds to the sympathetic
imagination.”102
It needs to be noted that the sympathetic imagination here does not involve a
mental projection of feelings, but rather a move towards an imaginative union
that is grounded in shared finitude. Costello explicitly connects her notion of
sympathetic imagination with corporeality or embodiedness, emphasizing that it
involves an experience “not of inhabiting another mind but of inhabiting another
body.”103 Haraway’s notion of “creating a we” and her call for “grappling with,
rather than generalizing from”104 is echoed in Costello’s insistence on a shift
“toward a different kind of being-in-the-world” that involves reflection that “is
not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with him.”105
Costello thus foregrounds a bodily experience of abjection as opposed to imagina-
tive projection, the former involving an expulsion of the subject from linguistic
and societal domains.106
By expounding insights about the sympathetic imagination in opposition to a
certain tendency in the rationalist tradition, the dual problematic of attacking
reason while (inevitably) relying on reason and rejecting philosophical dis-
course107 through the use of philosophical discourse comes to the fore. This prob-
lematic is emphasized and criticized by several voices in the novel, none more
persistent and vehement than Costello’s daughter-in-law, Norma, who holds a
PhD in philosophy. Norma argues “there is no position outside of reason where
you can stand and lecture about reason and pass judgment on reason.”108 Elaine
Marx also raises this concern while addressing Costello:
In your lecture you argued that various criteria – Does this
creature have reason? Does this creature have speech? – have
been used in bad faith to justify distinctions that have no real
basis, between Homo and other primates, for example, and thus
to justify exploitation. Yet the very fact that you can be arguing
against this reasoning, exposing its falsity, means that you put a
certain faith in the power of reason, of true reason as opposed to
false reason.109
Costello’s refusal to “bow to reason” and “embroider on the discourse of the old
philosophers” elicits the counter-voices of Norma and Elaine Marx, the latter’s
words in turn echoing Jeremy Bentham’s famous call for a moral response to ani-
mal suffering. “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but,
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Can they suffer?” argued Bentham.110 It is precisely on the matter of animal suf-
fering that Costello challenges the limits of traditional Western philosophical dis-
course on animals and invites a radical shift in our approach to animal ethics.
The dominant reception of Bentham’s argument in the field of animal ethics
has entailed a consequentialist engagement with the animal’s ability to suffer (and
emanating interest in not being subjected to suffering) as a ground for moral
standing. Costello, rather, would have us consider the suffering of animals in light
of their embodied exposure, emphasizing “to be alive is to be a living soul. An ani-
mal – and we are all animals – is an embodied soul.”111 Costello’s views on animal
suffering are related to Jacques Derrida’s reading of Bentham in his autobiograph-
ical lecture titled The Animal That Therefore I Am.112 Like Costello, Derrida is
never left indifferent to the ongoing suffering of animals, which to him broaches a
complex disruptive dimension to human–animal relations.
Rather than reading Bentham’s question in terms of capacities and faculties,
Derrida raises the more basic question of animals’ finitude and exposure.
Derrida’s thought is guided by what Matthew Calarco terms a “proto-ethical
imperative.”113 For Derrida, capacities do not configure the definitive foundation
to the ethical relation with the animal Other. Rather, the question itself (Can
they suffer?) subsumes the trace of a more fundamental interruptive encounter
with the suffering of the animal Other that calls my being into question and
provokes thought; the question is already a response to a preceding event.114
The idea of this proto-ethical encounter or event is fundamental to Derrida’s
approach to animal ethics and, as we shall see, also Costello’s. Derrida is argu-
ing that recognition of the animal Other’s ability or capacity for suffering holds
less disruptive force than a confrontation with the animal Other’s inability or
incapacity to escape suffering, her “fleshy vulnerability and exposure to
wounding.”115 Derrida’s relocation of the disruptive power inherent to an
encounter with the animal (in her embodied vulnerability) has radical signifi-
cance for the configuration of a positive animal ethics that responds to this
“nonpower at the heart of power”:
How should one take [this inability and vulnerability] into
account? What right should be accorded it? To what extent does
it concern us? Being able to suffer is no longer a power; it is a
possibility without power, a possibility of the impossible.
Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking
the finitude that we share with animals, the mortality that
belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of
compassion, to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this
nonpower, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of this
vulnerability, and the vulnerability of this anguish.116
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Derrida’s argument is that the interruptive force in animal suffering (and our
response-ability) is undeniable and inescapable. The “face” of the animal Other
disrupts us prior to any contemplation on the nature or extent of animal suffer-
ing, “before the undeniability of this response (yes, they suffer, like us who suffer
for them and with them), before this response that precedes all other questions,
both ground and cornerstone of this problematic shift.”117 The question itself
attests to the disruptive capacity of animal suffering and the finitude that
humans share with animals. During her first lecture Costello also emphasizes
our shared finitude and vulnerability as a force that demands reflection by evok-
ing a Holocaust analogy that compares the suffering of animals in modern-day
society to the genocidal killing of Jews in the Nazi death camps:
Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of
degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third
Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise
without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbis, rats, poultry,
livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.118
Costello refuses consequentialist debates that seek to deflect the disruptive force
of our shared embodiedness and exposure:
And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that
Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to
nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is
ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does
not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up
and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the
comfort of our homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it
would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask
the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat
was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.119
The Holocaust analogy once again elicits several strong counter-voices in the
novel. Following Costello’s evocation of the Holocaust during her first lecture,
Abraham Stern, a well-respected elderly Jewish poet and academic at Appleton
College, withdraws in protest from the dinner held in Costello’s honor. He leaves
a handwritten letter addressed to Costello, explaining the reason for his refusal
to “break bread” with her:
At the kernel of your lecture, it seemed to me, was the question of
breaking bread. If we refuse to break bread with the executioners
of Auschwitz, can we continue to break bread with the
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slaughterers of animals? You took over for your own purposes the
familiar comparison between the murdered Jews of Europe and
slaughtered cattle. The Jews died like cattle, therefore cattle die
like Jews, you say. That is a trick with words which I will not
accept. You misunderstand the nature of likenesses; I would even
say you misunderstand willfully, to the point of blasphemy. Man is
made in the likeness of God but God does not have the likeness of
man. If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle
are treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the
dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a cheap way.120
Coetzee’s dramatic structure here effectively facilitates polyphony, attaining syn-
crisis and anacrisis and realizing several Bakhtinian themes related to carnival.
While autonomous voices are heard during Costello’s lecture through John’s narra-
tional consciousness and the question and answer session, the dinner following
Costello’s lecture is dialogical in form and enables the birth of truth through a
Socratic dialectic. Here, as is characteristic of carnivalistic acts, authority and
hierarchy are temporary and susceptible to inversion and give right to “ease and
familiarity, to a certain frankness, to eccentricity, ambivalence; that is, the com-
bination in one discourse of praise and abuse, of the serious and the comic.”121
John alludes to authority and hierarchy when he says that he and Norma had ini-
tially not been invited to the dinner and were only added to the list after it came to
light that Costello had a son at Appleton College. He adds that “they will certainly
be the most junior, the lowliest.”122 The suspension and inversion of this hierarchy
is evident in the imperious presence of Norma’s counter-voice at the table and the
pervasiveness of her combative opposition to Costello’s vegetarianism.
The carnivalesque is also realized at the level of ingestion. Bakhtin empha-
sizes that eating and drinking are central to carnival; “the body transgresses
here its own limits: it swallows, devours, rends the world apart, is enriched and
grows at the world’s expense.”123 Man’s experience here is one of conquest,
“man’s encounter with the world in the act of eating is joyful, triumphant; he tri-
umphs over the world, devours it without being devoured himself.”124
Interestingly, the etymology of the word “carnival” is “to remove meat” and meat
was excluded from the menu on account of Costello’s vegetarianism.125 John reit-
erates the significance of this when he states that he looks forward, with grim
interest, “to seeing how the college will cope with the challenge of the menu.”126
John also anticipates confrontational dialogical interactions on this issue, dreading
that someone will ask Costello what led her to become vegetarian “and that she
will then get on her high horse and produce what he and Norma call The Plutarch
Response.”127 His use of the high horse metaphor once again alludes to hierarchy
and the impermanent relativity thereof. While Costello is never confronted with
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the dreaded question, the anticipated answer is “imperfectly reproduced” in John’s
narratorial consciousness and thereby included in the dialogical interaction:
You ask me why I refuse to eat flesh. I, for my part, am
astonished that you can put in your mouth the corpse of a dead
animal, astonished that you do not find it nasty to chew hacked
flesh and swallow the juices of death-wounds.128
Costello’s alternative account of being as reflected in her refusal to eat meat
holds great symbolic significance. There is clear questioning and suspension of
the hierarchical precedence that facilitates and legitimates man’s consumption of
animals and, typical of the carnivalesque scene, we find “temporary liberation
from the prevailing truth and from the established order”129 on a very deep level.
A sense of hostility towards a certain immortalized and completed interpretation
of man (as conquering eater of flesh) can be felt, imbuing a sense of becoming,
modulation, and renewal. Costello’s response when prompted by a member of the
university administration to elaborate on the motivation behind her vegetarian-
ism is equally significant. She insists that her vegetarianism “comes from a
desire to save [her] soul,” rather than moral conviction.130 Here the Socratic idea
of salvation through critical self-reflection is brought to mind131 and the leitmotif
of our shared embodiedness and mortality is recalled. More importantly, it is
Costello’s exclusive position that provokes and facilitates the dialogue, as is typ-
ical of Socratic dialogism.132 By not giving voice to the standard arguments of
the animal rights movement, Costello represents a marginal figure and her dis-
course is figured as the pleadings of a woman on the threshold. As Julia Kristeva
explains, this fulfills an important function in Socratic dialogism, as “the exclu-
sive situation liberates the word from any univocal objectivity, from any repre-
sentative function, opening it up to the symbolic sphere.”133 Costello is not
expounding any “ready-made truth,” principle, or rule, but rather engaging in
constructive carnivalesque dialogical discourse to question and test people and
their ideas. Costello’s dialogue inherently resists finalizing authority precisely
because it also engages in dialogue with itself, “writing reads another writing,
reads itself and constructs itself through a process of destructive genesis.”134
In continuing to consider the relevance of the insights and subversive force
that literature brings to law’s finalizing authority, I briefly turn, in conclusion, to
van Marle’s notion of a “risking law.” I am interested in the capacity of literature,
specifically the voice of refusal, to ultimately gesture another ethics and another
law, and I ask, along with van Marle, what kind of law will this be?135 In consider-
ing the kinds of approaches and type of law to which refusal might lead us, van
Marle reflects on refusal’s precarious relation to risk and tentatively suggests the
idea of a “risking law” in relation to which the notion of risk lies central in several
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regards. On a very broad or general level, it could refer to the mere possibility of
taking the risk of utilizing law to achieve a certain aim. More significantly, it
denotes a legal approach “that goes beyond the certainty of predictable approaches
and that is candid about the risks involved when engaging law.”136
I read and regard a risking law as a decentered and humbled law; challenged
in its ignorant complacency grounded in self-perpetuating force that claims object-
ive authority, and realistically approached as a method with both advantageous
and pernicious consequences. A risking law, finally, is not fixed or closed off, but
dwells in a space “between past and future.”137 It is never completed, but rather
in a constant state of reform(ulation), engaging a world of ambiguity and instabil-
ity. We see why the voice of refusal is neither defeatist nor passive, but beckons
alternatives in holding open the possibility of writing an increasingly ethical world.
Neither its relevance nor its success can be known in advance; it is, however, cer-
tain that the question of animal liberation is situated at the limits of law and phil-
osophy and that the tools with which we can address this question are not located
solely inside those traditions. It is within the type of critical space opened up by
refusal that an alternative thought and approach might develop.
CONCLUSION
As the title of this article suggests, my intention here was not to provide any solu-
tions or conclusions, but rather to introduce the law and literature interplay from
a specific vantage point that, I hope, might motion an alternative approach to law
and the question of the animal. The reconfiguration of a risking law inevitably
introduces several unexamined questions regarding law’s limits and representa-
tion of being(s); its capacity for reflexivity and perception of ambiguity and rigid-
ity. Apart from attempting to illustrate the implications of a Bakhtinian approach
to the law and literature interaction, I hope to motivate scholars in the field of
animal ethics to think more critically about the direction that the increasingly glo-
rifying discourse of animal rights has taken and challenge the view of legal reform
as the be-all and end-all of animal liberation. This article should thus essentially
be read as both a reflection on refusal and an act of refusal in itself.
The ethics of the novel proceed from a relational structure where identity is
in flux and neither the self nor the other is solely human, allowing us to employ
literature as a vehicle to ethically “write” the animal and “read” her response
that is silenced by the law. The dearth of scholarship that engages with this
alternative avenue in order to effect change is itself a symptom of the way in
which law exercises power and disqualifies other discourses. It is, ironically, pre-
cisely for this reason that animal ethicists should continue their engagement
with law. Being cognizant of the congruence between law and anthropocentric
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culture, I however urge that the engagement with law and especially a resort to
law should be tentative, reflective, and cautious.
Bakhtin would have us consider literature’s generic force in relation to law. I
hope to have demonstrated that the structure and style of The Lives of Animals
place various views and discourses in juxtaposition in order to unsettle and cre-
ate insight into complacent authorities. Costello’s refusal of philosophically and
legally solidified premises sets the violence of these discourses and practices
against their material effects, thereby illustrating Bakhtin’s insights into the lit-
erary tradition’s capacity to carry out a mode of justice. Coetzee’s novella does
not collapse prescription into description by advancing assertions that thematize
and speak directly about a certain formulated justice. Rather, the novel stimu-
lates reaction to(wards) a positive practice of justice. To reiterate, the discourse
of justice in literary works is located in its manner rather than its matter.138
Approached from this vantage point, literature provides new resources with
which we can grasp the relation of law and literature and engage with the ques-
tion of animality. Perhaps more importantly, it resists any form of closure to the
possibility of bringing forth something more and better.
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To manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and beyond the 
manifested and purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a mode 
irreducible to manifestation, the very straight-forwardness of the face to 
face, without the intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity, that is, in 
one’s destitution and hunger.1
As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze 
called “animal” offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the 
inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the bordercrossing 
from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby 
calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself. And in 
these moments of nakedness, as regards the animal, everything can 
happen to me, I am like a child ready for the apocalypse, I	am	(following)	
the	apocalypse	itself, that is to say, the ultimate and first event of the end, 
the unveiling and the verdict.2 
What does it mean to be caught (naked) under the gaze of an animal? How 
can an animal look you in the face? What limits must I cross in order to stand 
in the truth of (my) being in front of an animal? In his remarkably rich and 
insightful autobiographical text The	 Animal	 That	 Therefore	 I	 Am,3 Jacques 
Derrida recalls the unease and shame that he experienced when, following 
a morning shower, he unexpectedly discovered that he was being looked 
at naked by his companion cat who entered the bathroom to ask for her 
1 Emmanuel Levinas Totality	and	Infinity:	An	Essay	on	Exteriority (trans Lingis A) (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: The Hague, 1979) 200.
2 Jacques Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am (trans Wills D, ed Mallet M) (Fordham University 
Press: New York, 2008) 12.
3 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am.
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breakfast. Derrida is not focused on his personal awareness of the cat, but 
rather on the experience of “finding [himself] naked, [his] sex exposed, stark 
naked before a cat that looks at [him] without moving”.4 This seemingly banal 
encounter has profound philosophical significance for Derrida, given Western 
philosophy’s refusal to acknowledge the address of the animal gaze and how 
this negation, which “could not be the figure of just one disavowal among 
others”, fundamentally “institutes what is proper to man, the relation to itself 
of a humanity that is above all anxious about, and jealous of, what is proper 
to it”.5 Not surprisingly, then, this encounter leads Derrida to reflect on his 
own certitudes and what he considers to be the leading question of his body 
of work: Who	am	I	(following)?6 It becomes increasingly clear that Derrida is 
not raising the question with the intention of concretizing an answer. He is 
here more interested in determining the sense of this question, which opens 
onto his much broader concern with ontology and an exploration of the 
strong connection between our thinking concerning animals and our self-
understanding.7 
Derrida is somewhat perplexed by a lingering embarrassment. This 
“impropriety of a certain animal nude before the other animal … [that] 
one might call … a kind of animalséance: the single, incomparable and 
original experience of the impropriety that would come from appearing 
4 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 4.
5 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 14.
6 Derrida The	 Animal	 That	 Therefore	 I	 Am 3-4. In formalizing philosophical responsibility as 
inescapably concerning the responsibility (and thus question) of someone, Derrida previously 
argued “I would say that for me the great question is always the question who. Call it biographical, 
autobiographical or existential, the form of the question who is what matters to me, be it in, say, 
its Kierkegaardian, Nietzschean, or Heideggerian form. Who?	Who	asks	the	question	who?	Where?	
How?	When?	Who	arrives? It is always the most difficult question, the irreducibility of who to 
what, or the place where between who and what the limit trembles, in some way. It is clear that 
the who withdraws from or provokes the displacement of the categories in which biography, 
autobiography, and memoirs are thought. Abyssal question of the signature, but also signature 
of the question, the pledge pledged in the question”. Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris A 
Taste	for	the	Secret (trans Donis G, ed Donis G and Webb D) (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2001) 41-2.
7 David Wood “Thinking with Cats” in Atterton P and Calarco M (eds) Animal	Philosophy:	Essential	
Readings	in	Continental	Thought (Continuum: London, 2004) 129-44, 129.
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in truth naked, in front of the insistent gaze of the animal, a benevolent or 
pitiless gaze, surprised or cognizant” not only invokes a reflex of shame, 
but also a certain shame for being ashamed.8 It is the complexity of this 
shame, which Derrida finely traces back to a time before the Biblical fall,9 
and the alterity of the cat that evokes his reflections on (the nature of) 
animal difference(s). Being all too aware of the peril of neutralization and 
erasure, Derrida’s central concern is with multiplying the difference(s) in 
order to mark or avow the “unsubstitutable singularity” of his companion 
animal as “an existence that refuses to be conceptualized”.10 Derrida is at pains 
to underscore that this encounter involves a real (rather than metaphorical or 
figurative) cat who, even before its identification as a cat, “comes to [him] as 
this irreplaceable living being that … can encounter [him], see [him], even see 
[him] naked”.11 This is not a primal scene of Man meeting Animal. On the 
contrary, it is precisely the Man/Animal binary opposition that has served to 
neutralize and erase the multitudes of differences that ground the possibility 
of the intersecting gaze that allows me to recognize the absolute alterity of 
my neighbor. The encounter that Derrida speaks of here is one of mutual 
recognition, embodied proximity, responsiveness, and responsibility that 
subsist in a dimension of radical singularity and irreducibility. It is a “naked” 
encounter with an Other before or outside concepts and proper names that 
designate and denote them. It is a face-to-face encounter.
Moving beyond the reductive thinking, conceptual hegemony, and actual 
violence engendered by the general singular category “Animal” towards an ethics 
of (multitudes of) difference(s) is imperative to the possibility of a face-to-face 
encounter with the Other. In this dissertation I sought to delineate a problematic 
counter-movement at the core of dominant models of animal rights that 
paradoxically defines animals in relation to humans and forecloses the possibility 
8 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 4.
9 See especially Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 3-23.
10 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 9.
11 Derrida The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am 9.
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of recognizing and embracing the animal as (unsubstitutable, singular) Other. 
To this end I identified the metaphysics of subjectivity, specifically the way in 
which it solidifies and binds these theories to the very humanism they seek 
to displace, as the focus and critical point of departure for this project. The 
metaphysics of subjectivity is inextricably part of the history of the oppositional 
Human/Animal binary that has functioned to subsume and effect an erasure 
of the multitudes of differences on both sides of the divide and facilitate our 
subjugating position of mastery over animals. Drawing on philosophical 
resources, I have sought to foreground the importance of thinking difference 
differently, outside of- and beyond oppositional binaries. Inasmuch as the 
subordinating structure embedded in the Human/Animal oppositional limit 
bequeathed by the metaphysico-dialectic tradition continues to operate in 
the dominant models of animal rights theory and forecloses the possibility 
of openness to difference, I have situated my critical project at the borders 
of the Human/Animal opposition and specifically illustrated its constitutive 
functioning in relation to the construct of subjectivity. This inquiry grounds my 
thesis that there is essential congruence between (the subject-centered model 
of) law and animal subjugation and my sustained problematization of law as 
channel for animal liberation. 
As explained in chapter 2, deconstruction aims to protect the ethical 
relation from being collapsed into symmetry and the Other from being denied 
her otherness. The ethical impulse implicit in deconstruction is excavated by 
Drucilla Cornell in her (re)conceptualization of the philosophy of the limit, 
allowing us to better understand its insistence on maintaining a divide between 
the system of rules that is and the future that ought, and situating the structure 
of subjectivity in relation to the difference between law and justice. Following 
Derrida, I illustrated that the human is constituted as subject through a carno-
phallogocentric schema of sacrifice and, in turn, I sought to demonstrate the 
deconstructive potential of veganism as a mode of being that exposes and 
resists the sacrificial anthropocentric character of this configuration.
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In chapter 3 I introduced another thesis on the juridical register of animality by 
illustrating how a strategic support for welfare-based law reforms that condone 
the sacrificial property status of animals fundamentally counters the ideological 
foundations of the rights-based position, and I urged that the two paradigms be 
conceptually and strategically separated in order to preserve the possibility of 
recalibrating the animal’s sacrificial status. Whilst the existence of an ideological 
purlieu separating welfare theory and rights theory is by no means a novel 
insight, I hope to have illustrated its profound significance for a positive political 
project and that a sustained engagement with the conceptual inconsistencies 
between the two models is vital to safeguarding a projected future of animal 
liberation from being deflected, and ultimately foreclosed, in the continuation 
of the present. A critical approach of slowness, which effects a de-privileging 
of the present, is apposite precisely because it allows us to acknowledge and 
reflect on the complexity of the question of the animal in law as being situated 
in the past, present and future, and to consider that a utilization of law may 
unintentionally solidify discourses, practices and modes of social regulation that 
are fundamentally anthropocentric and thereby produce more harm than good. 
I employed a semiotic approach to offer a problematization of rights 
in chapter 4. My critical angle of engagement involved the philosophical 
conditions of existence of modern rights that inherently render them limitless 
and allows for the extension of rights to animals. By specifically focusing on 
the similarity principle, which is deeply rooted in a logic of binary opposition, 
I sought to illustrate how the animal rights model defines animals by virtue 
of their relative proximity to humans and thereby forecloses the possibility 
of embracing their singularity and otherness. The fundamental problematic 
here concerns the oppositional thinking that effaces differences and reverts 
to the homogenous. By thinking animal Being in light of shared substantive 
properties, animals are not recognized as phenomenologically symmetrical 
to humans. The animal is conceptualized as the Other to man and thus, 
ultimately, not genuinely other at all. 
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Chapter 5 aimed to position the anthropocentric ontology of similarity 
underlying rights theory in relation to a more foundational problematic that 
continues to situate the human as ground of intelligibility and relational 
center of all that exists. I turned my attention to uncovering the metaphysics 
of subjectivity as having effected a progressive subjectivization of human-
Being (in opposition to animal-Being). This focus on man’s becoming-
subject allowed me to isolate anthropocentrism as a guiding thread of the 
metaphysical tradition and foreground its implications for discourses and 
institutions that employ the construct of subjectivity in service of animal 
liberation. The operational force of what I termed the anthropomorphic 
hegemony of subjectivity renders any evocation of the subject a (paradoxical) 
deepening or solidification of the very interpretation of man that lies at the 
core of animal subjugation. As such, I argued that a meaningful turn towards 
animal liberation requires a rigorous and sustained deconstruction of the 
underlying metaphysical support of rights in order to preserve the possibility 
of rethinking human-animal relationality from a non-anthropocentric, post-
metaphysical space.
In chapter 6 I critically engaged with a landmark ruling by the highest 
court in South Africa in order to illustrate the profound hold that metaphysical 
anthropocentrism has over Western culture and the emanating difficulties 
accompanying efforts aimed at the recalibration of the animal’s legal status as 
an object, even when animals are recognized as sentient beings with intrinsic 
worth. The ruling presented me with an opportunity to comprehend and 
articulate law’s deep resistance to the concerns of animals against my thesis on 
the object status of the animal as a constitutive function of (the subject-centered 
model of) law, thus deepening my problematization of a pragmatic utilization 
of law as instrument of immediate resolution. The court’s vacillation between 
two contrasting ideologies that respectively regard animals as utility objects 
and individuals with intrinsic worth relates to the anthropocentric limits 
inherent in legal discourse and institutions, or the animal as other to a subject-
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centered system of law. At issue, as previously illustrated, is the way in which 
discourse on the subject continues to associate subjectivity with the human, 
even when it acknowledges that animals possess subjective consciousness, are 
capable of experiencing pain, and form an integral part of a rich social fabric. 
The question of the animal as subject of law thus re-introduces precisely what 
is put in question, and whilst this consequence might strategically be worth 
risking in certain circumstances, I regard it as crucial that we are forthright 
in acknowledging these types of risks when engaging law. As such, my 
discussion here prefigured my reflections on the notion of a risking law in the 
following chapter. 
In my final chapter I reflected on the capacity of literature to problematize 
the authority of traditional philosophical and legal discourses and circumvent 
some of the theoretical and ethical constraints that I have foregrounded in the 
preceding chapters. Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s critical insights into the 
comprehensive critique of authority performed by the style and form of the 
polyphonic novel, I analyzed the stylistic and structural characteristics of J.M. 
Coetzee’s novella The Lives of Animals in order to present a reading of this text 
as a very important counterpoise to not only the anthropocentrism embedded 
in law, but indeed law as a regulating authority of the social order. Insofar as 
the experience of the polyphonic novel, as aesthetic activity, can furthermore 
facilitate a “writing” of the animal and a “reading” of her response that is 
silenced by the law, my sense is that literature holds great liberatory potential 
for the animal. Whilst I interpret the dearth of scholarship exploring this 
alternative as a symptom of law’s ever growing hegemony, it is precisely 
for this reason that I feel strongly that literature has a vital role to play in 
animal studies. Literature not only destabilizes the dominant binary mode 
of exclusively engaging (with) law to either resist legal changes that pose 
detriment to animals or utilizing law to promote the interests of animals, but 
also effects a de-centering of law that can radically alter our understanding 
of- and approach to law itself. It is in this sense that I consider the subversive 
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potential of literature as potentially gesturing what Karin van Marle terms a 
risking law that is humbled through the exposure of its conservation of both 
conceptual and actual violence, and realistically engaged as a strategy that not 
only inherently poses risk, but could potentially generate disastrous effects.  
I hope to have persuasively illustrated that the question of the animal 
is an exceedingly nuanced one that necessitates a response more rigorous 
than the extension of any right(s) can effectuate. At the center of this complex 
problematic lies the construct of man as subject that has facilitated unbridled 
power for some and unimaginable violence for others.12 I have been arguing 
that, in order for thought to progress otherwise in regard to animals, these 
very concepts of man, subject, and thus also animal, have to be subjected 
to sustained deconstruction. The fundamental issue at stake concerns the 
(im)possibility of a non-violative and non-relational alterity that is not 
assimilated into an economy of the same. Resistance to the collapse of difference 
into the register of the calculable and exchangeable is vital to preserving the 
possibility of “the singular coming of the Other”, or what Derrida also calls 
an event.13 This challenge to responsibly think the alterity of the living relates 
to a thought exposed and responsive to the very un-conditionality and non-
calculability that exceeds the order of the subject. My intention, then, was to 
think the conditions of possibility towards the event of what we so confusedly 
call the animal.
12 I recall here Theodor Adorno’s critique of the concept of Western subjectivity as complicit in 
the tragic events of twentieth-century history, arguing “it is not wrong to raise the less cultural 
question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living – especially whether one who escaped by 
accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls 
for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have 
been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared”. Theodor Adorno Negative	
Dialectics (trans Ashton E) (Continuum: New York, 1973) 362-63.
13 See inter alia Jacques Derrida Rogues:	Two	Essays	on	Reason (trans Brault P and Naas M) (Stanford 




The Anthropomorphic Hegemony of Subjectivity:
Critical Reflections on Law and the Question of the Animal
This project contemplates an ethics of difference and singularity that can 
effectuate a displacement of anthropocentrism and radical transformation in 
the way we understand and approach relationality across species borders. 
My reflections take place against the background of the problematic 
accompanying the (re)presentation of animals in the subject-centered models 
of moral philosophy and law, and I call into question the salient ways in 
which theorists have engaged these avenues in order to effect change in our 
treatment of animals. Animal liberation scholars and activists have mainly 
sought to address the plight of animals from the theoretical frameworks of 
legal rights, interest-based equality, and identity discourse that foreground 
the ways in which animals are essentially similar to human beings in terms 
of ethically relevant qualities or characteristics. My project critically reflects 
on Emmanuel Levinas’s formulation of the ethical in order to advance an 
alternative understanding of human-animal relations as grounded in the 
radical singularity or difference of individual beings.
Following Jacques Derrida and Drucilla Cornell, I deconstruct the 
dominant animal rights models by uncovering anthropocentrism as a guiding 
thread of the Western metaphysical tradition and illustrating how the construct 
of subjectivity born from that tradition forecloses or limits certain ethical 
possibilities. I situate the functioning of the human/animal oppositional limit 
in relation to man’s becoming-subject and argue that attempts at assimilating 
animals to the model of (legal) subjectivity paradoxically solidify precisely 
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the interpretation of man that is being called in question. In line with much 
of the scholarship written in the post-humanist tradition, I thus also take the 
metaphysics of subjectivity as the critical point of departure of my project. I aim 
to illustrate specifically the	anthropomorphic	hegemony	of	subjectivity – by which 
term I wish to designate the tacit anthropocentric contours of the construct 
of subjectivity that guide a determination of animal Being and ethical worth 
against a standard of humanness – and its implications for discourses and 
institutions that evoke this construct.
My focus ultimately concerns an examination of law’s relation to animal 
subjugation, both as facilitator of animal sacrifice and potential enabler of animal 
liberation, against the operative force of the anthropocentrism embedded in 
law’s fabric. I determine that law fundamentally grounds and maintains the 
subordinate status of animals and illustrate essential congruence between law 
and what might be called an anthropocentric culture. I accordingly propose 
that the critical focus of animal ethicists should be on law and legal discourse 
as signifier of anthropocentric power in preference to legal reform as such, and 
I call for an ongoing engagement with the underlying metaphysical support 
of animal rights at a conceptual level rather than a pragmatic utilization 
of the law as instrument of immediate resolution. This study concludes by 
offering reflections on ways in which literature might begin to open up new 
potentialities and risks for thought in relation to the question of the animal 
(in law). I explore the capacity of literature to problematize the authority 
of traditional philosophical and legal discourses and circumvent some of 
the theoretical and ethical constraints that they pose. By disrupting or de-
centering the construct(s) of law, my primary aim is to open a critical space 





De Anthropomorfische Hegemonie van Subjectiviteit:
Kritische Reflecties op Recht en de Kwestie van het Dier
Dit project denkt een ethiek van verschil en singulariteit die een verplaatsing van 
anthropocentrisme kan bewerkstelligen, en radicale verandering in de manier 
waarop we relationaliteit over de grenzen van de soorten heen begrijpen en 
benaderen. Mijn beschouwingen vinden plaats tegen de achtergrond van de 
problematiek van het (re)presenteren van dieren in de modellen van morele 
filosofie en recht die gecentreerd zijn rond het subject, en ik stel de gangbare 
manieren ter discussie waarop theoretici deze modellen hebben gebruikt om 
verandering tot stand te brengen in de manier waarop we dieren behandelen. 
Wetenschappers en activisten die zich bezighouden met de bevrijding van dieren 
hebben vooral geprobeerd om de slechte toestand van dieren te benaderen 
vanuit de theoretische kaders van juridische rechten, een op belangen gebaseerde 
gelijkheid en een discours van identiteit, kaders die de manieren waarop dieren 
in essentie lijken op mensen waar het gaat om ethisch relevante kwaliteiten of 
kenmerken op de voorgrond zetten. Door een kritische reflectie op Emmanuel 
Levinas' formulering van het ethische breng ik een alternatief begrip van mens-
dierrelaties naar voren dat is gebaseerd op de radicale singulariteit of het verschil 
van individuele wezens.
In navolging van Jacques Derrida en Drucilla Cornell deconstrueer 
ik de dominante modellen van dierenrechten, door bloot te leggen hoe 
anthropocentrisme een rode draad is in de westerse metafysische traditie, 
en door te laten zien hoe de constructie van subjectiviteit die is geboren uit 
die traditie bepaalde ethische mogelijkheden afsluit of beperkt. Ik situeer het 
functioneren van de mens/diertegenstelling in relatie tot het subject-worden 
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van de mens, en ik betoog dat pogingen om dieren te assimileren tot het model 
van (juridische) subjectiviteit het mensbeeld dat ter discussie gesteld wordt 
paradoxaal genoeg juist consolideren. In lijn met veel wetenschappelijke werken 
in de posthumanistische traditie neem ook ik de metafysica van de subjectiviteit 
dus als kritisch vertrekpunt van mijn project. Ik probeer specifiek om de 
anthropomorfische hegemonie van subjectiviteit te illustreren - met deze term 
bedoel ik de stilzwijgende anthropocentrische contouren van de constructie van 
subjectiviteit die bij het bepalen van het Zijn en de ethische waarde van dieren 
menselijkheid als maatstaf nemen - en de implicaties voor discoursen en instituties 
die deze constructie tevoorschijn roepen.
Mijn uiteindelijke focus is een onderzoek naar de relatie van het recht tot de 
onderwerping van dieren, niet alleen als iets dat het offeren van dieren faciliteert, 
maar ook als iets dat de bevrijding van dieren mogelijk zou kunnen maken, tegen 
de werkzame kracht van het anthropocentrisme dat is ingebed in de vezels van het 
recht. Ik stel vast dat het recht de ondergeschikte status van dieren fundeert en in 
stand houdt, en ik illustreer een essentiële overeenstemming tussen het recht en 
wat een anthropocentrische cultuur zou kunnen worden genoemd. Daarom stel 
ik voor dat de kritische focus van dierenethici zou moeten liggen op het recht en 
op het juridische discours als symptoom van anthropocentrische macht, in plaats 
van op het hervormen van het recht. Ook pleit ik voor voortdurende aandacht 
voor de onderliggende metafysische steun voor dierenrechten op conceptueel 
niveau, in plaats van een pragmatisch gebruik van het recht als instrument 
voor onmiddelijke oplossingen. Deze studie besluit met enkele gedachten over 
manieren waarop literatuur nieuwe mogelijkheden en risico's voor het denken 
zou kunnen openen in relatie tot de vraag van het dier (in het recht). Ik onderzoek 
het vermogen van literatuur om de autoriteit van traditionele filosofische en 
juridische discoursen te problematiseren, en om sommige van de theoretische en 
ethische beperkingen die deze discoursen stellen te omzeilen. Mijn primaire doel 
is om, door de constructie(s) van het recht te ontwrichten of van hun centrale plek 
te halen, een kritische ruimte te openen waarin een alternatief denken van relatie 
zich zou kunnen ontwikkelen.
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